did not create the world in time, because before creation time was not. " Si literae sacrse maximeque veraees ita dicunt, in principio fecisse Deum coelum et terram, ut nihil antea fecisse intelh'gatur, quia hoc potius in principio fecisse diceretur, si quid fecisset ante coetera cuncta quae fecit ; procul dubio non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore." ^ This is true enough. If time be duration measured by motion or succession, it is plain that before succession there can be no time. It is hard, however, to see how this reheves the matter. The fact remanis that the world is not eternal, and therefore, in our mode of conception, there were infinite ages during which the world was not. Still the difficulty is purely subjective, arising from the limitations of our nature, which forbid our comprehending God, or our understanding the relation of his activity to the effects produced in time. All we know is that God does work and act, and that the effects of his activity take place successively in time.
4. As to the objection that the doctrine of creation supposes a change in God, the theologians answer that it does not suppose any change in his will or purpose, for he purposed from eternity to create. On this point Augustine ^ says, " Una eademque sempi- terna et immutabili voluntate res quas condidit et ut prius non essent egit, quamdiu non fuerunt, et ut posterius essent, quando esse coeperunt." In other words, God did not purpose to create from eternity ; but from eternity he had the purpose to create. As there is no change of purpose involved in creation, so there is no change from inaction to activity involved in the doctrine. God is essentially active. But it does not follow that his activity is always the same, i. e., that it must always produce the same effects. The eternal purpose takes effect just as was intended from the begin- ning. These objections, however, are mere cobwebs ; but they are cobwebs in the eye ; the eye of our feeble understanding. They are best got rid of by closing that eye, and opening what the Scriptures call " the eyes of the heart." That is, instead of submitting ourselves to the guidance of the speculative under- standing, we should consent to be led by the Spirit as He reveals the things of God in his Word, and in our own moral and religious nature.
§ 5. Design of the Qreation.
Men have long endeavoured to find a satisfactory answer to the ques-tion, Why God created the world ? What end was it designed to accomplish ? Answers to this question have been sought from
1 De Civitate Dei, xi. 6, edit. Benedictines, vol. vii. p. 444, c, d.
2 De Civitate Dei, xii. 17, edit. Benedictines, vol. rh. p. 508, b
566 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. X. — Ckeamon.
the following sources, — (1.) The nature of God himself, (2.) From the nature of his works and the course of history. (3.) From the declarations of the Scriptures. As to the first source, it is to be remarked that the systems which preclude the admission of final causes, as Materialism and Pantheism in all their forms, of course preclude any question as to the design of the creation. The world is the evolution of an unconscious, unintelligent force, which has no design out of itself To ask wliat is the design of the world is, in these systems, equivalent to asking what is the design of the being of God ; for God is the world and the world is God. Those who admit the existence of an intelligent extramundane God, and who endeavour from his nature to determine the end for which He created the world, have pursued different courses and come to dif- ferent conclusions. From the absolute self-sufficiency of God it follows that the creation was not designed to meet or satisfy any necessity on his part. He is neither more perfect nor more happy because of the creation. Again it follows from the nature of an infinite Being that the ground (i. e., both the motive and the end) of the creation must be iiijlimself As all things are from Him and through Him, so also they are^fbr Tlim. Some infer from his holi- ness that the purpose to create arose, so to speak, from the desire to haA'e a field for the development of moral excellence in rational creatures. IBy far the most common opinion from the beginning has been that the creation is to be referred to the bonitas, good- ness, benevolence, or, as the modern Germans at least generally express it, the love of God. As God is love, and the nature of love is to communicate itself, as it must have an object to be enjoyed and rendered blessed, so God created the world that He might rejoice in it and render it blessed. From the time of Leib- nitz, who made this idea the foundation of his " Th^odic^e," this theory has assumed a more contracted form. He reduced love to mere benevolence, or the desire to promote happiness. Hence the end of the creation was assumed to be the production of happiness. And as God is infinite, not only in benevolence, but also in wis- dom and power, this world is necessarily the best possible world for the production of happiness. This theory is very fruitful of consequences. (1.) As all virtue consists in benevolence, happi- ness must be the highest good.. Holiness is good only because it tends to happiness. It has no virtue of its own. (2.) Whatever tends to promote happiness is right. There is no such thing as sin. What we call sin, if a necessary means of the greatest good, becomes virtue. It is evil only so far as it has a contrary tendency. And