animus imponentis, as is universally admitted, must therefore determine the interpretation of an oath. It was the fact that the Jesuits inculcated the lawfulness of mental reservation, which more than anything else made them an abomination in the eyes of all Christendom. It was this which furnished the sharpest thong to the scourge with which Pascal drove them out of Europe.
This is a matter about which men who mean to be honest are not always sufficiently careful. Their conscience is satisfied if what they say will bear an interpretation consistent with the truth, although the obvious sense is not true.1
•No oath is obligatory which binds a man to do what is unlawful or impossible. The sin lies in taking such an oath, not in break- ing it. The reason of this rule is, that no man can bring himself under an obligation to commit a sin. Herod was not bound to keep his oath to the daughter of Herodias when she demanded the head of John the Baptist. Neither were the forty men, who had bound themselves with " an oath of execration " to kill Paul. But an oath voluntarily taken to do what is lawful and within the power of the juror binds the conscience, (a.) Even when fulfilling it involves injury to the temporal interests of the juror. The Bible pronounces the man blessed who " sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not." (Ps. xv. 4.) (£>.) When the oath is obtained by deceit or violence. In the latter case the juror makes a choice of evils. He swears to make a sacrifice to save himself from what he dreads more than the loss of what he promises to relin- quish. This may often be a hard case. But such is the solemnity of an oath, and such the importance of its inviolable sanctity being preserved, that it is better to suffer injustice than that an oath should be broken. The case where an oath is obtained by deceit is more difficult, for when such deceit is practised the juror did not intend to assume the obligation which the oath imposes. He might, therefore, plausibly argue that if he did not intend to assume an obligation, it was not assumed. But, on the other hand, the principle involved in the commercial maxim, caveat emptor, applies to oaths. A man is bound to guard against de- ception ; and if deceived he must take the consequences. Besides, those to whom the oath is given trust to it, and act upon it, and, in a certain sense at least, acquire rights under it. The Scriptures, however, in this as in all other cases, are our safest guide. Wheu
1 A gentleman was charged with having written a certain article in a newspaper. He declared that he did not write it. That was true. But he had dictated it.
314 PART in. Ch. XIX.— THE LAW.
the Israelites conquered Canaan, the Gibeonites who dwelt in the land, sent delegates to Joshua pretending that they were from a distant country, and " Joshua made peace with them, and made a league with them, to let them live : and the princes of the con- gregation sware unto them." When the deception was discovered, the people clamoured for their extermination. " But all the princes said unto all the congregation, We have sworn unto them by the Lord God of Israel : now, therefore, we may not touch them." (Joshua ix. 15, 19.) This oath, as appears from 2 Sam- uel xxi. 1, was sanctioned by God and the people were punished for violating it.
Romish Jfroctrine.
The principle on which the authorities of the Roman Church assume the right to free men from the obligation of their oaths, is that no man can bind himself to do what is sinful. It is the pre- rogative of the Church to decide what is sinful. If therefore the Church decide that an oath to obey a sovereign disobedient to the Pope, to preserve inviolate a safe conduct, or to keep faith with heretics or infidels is sinful, the obligation of every such oath ceases as soon as the judgment of the Church is rendered.
In answer to the question, " Cui competit potestas dispensandi super juramento ? " the Romish theologians answer : " Prin- cipaliter competit summo Pontifici ; non tamen nisi ex rationabili causa, quia dispensat in jure alieno : competit etiam jure ordinario Episcopis, non Parochis. Requirit autem haec dispensatio potes- tatem jurisdictionis majoris." 1 The casuists, on this as on all other practical subjects, go into the most minute details and subtle distinctions. Dens, for example, in the section above quoted, gives no less than ten conditions under which the obligation of an oath ceases. To the question : " Quibus modis potest cessare obligatio juramenti promissorii ? " he answers: "1. Irritatione. 2. Dispensatione et relaxatione. 3. Commutatione. 4. Materiae mutatione vel subtractione. 5. Cessante fine totali complete. 6. Ratione conditionis non adimpletae. 7. Cessante principali obli- gatione cessat juramentum pure accessorium. 8. Non acceptatione, et condonatione, seu remissione. 9. Si juramentum incipiat vergere in deteriorem exitum, vel in praejudicium boni communis, vel etiam alicujus particularis, v. g. quis juravit occultare furtum alterius, sed inde alter liberius prolabitur ad alia furta: item cessat jura- mentum, quando directe est majoris boni impeditivum. 10. Deni-
i Theoloffia Moralis Dogmatica Reverendi et Eruditissimi Domini Petri Dens ; de Jura- mento, n. 177. edit. Dublin, 1832, vol. iv. pp.v214-216.