space is not ; it is "negation defined by boundaiy lines ; " others, with Kant and Hamilton, say that it is "a condition of thought," " the subjective condition of sensibility ; " others that it is an attribute or accident of God; others that it is that in which real ex- istences can act and move. Notwithstanding; these conflicthio- state- to o
ments of philosophers, and the real obscurity of the subject, every man knows clearly and definitely what the word " space " means, although no man may be able to define it satisfactorily. It is much the same with the idea of infinity. If men would be content to leave the word in its integrity, as simply expressing what does not admit of limitation, there would be no danger in speculating about its nature. But in^all ages wrong views of what the infinite is, have led to fatal errors in philosophy and religion. Without attempting to detail the speculations of philosopliers on this subject, we shall simply endeavor to state what is meant when it is said that God is infinite in his being and perfections.
The Idea of Infinity not merely Negative. Being, in this connection, is that which is or exists. The being of God is his essence or substance, of which his perfections are the essential attributes or modes of manifestation. When it is said that God is infinite as to his being, what is meant is, that no limitation can be assigned to his essence. It is often said that our idea of the infinite is merely negative. There is a sense in which this may be triiej but there is a sense m which it is not . true. It is true that the form of the proposition is negative when we say that no limit can be assigned to space, or possible duration, or to the being of God. But it implies the affirmation that the object of which infin- ity is predicated j^JJJimitable. It is as much a positive idea wdiich ■ve express when we say a thing is infinite as when we say that it is finite. We cannot, indeed, form a conception or mental image of an infinite object, but the word nevertheless expresses a positive judgment of the mind. Sir Wilham Hamilton and others, when they say that the infinite is a mere negation, mean that it implies a negation of all thought. That is, we mean nothing when we say that a thing is infinite. As w^e know nothing of the inhabitants of the other planets of our system, if such there be, or of the mode in which angels and disembodied spirits take cognizance of material objects, our ideas on such subjects are purely negative, or blank ignorance. " The infinite," Mansel says, " is not a positive object of human thought." ^ Every man, however, knows that the propositions " Space is infinite," and " Space is finite," express
1 Prolegomena Locjica, Boston, 1860, p. 52.
382 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Cn. V. — Divine Attributes.
different and equally definite tliouglits. When, therefore, we say- that God is infinite, we mean something ; we express a great and positive truth.
A. The Infinite not the All. The infinite, although illimitable and incapable of increase, is not necessarily all. An infinite body must include all bodies, infinite space all portions of space, and infinite duration all periods of du- ration. Hence Mr. Mansel says that an infinite being must of necessity include within itself all actual and all possible forms or modes of being. So said Spinoza, many of the schoolmen, and even many Christian theologians. The sense in which Spinoza and Mansel make this assertion is the fundamental princij)le of Pantheism. Mr. Mansel, as we have seen, escapes that conclusion by appealing to faith, and teaching that we are constrained to believe what reason pronounces to be impossible, which itself is an impossibility. The sense in which theologians teach that an infi- nite bein_g^jnust comprehend within it all being, is, that in the infinite is the cause or ground of all that is actual or possible. Thus Howe^ says, "Necessary being must include all being." But he immediately adds, not in tlie same way, " It comprehends all being, besides what itself is, as having had, within the compass of its productive power, whatsoever hath actually sprung from it ; and having within the compass of the same power, whatsoever is still possible to be produced." This, however, is not the proper mean- ing of the words, nor is it the sense in which they are generally used. What the words mean, and what they are generally intended to mean by those who use them is, that there is only one being in the universe ; that the finite is merely the modus existendi^ or manifestatiou of the Infinite. Thus Cousin says, God must be " infinite and finite togethei', .... at the summit of being and at its humblest degree . . . . ; at once God, nature, and human- ity."^ Even some of the Remonstrants regard this as the neces- sary consequence of the doctrine of the infinitude of the divine essence. Episcopius ^ says,*" Si essentia Dei sic immensa est, turn intelligi non potest quomodo et ubi aliqua creata essentia esse possit. Essentia enim creata non est essentia divina ; ergo aut est extra essentiam divinam, aut, si non est extra earn, est ipsa essentia ilia, ■ \ \ et sic omnia sunt Deus et divina essentia." "God is infinite," says \ U Jacob Bohme, "for God is all." This, says Strauss,* is exactly the \ t \doctrine of the modern philosoi)hy.
\ 1 "Living Temple," Works. London, 1724, vol. i. p. "0.
a Hiilory of Morhrn Philosophy, translated by Wi«lit. New York, 1852, vcl i. p. 113. 8 Institiitiones Theological, iv. ii. 13, edit. Amsterdam, 1550, vol. i. p. 294. < Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 556