A Brighter Day Begins with His Word.

Hodge, Charles, 1797–1878 • SECTION 147

§ 4, B.] THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. 229

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he says that the concatenation of cause and effect is confined to the external world, and therefore that it is illogical to apply the princi- ple of causation to account for the existence of the external world itself. He further objects that the evidences of design in nature would prove only a demiurgus, or world-builder, and not an extra- mundane God. It is further urged against the sufficiency of the teleological argument, that even if it proved the author of the world to be distinct from it, it would not prove him to be infinite, because the world is finite, and we cannot infer an infinite cause from a finite effect.

Ansiver to the Objections.

In answer to these objections it may be remarked that what the argument from design is intended to prove, and what it does prove, is, (1.) That the Author of the universe is an intelligent and vol- untary agent. (2.) That He is extramundane and not merely the life, or soul of the woi-ld, for the design is shown not simply or chiefly by the moulding of organized bodies by a principle acting from within outward ; but by the adaptation of things external to such organisms, to their various necessities ; and by the disposition and orderly arrangement of immense bodies of matter, separated oy millions, or even billions of miles. (3.) The immensity of the universe through the whole of which design is manifest, proves that its cause must be adequate to the production of such an effect ; and if the effect be, as it is to us, incomprehensibly great, the cause must be so also. And incomprehensibly great and infinitely great, are practically equivalent. But besides, the cosmological argument proves that God is not only maker, but creator. And creation im- plies the possession of infinite power. Not only because the dif- ference between existence and non-existence is infinite, but because in Scripture creation is always represented as the peculiar work of the infinite God. So far as we know all creature power is limited to self-action, or to the more or less limited control of what already exists.

What has already been said may be a sufficient answer to the ob- jection that while design does indeed prove intelligence, yet that in- telligence may be in matter itself, or in nature (a vis insita), as in the soul of the world. These points, as they are generally presented, cjoncern more properly the relation of God to the world, than his existence. They involve the admission of the existence of an in- telligence somewhere, adequate to account for all the phenomena of the universe. They involve consequently the denial that these

230 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. H. — Theism.

phenomena are to be referred either to chance, or the action of mere physical laws. Where that intelligence is placed, is not the questioti. Wherever placed it must be. a person ; and not merely an unintelligent force acting according to necessary law. For the evidence of voluntary action and of benevolence is as clear as that of intelligence. And the considerations already urged prove that this voluntary, intelligent Being must be extramundane ; a conclu- sion which is rendered still more evident from our relation to Him as responsible and dependent.

C. 3Iiscellaneous Ohjectio7is.

1. It is objected that both in the vegetable and animal kingdoms there are malformations, abnormal productions, which are incon- sistent with the idea of the control of an infinite intelligence. This is at best merely an argument from our ignorance. Admitting that there are in nature some things which we cannot account foi", this does not invalidate the argument drawn from the innumerable cases of benevolent design. If Mr. Babbage's calculating machine should once in many million of times present the wrong number, this would not prove that there was no intelligence manifested in its construction. It is not necessary even to assume that such apparently irregular action is to be referred to the imperfection of the machine. For what we know, its maker may have a reason for such action, which we cannot discover. In every extended piece of music, discords here and there occur, which pain the ear, and which those unskilled in music cannot account for, but which the competently instructed perceive are taken up and resolved into a higher harmony. If a prince should give us a chest containing millions in coin and jewels, we should not question his kind inten- tion, even should we find among them a spurious dime for whose presence we could not account. It would be insane to reject the Bible with all its sublime and saving truths, because there may be in it a few passages which we cannot uliderstand, and which in themselves seem inconsistent with the perfection of its author. No man refuses to believe in the sun and to rejoice in its light because there are dark spots on its surface for which he cannot account. Ignorance is a very healthful condition of our present state of being.

Useless Organs.

2. A second objection of much the same kind is founded on the fact that we find members in organized bodies for which they have no use. For example, men have mammas ; the whale has teeth

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