world is indebted to wars for the preservation of civil and religious liberty, for which they are a small price. Better have war than lose the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free. Thus, if sin be the necessary means of the greatest good, it ceases to be an evil, on the whole, and it is perfectly consistent with the benevo- lence of God to permit its occurrence. This has been a favorite method of solving the problem of evil in all ages. This is the idea which Leibnitz wi'ought out so elaborately in his " Theodicde." It has been adopted by many theologians who do not carry it on to its legitimate consequences. Thus Twesten ^ says : " If the world be absolutely dependent on the most perfect Being ; if it be the work of the highest love, power, and wisdom ; and if it be con- stantly controlled and governed by God, it must be absolutely per- fect." Hence even sin, although like pain an evil in itself, must on the whole be a good. It is a necessary element in a perfect world. Twesten, therefore, says,^ " If the world, with the sin and misery which it contains, produces a greater amount of good, and reveals the divine power and love more fully than could other- wise be possible, then the consistency of the existence of evil with the universal causality (or government) of God is thereby vindi- cated." The word good in this connection, according to the com- mon doctrine of optimists, does not mean moral good, but happi- ness. The principle on which this theory is founded was propounded in a posthumous treatise of President Edwards, in which he taught that virtue consists in the love of being. This principle was adopted and carried out by Drs. Hopkins and Emmons in their systems of theology, which for many years had great influence in this country.
Objections to this Theory. Plausible as this theory is, it is liable to many objections.
1. In the first place, we have no right to limit the infinite God. To say that this is the best possible world, is to say that God can make nothing greater or better ; which, unless the world be infi- nite, is to say that God is finite. It is enough for us to believe that the world with its finite results, is what God in his wisdom saw fit to call into existence ; but that it is the best He could make, is a gratuitous and derogatory assumption.
2. It is unscriptural, and contrary to our moral reason, to make happiness the end of creation. The Bible declares the glory of God, an infinitely higher end, to be the final cause for which all things exist. It is the instinctive judgment of men, that holiness
1 Dogmalik, ii. p. 121. 2 jfnd. p. 130.
434 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. V. — Divine Attributes.
or moral excellence is a greater good than happiness. But, on this theory, holiness has no value except as a means of producing hap- piness. This cannot be believed, except under a protest from our moral nature. The theory in question, therefoi'e, solves the prob- lem of evil by denying its existence. Nothing is an evil which tends to the greatest happiness. Sin is the necessary means of the greatest ffood, and therefore is not an evil.
The Doctrine that Grod cannot prevent Sin in a Moral The second general method of reconciling the existence of sin with the benevolence and holiness of God, is, not to deny that sin, even all things considered, is an evil ; but to affirm that God can- not prevent all sin, or even the present amount of sin, in a moral system. It assumes that certainty is inconsistent witli free agency. Any kind or degree of influence which renders it certain how a free agent will aet, destroys his liberty in acting. He must always be able to act contrary to any degree of influence brought to bear upon him, or he ceases to be free. God, therefore, of necessity limits Himself when He creates free agents. They are beyond his absolute control. He may argue and persuade, but He cannot govern.
This doctrine that God cannot eflPectually control the acts of free agents without destroying their liberty, is so contrary to the Scrip- tures, that it has never been adopted by any organized portion of the Christian Ciiurch. Some theologians avail themselves of it for an emergency, when treating of this subject, although it is utterly at variance with their general scheme. Twesten, for example, who, as we have seen, in one place teaches that God voluntarily permits sin as the necessary means of the greatest good, in another place ^ says that He cannot prevent it in a moral system. " Mit der Freiheit," he says, " war die Moglichkeit des Misbrauchs gege- ben ; ohne jene zu vernichten, konnte Gott diesen nicht verhin- dern." That is, without destroying liberty, God cannot prevent its abuse. If this be so, then God cannot govern free agents. He cannot secure the accomplishment of his purposes, or the fulfilment of his promises. There is no security for the triumph of good in the universe. Angels and saints in heaven may all sin, and evil become dominant and universal. On this theory, all prayer that God would cliange our own hearts, or the hearts of others, become.' irrational. All this is so contrary to the teaching of the Bible, which everywhere asserts the sovereignty and supremacy of God,
1 Dogmatik, ii. p. 137.