que cessat obligatio juramenti, licet improprie, per adimpletionem sive totalem solutionem rei juratae : et e contra dicitur cessare ab initio, quia juramentum fuit nullum, sive quia nullam ab initio obligationem produxit." Number nine opens a very wide door the last clause especially seems to teach that a promissory oath ceases to bind whenever it is expedient to break it.1
The whole Romish system is the masterpiece of the " wisdom of the world." As many promissory oaths are not obligatory, it would seem to be wise, instead of leaving the question of their continued obligation to be decided by the individual juror, who is so liable to be unduly biased, to refer the matter to some compe- tent authority. This would tend to prevent false judgments, to satisfy the conscience of the juror and the public mind. And as the question is a matter of morals and religion, it would seem to be proper that the decision should be referred to the organs of the Church. Rome makes all these seemingly wise arrangements. But as God has exalted no human authority over the individual conscience, as no man can delegate his responsibility to another, but every man must answer to God for himself, it is clear that no such arrangement can be consistent with the divine will. Again, if it were true that the Church were divinely guided so as to be infallible in its judgment, this tremendous power over the consciences of men might be safely intrusted to it ; but as in fact the representatives of the Church are men of like passions as other men, and no more infallible than their fellows, Roman- ism is nothing more than a device to put the prerogatives and power of God into the hands of sinful men. History teaches how this usurped power has been used.
Vows, Vows are essentially different from oaths, in that they do not involve any appeal to God as a witness, or any imprecation of his displeasure. A vow is simply a promise made to God. The conditions of a lawful vow are, first, as to the object, or matter of the vow, (1.) That it be something in itself lawful. (2.) That it be acceptable to God. (3.) That it be within our own power. (4.) That it be for our spiritual edification. Secondly, as to the person making the vow, (1.) That he be competent ; that is, that he have sufficient intelligence, and that he be sui
1 In conversation with a very intelligent Romish priest who had been educated at May- nooth, the question was asked, What was the effect of a course of " Moral Theology " de- signed to train priests for the confessional ? The prompt awswer was, Utterly to destroy the moral sense.
316 PART IE. Ch. XIX. — the law.
Juris. A child is not competent to make a vow ; neither is one under authority so that he has not liberty of action as to the matter vowed. (2.) That he act with due deliberation and solemnity ; for a vow is an act of worship. (3.) That it be made voluntarily, and observed cheerfully.
All these principles are recognized in the Bible. "When thou shalt vow a vow unto the Lord thy God, thou shalt not slack to pay it : for the Lord thy God will surely require it of thee ; and it would be sin in thee. But if thou shalt forbear to vow, it shall be no sin in thee. That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt keep and perform : even a freewill offering, according as thou hast vowed unto the Lord thy God, which thou hast promised with thy mouth." (Deut. xxiii. 21-23.) In Numbers xxx. 3-5, it is enacted that if a woman in her father's house make a vow, and her father disallow it, it shall not stand, " and the Lord shall forgive her, because her father disallowed her." The same rule is applied to wives and to children, on the obvious principle, that where the rights of others are con- cerned, we are not at liberty to disregard them.
All the conditions requisite to the lawfulness of a vow, may be included under the old formula, " judicium in vovente, justitia in objecto, Veritas in mente." There are two conditions insisted upon by Romanists to which Protestants do not consent. The one is that a vow must be " de meliore bono," i. e., for a greater good. If a man vows to devote himself to the priesthood, to make a pilgrimage, to found a church, or to become a monk, the thing vowed is not only good in itself, but it is better than its opposite. The other condition is, that the thing vowed must be in itself not obligatory, so that the sphere of duty is enlarged by the vow. These conditions are included in those laid down by Dens. 1 He says : " Quinque ex causis provenire, quod aliquid non sit apta materia voti ; 1°. quia est impossibile ; 2°. quia est necessarium ; 3°. quia est illicitum ; 4°. quia est indifferens vel inutile ; 5°. quia non est bonum melius." The two conditions just specified no doubt concur in many vows acceptable to God, but they are not essential. A man may vow to do what he is bound to do, as is the case with every man who consecrates himself to God in baptism. Nor is it necessary that the thing vowed should be in its own nature a greater good. A man may bind himself to a work out of gratitude to God, which in its own nature is indifferent. This was the case with many
1 Tractatua de Voto ; Theologia, edit Dublin, 1832, vol. iv. R. 91, p. 111.