a highly finished education. He early devoted himself to the study of philosophy, and was at first a disciple of Des Cartes. Leibnitz characterizes the system of Spinoza as Cartesianism run wild. Des Cartes distrusted the testimony of the senses. His starting-point was the consciousness of existence, "I think." In that proposition the existence of a thinking substance is necessarily included. The outward world produces impressions on this thinking substance. But after all, these sensations thus produced, are only states of self-consciousness. Self, therefore, and its varying states, are all of which we have direct knowledge. It is not all, however, that Des Cartes believed actually existed. He was a sincere Catholic, and died in communion with the Church. He acknowledged not only the existence of mind, but also of God and of matter. Our knowl- edge, however, of God and of matter as substances distinct from our minds, was arrived at by a process of reasoning. The validity of that process Spinpza denied. He admitted the existence of only one substance, and gave such a definition of the word as precluded the possibility of there being more substances than one. With him substance is that which exists of itself, of necessity, and is abso- lutely independent. There is, therefore, but one substance possi- ble. We come, however, everywhere into contact with two classes of phenomena : those of thought and those of extension. Thought and extension, therefore, are the two attributes of the one infinite substance. Individual things are the modes under which the in- finite substance is constantly manifested. In Spinoza's system there are the three radical ideas of substance, attribute, and mode. Of these that of substance alone has any reality. The other two are mere appearances. If we look at anything through a glass colored red the object will appear red ; if the glass be blue, the object will appear blue ; but the color is not really an attribute of the object. Thus substance (the one) appears to us under one aspect as thought and under another as extension. The difference is appar- ent and not real. The finite has therefore no real existence. The universe is sunk into the Infinite ; and the Infinite is a substance of which nothing can be affirmed. Of the Infinite nothing can be denied, and therefore nothing can be affirmed for " omnis deter- minatio est negatio." Tlie Infinite, therefore, is practically nothing. A. sufficient account of modern Pantheism in its general features, as repi'esented by Fichte, Schelhng, and Hegel, and their succes- sors and disciples, has been given already at the commencement of this chapter. More detailed information may be found in the numerous recent histories of philosophy, as those of Morell, Schweg-
332 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. in. — Anti-Theism.
ler, Michelet, and Rosenkranz, and in Hunt's " History of Pan- theism."
F. Conclusion.
The fact that Pantheism has so extensively prevailed in every age and in every part of the world, is a proof of its fascination and power. Apart from a divine revelation, it seems to have been regarded as the most probable solution of the great problem of the universe. Nevertheless it is so unsatisfactory, and does such vio- lence to the laws of our nature, that it has never to any extent taken hold on the hearts of the people. ' India may be regarded as furnishing an exception to this remark. But even there, although Pantheism was the ground form of the popular religion, it had to resolve itself into polytheism in order to meet the necessities of the people. Men must have a personal god whom they can wor- ship and to whom they can pray.
The most obvious remark to be made of the whole system is that it is a hypothesis. From its very nature it is incapable of proof. It is a mere theory assumed to account for the phenomena of the universe. If it did satisfactorily account for them, and did not contradict the teachings of the Bible, it might be safely admit- ted. But it is not only inconsistent with all that the Scriptures reveal concerning the nature of God and his relation to the world, but it contradicts the laws of belief which God has impressed on our nature, subverts the very foundation of religion and morality, and involves even the deification of sin.
Had we no divine revelation on the subject. Theism merely as a theory could not fail to secure the assent of every devout mind in preference to Pantheism. Theism supposes the existence of a personal, extramundane God, the creator and preserver of the universe ; everywhere pi-esent in his wisdom and power, directing all events to the accomplishment of his infinitely wise designs. It supposes the material universe to be distinct from God, dependent on his will, upheld by his power, and pregnant with physical forces ever active under his control. It supposes that man is the creature of God, owing his existence to the will of God, created after his image, a free, rational, moral, and accountable agent, capable of knowing, loving, and worshipping God as a Spirit infinite in his being and perfections. Although this theory may have, for the reason, some problems, such as the origin and prevalence of evil, without a satisfactory solution, yet as it meets and satisfies all the demands of our nature, and solves the problem as to the origin and nature of the universe, it commends itself to the reason, the heart,
§ 5, F.] fflSTORY OF PANTHEISM. 333
and the conscience with a force which no sophistry of speculation can resist.
Pantheism, on the other hand, does violence to our nature, and contradicts the intuitive convictions of consciousness.
1. We are conscious that we are free agents. This is a truth which no man can deny with regard to liimself, and which every man assumes with regai'd to others. Tiiis truth Pantheism denies. It makes our activity only a form of the activity of God, and assumes that his acts are determined by necessity as much as the development of a plant or animal.
2. It is intuitively certain that there is a real distinction between moral good and evil : that the one is that to which man is bound to be conformed, and the other that which he is bound to hate and to avoid ; that the one deserves approbation, and that the other de- serves disapprobation, and merits punishment. These are convic- tions which belong to the rational nature of man ; and they cannot be destroyed without destroying his rationality. Pantheism, how- ever, pronounces these convictions delusions ; that there is no such thing as sin, in the sense above stated ; that what we call sin is mere weakness ; imperfect development, as unavoidable as feeble- ness in an infant. It goes further : it pronounces evil good. It makes the sinful acts and passions of men as much the acts and states of God as holy acts and holy feelings. There is no good but being ; and the men of power are the men of being ; and, there- fore, the strongest are the best ; the weak are to be despised ; they deserved to be conquered and trodden under foot. Hence where Pantheism has become a religion the deities who represent evil are the most honoured and worshipped.
3. Pantheism not only destroys the foundation of morals, but it renders all rational religion impossible. Religion supposes a per- sonal Being endowed not only with intelligence and power, but with moral excellence ; and to be rational, that Being must be in- finite in all his perfections. Pantheism, however, denies that an infinite Being can be a person ; that it is intelligent, self-con- scious, or possessed of moral attributes. It is just as impossible to worship such a Being as it is to worship the atmosphere, or the law of gravitation, or the axioms of Euclid.
4. It is no extravagance to say that Pantheism is the worst form of atheism. For mere atheism is negative. It neither deifies man nor evil. But Pantheism teaches that man, the human soul, is the highest form in which God exists ; and that evil is as much a man- ifestation of God as good ; Satan as the ever-blessed and adorable
334 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. m. — Anti-Theism.
Redeemer. Beyond this it is impossible for the insanity of wick- edness to go.
5. Man, according to this system, is no more immortal than the leaves of the forest, or the waves of the sea. We are transient forms of universal Being.
Our nature is indestructible ; as it is impossible that we should not believe in our own individual existence, in our free agency, in our moral obligations ; in our dependence and responsibility to a Being capable of knowing what we are and what we do, and of rewarding and punishing as He sees fit, so it is impossible that Pantheism should ever be more than a philosophical speculation, where the moral nature of man has once been developed by the knowledge of the living and true God.