reason to expect something in the constitution of our nature answer- ing to the Trinity in the Godhead. He refers to the memory, intelhgence, and will, as co-existing in one mind, so that the opera- tions of the one are involved in the operations of the others. Greg- ory of Nyssa refers for his illustration to the soul, the reason, and the living power, united in one spiritual substance in man. It was admitted, however, that these analogies did not hold as to the main point, for these different powers in man are not different sub- sistences, but different modes of activity of one and the same per- sonal essence, so that these illustrations lead rather to the Sabellian, than to the Scriptural view of the doctrine of the Trinity.
By far the most common illustration was borrowed from the operations of our consciousness. We conceive of ourselves as objective to ourselves, and are conscious of the identity of the sub- ject and object. We have thus the subjective Ego, the objective Ego, and the identity of the two ; the desired Thesis, Analysis, and Synthesis. In one form or another, this illustration has come down from the fathers, through the schoolmen and reformers, to theologians of our own day. Augustine ^ says, " Est qusedam imago Trinitatis, ipsa mens, et notitia ejus, quod est proles ejus ac de seipsa verbum ejus, et amor tertius, et hsec tria unum atque una substan- tia." Again,2 " Hgec — tria, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, quo- niam non sunt tres vitse, sed una vita ; nee tres mentes, sed una mens : consequenter utique nee tres substantige sunt, sed una sub- stantia." And,2 " Mens igitur quando cogitatione se conspicit, intelligit se et recognoscit : gignit ergo hunc intellectum et cog-
nitionem suam Haec autem duo, gignens et genitum,
dilectione tertia copulantur, quae nihil est aliud quam voluntas fini- endum aliquid appetens vel tenens." Anselm* has the same idea: " Habet mens rationalis, quum se cogitando intelligit, secum im- aginem suam ex se natam, id est cogitationem sui ad suam simili- tudinem, quasi sua impressione formatam, quamvis ipsa se a sua imagine, non nisi ratione sola, separare possit, quse imago ejus verbum ejus est. Hoc itaque modo, quis neget, summam sapien- tem, quum se dicendo intelligit, gignere consubstantialem sibi simil- itudinem suam, id est Verbum suum." Melancthon ^ adopts and carries out the same idea: "Filius dicitur imago et Aoyos: est igitur
1 De Trinitate, ix. xii. 18, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1837, vol. viii. p. 1352, b.
2 Ibid. X. xi. 18, p. 1366, a.
8 Ibid. XIV. vi. 8, pp. 1443, d, 1444, a.
* Monohgium, xxxiii., edit. Migne, p. 188, b. See also Thomas Aquinas, i. xxvii. 3, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 56.
• Loci Communes, De Filio, edit. Erlangen, 1828, vol. i. pp. 19, 21.
480 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. VI. — The Trinity,
imago cogitatione Patris genita ; quod ut aliquo modo considerari possit, a nostra mente exempla capiamus. Voluit enim Deus in
homine conspici vestigia sua Mens humana cogitando
mox pingit imaginem rei cogitatae, sed nos non transfundimus nos- tram essentiam in illas imagines, suntque cogitationes illse subitaB et evanescentes actiones. At Pater aeternus sese intuens gignit cogitationem sui, quae est imago ipsius, non evanescens, sed sub- sistens, communicata ipsi essentia. Haec igitur imago est- secunda
persona Ut autem Filius nascitur cogitatione, ita Spiri-
tus Sanctus procedit a voluntate Patris et Filii ; voluntatis enim est agitare, diligere, sicut et cor humanam non imagines, sed spiritus sen halitus gignit." Leibnitz,^ says " Je ne trouve rien dans les creatures de plus propre a illustrer ce sujet, que la reflex- ion des esprits, lorsqu'un meme esprit est son propre objet imme- diat, et agit sur soi-meme en pensant a soi-meme et a ce qu'il fait. Car le redoublement donne une image ou ombre de deux substances respectives dans une meme substance absolue, savoir de celle qui entend, et de celle qui est entendue ; I'un et I'autre de ces etres est substantiel, I'un et I'autre est un concret individu, et ils different par des relations mutuelles, mais ils ne sont qu'une seule et meme substance individuelle absolue."
Of the theologians of the seventeenth century belonging to the Reformed Church, Keckermann was the most disposed to present the doctrines of the Bible in a philosophical form. We find, there- fore, with him a similar attempt to make the mystery of the Trinity intelligible. He regards the existence of God as consisting in self- conscious thought. As thought is eternal, it must have an eternal absolute, and perfect object. That object must, therefore, itself be God. The unity of the divine essence demands that this object should be in God himself, and therefore, it eternally returns to Him.2
The modern theologians of Germany, who profess allegiance to the Scriptures, have, in many cases, taken the ground that abso- lute unity in the divine essence would be inconsistent with self- consciousness. We become self-conscious by distinguishing our- selves from what is not ourselves, and especially from other persons of like nature with ourselves. If, therefore, there were no person objective to God, to whom He could say Thou, He could not say I. Thus Martensen '^ says : Although tiie creature can have no ade- quate comprehension of the divine nature, we have a semblance
1 Remarque sur h Livre ctun Anlitrinilaii-e Arif/his, edit. Geneva, 1768, vol. i. p. 27. ^ Optra, edit. Cologne, 1614, vol. ii. Systema Theolorjice (tract at end of vol.), p. 72, the last of three pages marked 72. 3 Dogmatik, pp. 129, 130.