/summa/FS/FSIII/FS_Q28/FS_Q28_A6:
* Objection 1: * It would seem that the lover does not do everything from love. For love is a passion, as stated above (Q[26], A[2]). But man does not do everything from passion: but some things he does from choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Therefore not everything that a man does, is done from love.
* Objection 2: * Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. If, therefore, whatever a man does is done from love, the other passions of the appetitive faculty are superfluous.
* Objection 3: * Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by contrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore all things are not done from love.
* On the contrary, * Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good."
* I answer that, * Every agent acts for an end, as stated above (Q[1], A[2] ). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some kind.
* Reply to Objection 1: * This objection takes love as a passion existing in the sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love in a general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks of love in chapter iv of De Divinis Nominibus.
* Reply to Objection 2: * As stated above (A[5]; Q[27], A[4]) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the soul, result from love. Wherefore every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.
* Reply to Objection 3: * Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state further on (Q[29], A[2]).