of the divine being in man. Man is the image of God, and there- fore in his nature is like God, perfect or complete in himself ; and conformity to the divine image is for him the goal and command. (Matt. v. 45.) Religion, on the other hand, is the bond between man and God, or what binds men to God, so that we should know and will only in Him, refer everything to Him, — entire consecra- tion, the personal union with God. Thus, love of our neighbour, courage, spirituality (the opposite of sensuality), may be simply moral virtues ; whereas faith and the love of God are purely religious. The courage of Napoleon's guard was a moral virtue (a state of the will) ; the courage of Luther was religious (a power derived from his relation to God)." 1
Religion and morality, although thus different, are not indepen- dent. They are but different phases of our relation to God. Stahl, therefore, controverts the doctrine of Grotius, that there would be a jus naturale if there were no God ; which is really equivalent to saying that there would be an obligation to goodness if there were no such thing as goodness. Moral excellence is of the very essence of God. He is concrete goodness ; infinite reason, excel- lence, knowledge, and power in a personal form ; so that there can be no obligation to virtue which does not involve obligation to God. Wolf carried out the doctrine of Grotius to the. length of saying that an Atheist, if consistent, would act just as the Chris- tian acts. This principle of Grotius, says Stahl, contained the germ of separation from religion, which unfolded itself with Kant into an ignoring, and, with those who followed him, into the denial of God.2
" The primary idea of goodness, is the essential, not the crea- tive, will of God. The divine will in its essence is infinite love, mercy, patience, truth, faithfulness, rectitude, spirituality, and all that is included in holiness, which constitutes the inmost nature of God. The holiness of God, therefore, neither precedes his will (' sanctitas antecedens voluntatem ' of the Schoolmen), nor fol- lows it, but is his will itself. The good is not a law for the divine will (so that God wills it because it is good) ; neither is it a crea- tion of his will (so that it becomes good because He wills it); but it is the nature (das Urwollen) of God from everlasting to everlasting." 8 Again it is said, " Hence it follows that moral goodness is concrete, specific, .... absolute, original, as little determined by logical laws as by a relation to external ends
1 Stah,, ut supra i. ii. 1, § 24; Ibid. p. 71. 2 Ibid. pp. 73,74.
* Ibid. i. ii. 2, § 29 ; Ibid. pp. 84, 85.
262 PART III. Ch. XIX. — THE LAW.
This is not the doctrine of modern ethics. According to the eu- daimonistic view adopted by the English philosophers, by Thom- asius, and others, the good is good because it tends to produce hap- piness. According to the rationalists, the good is conformity
with the laws of thought (Denkrichtigkeit) This was
the real doctrine of Wolf, who made morality to consist in order (Regelmassigkeit); still more decidedly was it the doctrine of Kant, with whom the moral law is a consequence of the laws of thought. He says, expressly, that the idea of moral good must be derived from preceding law, that is, the law of reason."1
These two principles, then, are to be taken for granted ; first, that moral good is good in its own nature, and not because of its tendencies, or because of its conformity to the laws of reason ; and, second, that all law has its foundation in the nature and will of God. These principles are very comprehensive. They are of special importance in the exposition of the law in its aspect as the revealed will of God designed to regulate human character and conduct.
Protestant Principles limiting Obedience to Human Laws.
There is another principle regarded as fundamental by all Prot- estants, and that is, that the Bible contains the whole rule of duty for men in their present state of existence. Nothing can legitimately bind the conscience that is not commanded or forbid- den by the Word of God. This principle is the safeguard of that liberty wherewith Christ has made his people free. If it be re- nounced, we are at the mercy of the external Church, of the State, or of public opinion. This is simply the principle that it is right to obey God rather than man. Our obligation to render obedience to human enactments in any form, rests upon our obli- gation to obey God ; and, therefore, whenever human laws are in conflict with the law of God we are bound to disobey them. When heathen emperors commanded Christians to worship idols, the martyrs refused. When popes and councils commanded Protestants to worship the Virgin Mary, and to acknowledge the supremacy of the bishop of Rome, the Protestant martyrs refused. When the Presbyterians of Scotland were required by their ru- lers in Church and State to submit themselves to the author- ity of prelatical bishops, they refused. When the Puritans of England were called upon to recognize the doctrine of "passive obedience," they again refused. And it is to the stand thus taken
1 Stahl, ut supra, p. 87.
§ i.j PRELIMINARY PRINCIPLES.
by those martyrs and confessors that the world is indebted for all of the religious and civil liberty it now enjoys.
Whether any enactment of the Church or State conflicts with the truth or law of God, is a question which every man must de- cide for himself. On him individually rests the responsibility, and therefore to him, as an individual, belongs the right of judg- ment.
Although these principles, when stated in thesi, are universally recognized among Protestants, they are nevertheless very fre- quently disregarded. This is true not only of the past when the Church and State both openly claimed the right to make laws to bind the conscience. It is true at the present time. Men still insist on the right of making that sin which God does not forbid ; and that obligatory which God has not commanded. They pre- scribe rules of conduct and terms of church fellowship, which have no sanction in the Word of God. It is just as much a duty for the people of God to resist such usurpations, as it was for the early Christians to resist the authority of the Roman Emperors in matters of religion, or for the early Protestants to refuse to recognize the right of the Pope to determine for them what they were to believe, and what they were to do. The essence of infi- delity consists in a man's putting his own convictions on matters of truth and duty above the Bible. This may be done by fanatics in the cause of benevolence, as well as by fanatics in any other cause. It is infidelity in either case. And as such it should be denounced and resisted unless we are willing to renounce our alle- giance to God, and make ourselves the servants of men.
Christian Liberty in Matters of Indifference.
It is perfectly consistent with the principle above stated, that a thing may be right or wrong according to circumstances, and, therefore, it may often be wrong for a man to do what the Bible does not condemn. Paul himself circumcised Timothy ; yet he told the Galatians that if they allowed themselves to be circum- cised, Christ would profit them nothing. Eating meat offered in sacrifice to idols was a matter of indifference. Yet the Apostle said, " If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend."
There are two important principles involved in these Scriptural facts. The first is, that a thing indifferent in itself may become even fatally wrong if done with a wrong intention. Circumcision was nothing, and uncircumcision was nothing. It mattered littie
264 PART III. Ch. XIX. — THE LAW.
whether a man was circumcised or not. But if any one sub- mitted to circumcision as an act of legal obedience, and as the necessary condition of his justification before God, he thereby re- jected the Gospel, or, as the Apostle expressed it, he fell from grace. He renounced the gratuitous method of justification, and Christ became of no effect to him. In like manner, eating meat which had been offered in sacrifice to an idol, was a matter of in- difference. " Meat," says Paul, " commendeth us not to God : for neither, if we eat, are we the better ; neither, if we eat not, are we the worse." Yet if a man ate such meat as an act of reverence to the idol, or under circumstances which implied that it was an act of worship, he was guilty of idolatry. And, therefore, the Apostle taught that participation in feasts held within the pre- cincts of an idol's temple, was idolatry.