it lias not the cause of existence in itself, that it is not eternal, and therefore we are necessitated to assume the existence of a great First Cause to whose efficiency the existence of the universe is to be referred.
B. The World is an Effect.
1. The first argument to prove that the world as a whole is not self-existent and eternal, is, that all its parts, everything that enters into its composition, is dependent and mutable. A whole cannot be essentially different from its constituent parts. An infinite number of effects cannot be self-existent. If a chain of three links cannot support itself, much less can a chain of a million of links. Nothing multiplied by infinity is nothing still. If we do not find the cause of our existence in ourselves, nor our parents in themselves, nor their progenitors in themselves, going back ad in- finitum is only adding nothing to nothing. What the mind de- mands is a sufficient cause, and no approach to it is made by going back indefinitely from one effect to another. We are forced, there- fore, by the laws of our rational nature, to assume the existence of a self-existent cause, i. e., a Being endued with power adequate to produce this ever-changing phenomenal world. In all ages think- ing men have been forced to this conclusion. Plato and Aristotle argued from the existence of motion, that there must be an aeLKivrj- Tov lavTo KLvovv, ttn etcmal self-moving power ^ or primum movens, as it was called by the Schoolmen. The validity of this argument is acknowledged by almost all classes of philosophers, at least so far as to admit that we are forced to assume the existence of an eter- nal and necessary Being. The theistical argument is, that if every- thing in the world be contingent, this eternal and necessary Being must be an extramundane First Cause.
Historical Argument.
2. The second argument is the historical one. That is, we have historical evidence that the race of man, for example, has existed only a few thousand years. Tliat mankind has existed from eter- nity is absolutely incredible. Even if we adopt the development tlieory, it affords no relief. . It only substitutes millions for thou- sands of years. Both are equally insignificant when compared to eternity. Darwin's germ-cell as necessarily demands a self-existing cause out of itself, as a fully developed man, or the whole race of man, or the universe itself. We are shut up to the conclusion that the universe sprang out of nothing, or that there is a self-existing, eternal, exti'amundane Beincr.
212 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. U. - Theism.
Geological Argument. 3. The geological argument is to the same effect. Geologists as a class agree as to the following facts : (1.) That the extant gonera of plants and animals inhabiting our earth, began to be within a comparatively short period in the history of our globe. (2.) That neither experience nor science, neither fact nor reason, justify the assumption of spontaneous generation. That is, there is no evi- dence that any living organism is ever produced by mere physical causes. Every such organism is either immediately created, or is derived from some other organism having life, already existing. (3.) Genera and species are permanent. One never passes into another. A fish never becomes a bird, nor a bird a quadruped. Modern theorists have indeed questioned these facts ; but they still are admitted by the great body of scientific men, and the evidence in their favour is overwhelming to the ordinary mind. If these prin- ciples be conceded, it follows that all the extant plants and animals on the earth began to be. And if they began to be, they were created, and therefore there must be a Creator. These considera- tions are merely collateral. The main argument is the one first mentioned, namely, the absolute impossibility of conceiving either of an infinite succession of contingent events, or of the origin of the universe out of nothing.
C. Objections. Hume's Doctrine. There are only two objections to this cosmological argument which need be noticed. The one is directed to the principle on which it is founded, and the other to the conclusion drawn from it. Hume begins his " Treatise on Human Nature," by laying down the principle that the perceptions of the human mind resolve them- selves into impressions and ideas. By impressions he means " all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first ap- pearance in the soul." By ideas is meant " the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning." ^ There can, therefore, be no idea which is not derived from some previous impression. This is the fundamental principle of his whole system. From this it fol- lows that all our knowledge is founded on experience. We have certain impressions made by external things, and certain passions and emotions ; these are the only sources of our ideas, and there- fore of our knowledge. When ^ he comes to apply this principle
1 Treatise of Htimnn Nattire, Part i. § 1; Woi-ks, vol. i. Edinburgh, 1826. a In Part iii. § 14.