know nothing. It is, moreover, included in this knowledge of the Self, that the body is not the Ego. Although the body is inti- mately, and even vitally united to the substance in which our per- sonality resides, it is nevertheless objective to it. It is the organ which the Self uses, and by which it holds communion with the external world. That these are really facts of consciousness, and not merely dicta, or arbitrary assumptions, is clear because they are universally and of necessity recognized. They are imbedded in all human languages ; they are involved in all expressions of human thought ; they are of necessity assumed by those who the- oretically deny them. The Materialist cannot think, or speak, or write, without assuming the existence of mind as distinct from mat- ter, any more than the Idealist can live and act without assuming the existence of the external world.
Our knowledge of mind, therefore, as a thinking substance, is the first, and most certain, and the most indestructible of all forms of knowledge ; because it is involved in self-knowledge, or self-con- sciousness, which is the indispensable condition of all knowledge. That which knows is, in the order of nature, before that which is known. It is impossible, therefore, that the Materialist can have any higher evidence of the existence of matter, or of force, than that which every man has, in his own consciousness, of the exist- ence of mind. To deny the one is as unreasonable as to deny the other. Neither can be denied, except theoretically. As a matter of fact, every man believes in matter, and every man believes in mind. What are our sensations which are relied upon so confi- dently to give us knowledge "of physical phenomena, but states of consciousness ? If consciousness is to be trusted in reporting the testimony of the senses, why is it not to be trusted when it reports the facts of our interior life ? If it is believed when it says there is something visible and tangible without us, why should it not be believed when it says there is something which thinks and wills within us? If unreliable in the one case, it is unreliable in the other ; and if unreliable in either, the whole foundation of knowl- edge and of all faith is swept away. Confidence in the veracity of consciousness is our only security from the wildest, the most ir- rational, and the most degrading skepticism.
It may be said, however, that the Materialist does not deny that there is something within us that thinks and wills. He only says that that something is the brain. This, however, is to ignore one half of the testimony which consciousness really bears. It testi- fies not only that there are such sensations as those of sight and
278 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. m. - Axti-Theisjl
toucli, but that there is a real objective substance which is tangible and visible. That is to say, we believe in virtue of the constiui- tion of our nature, and therefore of necessity, when we see or touch, that the objects of our sense-perceptions have a real, objec- tive existence. This every man believes, and cannot help believ- ing. And in like manner, when he thinks, feels, or wills, he be- lieves, in virtue of the constitution of his nature, and therefore by a hke necessity, that he himself is an intelligent, feeling, and voluntary substance. That is, he believes that the Self is mind, or spirit, to which the body is objective, and therefore different from the Self. The belief in mind, therefore, is involved in the belief of self-existence. Consciousness gives us the assurance that the Self is an intelligent, voluntary agent, or spirit.
2. Another fact of consciousness which Materialism denies, either avowedly or by necessary implication, is the fact of free agency. This, indeed, is involved in what has already been said. Nevertheless there are those who admit the existence of mind who deny that man is a free agent. It needs no proof that con- sciousness attests that men have the power of self-determination. Every man knows this to be true with regard to himself. Every man. recognizes the fact with regard to his fellow-men. This again is a conviction which no obduracy of the conscience, and no soph- istry of argument can permanently obliterate from the human mind. This, however. Materialism denies, Phj-sical forces act necessarily and uniformly. In referring all mental action to phys- ical forces, jMaterialism cannot but exclude all freedom of action. There is no spontaneity in chemical affinity, in light, heat, or elec- tricity ; yet to these forces all vital and mental phenomena are re- ferred. If thought be a certain kind of molecular motion of the brain, it is no more free than that other kind of molecular motion called heat. And this is the more obviously true, if they are cor- relative, the one being changed into the other. Accordingly Ma- terialists, as a general thing, are avowed necessitarians. This is not only true of the Positivists, but the doctrine that human action is determined by necessary laws, is the foundation of their whole system of Social Science. And Professor Huxley, as we have seen, pronounces a spontaneous act, from the nature of the case, an absui-dity. It is for him a causeless effect. Every man, there- fore, who knows that he is a free agent, knows that Materialism cannot be true.
3. Materialism contradicts the facts of our moral and religious consciousness. Our moral perceptions are the clearest, the most