subjective, so in the sphere of religion and morality he exalted the power and authority of the practical reason. Everything was subordinate to moral excellence. Happiness was not the end. It was only a means of promoting and rewarding what is morally good. The attainment of the highest amount of moral excellence requires perfect harmony between happiness and good- ness, that is, that rational creatures should be happy in exact proportion to their goodness, and miserable in proportion as they are wicked. The punishment of sin is therefore inevitable. It is determined by the immutable moral order of the universe, which can no more be changed or set aside than any physical law on which the existence or order of the external world depends.
From these principles some of the Kantian theologians inferred that the pardon of sin is impossible. Misery is as inseparable from sin as pain is from the laceration of the body. If the only punishment of sin, however, be its natural consequences, then the removal of sin effects the removal of punishment. This deter- mines the view which many of the disciples of Kant take of the nature of redemption. It is purely subjective. Men are delivered from sin and thereby from its punishment.
To others, however, this view was unsatisfactory, (1.) Because the punishment of sin is not purely or exclusively natural. It is not so even in this world, as is proved by the deluge, by the de- struction of the cities of the plain, and by a thousand other in- stances. Much less is it true with regard to the future world. Conscience is not the only worm that never dies, or remorse the only fire which is never quenched. (2.) Because this theory reverses the natural order of events. It makes reformation pre- cede pardon, whereas pardon must precede reformation. On this point Bretschneider * quotes even Ewald ' as saying, "It is as unpsychological as it is unchristian so to present Christian refor- mation, that a man must become better before he is forgiven. It is precisely through the love of God anticipating our reformation, by which the man morally dead is quickened, that the elements of all religion, gratitude, trust, and love are called into exercise." This is certainly Paul's doctrine. (3.) The theory in question overlooks guilt, responsibility to justice for sins already commit- ted. (4.) The ends of punishment (according to the Kantians) are, first, the satisfaction of the moral excellence of God, who by necessity of his moral perfection must punish sin ; secondly,
1 Dogmatik, § 159, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1828, vol. n. p. 320, note.
2 Die Eeliqionslehren der Bibel, n. v. zu nro. 27; Stuttgart and Tubingen, 1812, vol. ii.p. 149.
198 PART in. Ch. XVII.- JUSTIFICATION.
the improvement of the offender ; and thirdly, the upholding the moral order of the universe. The two former of these ends, Bretschneider says, may be answered by the reformation of the sinner. When a man ceases to sin, he ceases to be opposed to God, and God ceases to be opposed to him. But the third end of punishment, namely, preserving the moral order of the universe, is not answered 'by the sinner's reformation. He is not the only person to be considered. The interests of morality would suffer, if he were rendered happy notwithstanding his past transgression. The question then is, is there any way in which the authority of the moral law can be sustained, and yet the sinner be forgiven and rendered blessed ? The Church answer to this question, the dis- ciples of Kant reject as contrary to reason ; but reason, says Bret- schneider, has nothing to object to the doctrine stated generally that God can consistently pardon sin for Christ's sake. He sums up under the following heads, what reason may accept in" regard to this whole subject. (1.) That the divine nature of Christ rendered his sufferings more important for the spiritual world and more available for man than they otherwise would have been. (2.) We cannot properly say that He suffered the penalty of the law, or the punishment of our sins, but that He endured his unmerited sufferings for the good of the world. (3.) That He did not make satisfaction for sin, but rendered secure the moral order of the universe. (4.) Although He did not make satisfaction, He procured or mediated our pardon. He is not our sponsor, but our " mediator salutis." (5.) The expression " the merit of Christ " does not mean any good imputed to us, or any title belonging to us, but simply the claim of Christ that his suf- ferings shall avail to the good of men. (6.) The word " recon- ciliation " is anthropopathic. It does not express any change in God ; but either objectively the possibility of pardon, or subjec- tively the hope of pardon. (7.) " To impute the merit of Christ " does not mean that God regards Christ's obedience as our obe- dience, or his sufferings as our punishment, but simply that, through love, God has determined to render his sufferings avail- able for the good of men. (8.) That Christ's death was vicari- ous in so far that in consequence thereof sin may be pardoned in the renewed. (9.) Justification is the application to individuals of the general declaration of God that He will save all who strive to reform. This is the highest form in which theologians regarded as rationalistic are willing to receive the doctrines of atonement and justification.