God to the world as effectually to make Him an unknown Being, merging all his perfections into the general idea of cause.
The objection to the second form of the doctrine is not to the idea meant to be expressed. It is true that the preservation of the world is as much due to the immediate power of God as its creation, but this does not prove that preservation is creation. Creation is the production of something out of nothing. Preser- vation is tTi¥ upholding in existence what alre_ady is.. This form of the doctrine is therefore a false use of terms. A more serious objection, however, is that this mode of expression tends to error. The natural sense of the words is what those who use them admit to be false, and not only false but dangerous.
To the real doctrine of a continuous creation the objections are far more serious, —
1. It destroys all continuity of existence. If God creates any given thing every moment out of nothing, it ceases to be the same thing. It is something new, however similar to what existed be- fore. It is as much disconnected from what preceded it as the world itself when it arose out of nothing, was disconnected from the previous nothingness.
2. This doctrine effectually destroys all evidence of the exist- ence of an external world. What we so regard, the impressions on our senses which we refer to things out of ourselves, are merely inward states of consciousness produced momentarily by the creat- ing energy of God. Idealism is, therefore, the logical, as it has been the historical consequence of the theory in question. If all necessity for the existence of an external world is done away with, that existence must be discarded- as an unphilosophical assump- tion.
3. This theory of course denies the existence of second causes. God becomes the sole agent and the sole cause in the universe. The heavens and earth with all their changes and with all they contain, are but the pulsations of the universal life of God. If pres- ervation be a continued production out of nothing, of everything that exists, then every material existence, all properties of matter so called, every human soul, and evei'y human thought and feeling, is as much the direct product of divine omnipotence as the original creation. There cannot, therefore, be any causation out of God, or any cooperation of any kind any more than when He said. Let there be light, and there was light. In the same manner He con- stantly now says, Let men exist with all the thoughts, purposes, and feelino-s, which constitute their nature and character for the
580 PART I. — THEOLOGY. [Ch. XI. — Providence.
4. On this theory there can be no responsibility, no sin and no holiness. If sin exist, it must be referred to God as much as holi- ness, for all is due to his creating energy.
5. Between this system and Pantheism there is scarcely a divid- ing line. Pantheism merges the universe in God, but not more effectually than the doctrine of a continuous creation. God in the one case as truly as in the other, is all that lives. There is no power, no cause, no real existence but the efficiency and causality of God. This is obvious, and is generally admitted. Hagenbach ^ says, " Creation out of nothing rests on Theism. It becomes deistic if creation and preservation are violently separated and placed in direct opposition to each other ; and pantheistic if creation be made a mere moment in preservation." " In creation," says Strauss, " God works all, the creature which is thus first produced, noth- ing." If, therefore, presei'vation is only the continuance of the same relation between God and the creature, it follows that God still effects everything and the creature nothing ; hence out of God, or other than God, there are no causes, not even occasional. Leib- nitz,2 quotes Bayle as saying, " II me semble, qu'il en faut conclure, que Dieu fait tout, et qu'il n'y a point dans toutes les creatures de causes premieres, ni secondes, ni meme occasionelles." And again, " On ne pent dire que Dieu me cr^e premierement, et qu' ^tant cree, il produise avec moi mes mouvemens et mes determinations. Cela est insoutenable pour deux raisons : la premiere est, que quand Dieu me crde ou me conserve a cet instant, il ne me con- serve pas comme un etre sans forme, comme une espdce ou quelque autre des universaux de logique. Je suis un individu ; il me crde et conserve comme tel, etant tout ce que je suis dans cet instant avec toutes mes d^pendances." To make preservation, there- fore, a continued creation, leads to conclusions opposed to the essential truths of religion, and at variance with our necessary beliefs. We are forced by tlie constitution of our nature to be- lieve in the external world and in the reality of second causes. We know from consciousness that we are the responsible authors of our own acts, and that we continue identically the same substance, and consequently are not created out of nothing from moment to moment.
This subject will come up again when treating of President Edwards' theory of identity, and its application to the relation be- tween Adam and his race.
1 Dogmengeschichte, ii. Zweite Hiilfte, p. 288, edit. Leipzig, 1841. « Theodicee, iii. 386; Opera, edit. Berlin, 1840, p. 615.