Chapter XCVIII.
I do not know, moreover, how Celsus could hear of the elephants' (fidelity to) oaths, and of their great devotedness to our God, and of the knowledge which they possess of Him. For I know many wonderful things which are related of the nature of this animal, and of its gentle disposition. But I am not aware that any one has spoken of its observance of oaths; unless indeed to its gentle disposition, and its observance of compacts, so to speak, when once concluded between it and man, he give the name of keeping its oath, which statement also in itself is false. For although rarely, yet sometimes it has been recorded that, after their apparent tameness, they have broken out against men in the most savage manner, and have committed murder, and have been on that account condemned to death, because no longer of any use. And seeing that after this, in order to establish (as he thinks he does) that the stork is more pious than any human being, he adduces the accounts which are narrated regarding that creature's display of filial affection [4065] in bringing food to its parents for their support, we have to say in reply, that this is done by the storks, not from a regard to what is proper, nor from reflection, but from a natural instinct; the nature which formed them being desirous to show an instance among the irrational animals which might put men to shame, in the matter of exhibiting their gratitude to their parents. And if Celsus had known how great the difference is between acting in this way from reason, and from an irrational natural impulse, he would not have said that storks are more pious than human beings. But further, Celsus, as still contending for the piety of the irrational creation, quotes the instance of the Arabian bird the phoenix, which after many years repairs to Egypt, and bears thither its parent, when dead and buried in a ball of myrrh, and deposits its body in the Temple of the Sun. Now this story is indeed recorded, and, if it be true, [4066] it is possible that it may occur in consequence of some provision of nature; divine providence freely displaying to human beings, by the differences which exist among living things, the variety of constitution which prevails in the world, and which extends even to birds, and in harmony with which He has brought into existence one creature, the only one of its kind, in order that by it men may be led to admire, not the creature, but Him who created it.
[4065] antipelargountos.
[4066] [See vol. i. pp. viii., 12, this series. Observe, Origen, in Egypt, doubts the story.]
Chapter XCIX.
In addition to all that he has already said, Celsus subjoins the following: "All things, accordingly, were not made for man, any more than they were made for lions, or eagles, or dolphins, but that this world, as being God's work, might be perfect and entire in all respects. For this reason all things have been adjusted, not with reference to each other, but with regard to their bearing upon the whole. [4067] And God takes care of the whole, and (His) providence will never forsake it; and it does not become worse; nor does God after a time bring it back to himself; nor is He angry on account of men any more than on account of apes or flies; nor does He threaten these beings, each one of which has received its appointed lot in its proper place." Let us then briefly reply to these statements. I think, indeed, that I have shown in the preceding pages that all things were created for man, and every rational being, and that it was chiefly for the sake of the rational creature that the creation took place. Celsus, indeed, may say that this was done not more for man than for lions, or the other creatures which he mentions; but we maintain that the Creator did not form these things for lions, or eagles, or dolphins, but all for the sake of the rational creature, and "in order that this world, as being God's work, might be perfect and complete in all things." For to this sentiment we must yield our assent as being well said. And God takes care, not, as Celsus supposes, merely of the whole, but beyond the whole, in a special degree of every rational being. Nor will Providence ever abandon the whole; for although it should become more wicked, owing to the sin of the rational being, which is a portion of the whole, He makes arrangements to purify it, and after a time to bring back the whole to Himself. Moreover, He is not angry with apes or flies; but on human beings, as those who have transgressed the laws of nature, He sends judgments and chastisements, and threatens them by the mouth of the prophets, and by the Saviour who came to visit the whole human race, that those who hear the threatenings may be converted by them, while those who neglect these calls to conversion may deservedly suffer those punishments which it becomes God, in conformity with that will of His which acts for the advantage of the whole, to inflict upon those who need such painful discipline and correction. But as our fourth book has now attained sufficient dimensions, we shall here terminate our discourse. And may God grant, through His Son, who is God the Word, and Wisdom, and Truth, and Righteousness, and everything else which the sacred Scriptures when speaking of God call Him, that we may make a good beginning of the fifth book, to the benefit of our readers, and may bring it to a successful conclusion, with the aid of His word abiding in our soul.
[4067] all' ei me pan ergon. "Gelenius does not recognise these words, and Guietus regards them as superfluous." They are omitted in the translation.
Elucidation.
------------------------
(Stated in obscure terms, with advantage, p. 495.)
Turn back to the Second Apology of Justin (cap. ix.), "Eternal punishment not a mere threat;" [4068] also to Clement (Stromata, iv. cap. xxiv.), "the reason and end of divine punishments." [4069] Now compare Gieseler [4070] (vol. i. p. 212) for what he so sweepingly asserts. And on the doctrine of Origen, let me quote a very learned and on such points a most capable judge, the late erudite and pious half-Gallican Dr. Pusey. He says:--
"Celsus and Origen are both witnesses that Christians believed in the eternity of punishment. Celsus, to weaken the force of the argument from the sufferings which the martyrs underwent sooner than abjure Christianity, tells Origen that heathen priests taught the same doctrine of eternal punishment as the Christians, and that the only question was, which was right. [4071]
"Origen answers, I should say that the truth lies with those who are able to induce their hearers to live as men convinced of the truth of what they have heard. Jews and Christians have been thus affected by the doctrines which they hold about the world to come, the rewards of the righteous, and the punishments of the wicked. Who have been moved in this way, in regard to eternal punishments, by the teaching of heathen priests and mystagogues?'
"Origen's answer acknowledges that the doctrine of eternal punishment had been taught to Christians, that One [Christ] had taught it, and that it had produced the effects He had [in view] in teaching it; viz., to set Christians to strive with all their might to conquer the sin which produced it." [4072]
On this most painful subject my natural feelings are much with Canon Farrar; but, after lifelong application to the subject, I must think Dr. Pusey holds with his Master, Christ. I feel willing to leave it all with Him who died for sinners, and the cross shuts my mouth. "Herein is love;" and I cannot dictate to such love, from my limited mind, and capacity, and knowledge of His universe. Here let "every thought be brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ." Let us sacrifice "imaginations and every high thing that exalteth itself," and leave our Master alike supreme in our affections and over our intellectual powers. He merits such subjection. Let us preach His words, and leave Him to explain them when He shall "condemn every tongue that shall rise against Him in judgment."
Let me also refer to Bledsoe's most solemn and searching reply to John Foster; also to his answer to Lord Kames's effort to help the Lord out of a supposed difficulty. [4073] I am sorry that Tillotson exposed himself to a witty retort by the same author, in these words: "If the Almighty really undertook to deceive the world for its own good, it is a pity He did not take the precaution to prevent the archbishop from detecting the cheat,...not suffering his secret to get into the possession of one who has so indiscreetly published it." The awful importance of the subject, and the recently awakened interest in its discussion, have led me to enlarge this annotation.
[4068] Our vol. i. p. 191.
[4069] Our vol. ii. p. 437.
[4070] Ed. Philadelphia, 1836.
[4071] See this treatise, Book VIII. cap. xlviii., infra.
[4072] What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment? in reply to Dr. Farrar's Challenge, 1879. By the Rev. E. B. Pusey, D.D., Oxford, 1881.
[4073] Theodicy, pp. 295-311 (answer to Foster), p. 81 (to Lord Kames), p. 310 (to Tillotson). I must confess that Bledsoe is paulo iniquior when he gives no reference to Tillotson's language. If the retort is based on the sermon (xxxv. vol. iii. p. 350, ed. folio, 1720) on the "Eternity of Torment," however, I do not think it just. The latitudinarian primate restricts himself therein to a very guarded statement of that reserved right by which any governor commutes or remits punishment, though he cannot modify a promise of reward. I wish modern apologists for the divine sovereignty had not gone farther.