this obedience was rendered in the exercise of their ability, as- sisted by the grace of God.
By grace, Pelagius says that we are to understand, (1.) The goodness of God in so constituting our nature that we can com- pletely obey the law in virtue of our free agency. (2.) The revelation, precepts, and example of Christ. (3.) The pardon of sins committed before conversion. (4.) The moral influences of the truth and of the circumstances in which we are placed. The effect of grace thus understood, is simply to render obedience more easy.
In the Council of Carthage, A. D. 418, the Pelagians were condemned, among other things, for teaching, (1.) That the effect of grace was merely to render obedience more easy. (2.) That the declaration of the Apostle John, " If we say that we have no Bin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us," is, as to some, a mere expression of humility. (3.) That the petition in the Lord's prayer, " Forgive us our trespasses," is not suited to the saints. They use it only as expressing the desire and neces- sity of others.
According to the Pelagian theory, therefore, (1.) The sin from which the believer may be perfectly free is the voluntary transgression of known law. Nothing else is of the nature of sin. (2.) The law to which perfect conformity in this life is possible, and in many cases actual, is the moral law in all its strictness. (3.) This obedience may be rendered without any supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit.
Romish Theory.
Romanists teach, (1.) That by the infusion of grace in justifi- cation as effected by or in baptism, everything of the nature of sin is removed from the soul. (2.) That good works performed in a state of grace are free from the taint of sin, and are perfect. " Si quis in quolibet bono opere justum saltern venaliter peccare dixerit .... anathema sit." l (3.) That the law may be and often is, perfectly obeyed by the children of God in this life. (4.) That men may not only do all that the law requires, but may even go beyond its demands. (5.) Nevertheless, as there is a higher law than that by which men are to be judged, no man is entirely free from venial sins, i. e., sins which do not bring the soul under condemnation, and therefore all men in this life have need to say, " Forgive us our trespasses."
1 Council of Trent, Sess. vi. Canon 25 ; Streitwolf , vol. i. p. 36
252 PART in. Ch. xviil-sanctification.
From this statement it appears, —
1. That by sin from which advanced believers are said to be free, is meant only what merits condemnation, and in itself de- serves the forfeiture of grace or divine favour. It is admitted that " concupiscence," or the remains of original sin, is not re- moved by baptism, but it is not of the nature of sin, in the sense just stated. Neither are venial sins, I. e., sins which do not for- feit grace, properly sins, if judged by the law under which believ- ers are now placed. So far, therefore, as the negative part of perfection, or freedom from sin is concerned, the Romanists do not mean freedom from moral faults, but simply freedom from what incurs the sentence of the law. It is perfection as judged by a lower standard of judgment.
2. The law to which we are now subject, and the demands of which Romanists say are satisfied by the obedience of the saints, is not the moral law in its original strictness, but the sum of that which is due from man in his present circumstances; in other words, the demands of the law are accommodated to the condi- tion of men in this life. This is evident, because they say that the saints obey the law so far as it is now binding, and because they admit that saints commit venial sins, which can only mean sins which, under a stricter rule of judgment, would merit con- demnation.
3i As stated above, they distinguish between the law and love. The former is that which all men, and especially Christians, are bound to observe, but love is a higher principle which prompts to doing more than the law or justice demands. Consequently, the positive part of perfection, or conformity to the law, does not imply the highest degree of moral excellence of which our nature is susceptible, but only such as answers to the lower demands of the law to which we are now subject. In a passage already quoted, Bellarmin says, " Defectus charitatis, quod videlicet non faciamus opera nostra tanto fervore dilectionis, quanto faciemus in patria, defectus quidem est, sed culpa, et peccatum non est. Unde etiam charitas nostra, quamvis comparata ad charitatem beatorum sit imperfecta, tamen absolute perfecta dici potest." 1 In like manner Moehler says,2 " In modern times the attempt has been made to sustain the old orthodox doctrine by assuming that the moral law makes ideal demands, which, as every other ideal, must remain unattainable. If this be true, then the man who
1 De Justificatione, iv. xvii. ; Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. iv. p. 933, b.
2 Symbolik, 6th edit. Mainz, 1843, p. 216.