Chapter XVII.--Aristotle; Duality of Principles; His Categories; His Psychology; His Ethical Doctrines; Origin of the Epithet "Peripatetic."
Aristotle, who was a pupil of this (Plato), reduced philosophy into an art, and was distinguished rather for his proficiency in logical science, supposing as the elements of all things substance and accident; that there is one substance underlying all things, but nine accidents,--namely, quantity, quality, relation, where, when, possession, posture, action, passion; and that substance is of some such description as God, man, and each of the beings that can fall under a similar denomination. But in regard of accidents, quality is seen in, for instance, white, black; and quantity, for instance two cubits, three cubits; and relation, for instance father, son; and where, for instance at Athens, Megara; and when, for instance during the tenth Olympiad; and possession, for instance to have acquired; and action, for instance to write, and in general to evince any practical powers; and posture, for instance to lie down; and passion, for instance to be struck. He also supposes that some things have means, but that others are without means, as we have declared concerning Plato likewise. And in most points he is in agreement with Plato, except the opinion concerning soul. For Plato affirms it to be immortal, but Aristotle that it involves permanence; and after these things, that this also vanishes in the fifth body, [123] which he supposes, along with the other four (elements),--viz., fire, and earth, and water, and air,--to be a something more subtle (than these), of the nature of spirit. Plato therefore says, that the only really good things are those pertaining to the soul, and that they are sufficient for happiness; whereas Aristotle introduces a threefold classification of good things, and asserts that the wise man is not perfect, unless there are present to him both the good things of the body and those extrinsic to it. [124] The former are beauty, strength, vigour of the senses, soundness; while the things extrinsic (to the body) are wealth, nobility, glory, power, peace, friendship. [125] And the inner qualities of the soul he classifies, as it was the opinion of Plato, under prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude. This (philosopher) also affirms that evils arise according to an opposition of the things that are good, and that they exist beneath the quarter around the moon, but reach no farther beyond the moon; and that the soul of the entire world is immortal, and that the world itself is eternal, but that (the soul) in an individual, as we have before stated, vanishes (in the fifth body). This (speculator), then holding discussions in the Lyceum, drew up from time to time his system of philosophy; but Zeno (held his school) in the porch called Poecilé. And the followers of Zeno obtained their name from the place--that is, from Stoa--(i.e., a porch), being styled Stoics; whereas Aristotle's followers (were denominated) from their mode of employing themselves while teaching. For since they were accustomed walking about in the Lyceum to pursue their investigations, on this account they were called Peripatetics. These indeed, then, were the doctrines of Aristotle.
[123] Or, "the fifth body, in which it is supposed to be, along with the other four (elements);" or, "the fifth body, which is supposed to be (composed) of the other four."
[124] Hippolytus expresses himself in the words of Stobæus, who says (Eclog., ii. 274): "And among reputed external blessings are nobility, wealth, glory, peace, freedom, friendship."
[125] Or, "glory, the confirmed power of friends."
Chapter XVIII.--The Stoics; Their Superiority in Logic; Fatalists; Their Doctrine of Conflagrations.
The Stoics themselves also imparted growth to philosophy, in respect of a greater development of the art of syllogism, and included almost everything under definitions, both Chrysippus and Zeno being coincident in opinion on this point. And they likewise supposed God to be the one originating principle of all things, being a body of the utmost refinement, and that His providential care pervaded everything; and these speculators were positive about the existence of fate everywhere, employing some such example as the following: that just as a dog, supposing him attached to a car, if indeed he is disposed to follow, both is drawn, [126] or follows voluntarily, making an exercise also of free power, in combination with necessity, that is, fate; but if he may not be disposed to follow, he will altogether be coerced to do so. And the same, of course, holds good in the case of men. For though not willing to follow, they will altogether be compelled to enter upon what has been decreed for them. (The Stoics), however, assert that the soul abides after death, [127] but that it is a body, and that such is formed from the refrigeration of the surrounding atmosphere; wherefore, also, that it was called psyche (i.e., soul). And they acknowledge likewise, that there is a transition of souls from one body to another, that is, for those souls for whom this migration has been destined. And they accept the doctrine, that there will be a conflagration, a purification of this world, some say the entire of it, but others a portion, and that (the world) itself is undergoing partial destruction; and this all but corruption, and the generation from it of another world, they term purgation. And they assume the existence of all bodies, and that body does not pass through body, [128] but that a refraction [129] takes place, and that all things involve plenitude, and that there is no vacuum. The foregoing are the opinions of the Stoics also.
[126] One of the mss. elucidates the simile in the text thus: "But if he is not disposed, there is absolutely a necessity for his being drawn along. And in like manner men, if they do not follow fate, seem to be free agents, though the reason of (their being) fate holds assuredly valid. If, however, they do not wish to follow, they will absolutely be coerced to enter upon what has been fore-ordained."
[127] Or, "is immortal." Diogenes Laertius (book vii.) notices, in his section on Zeno, as part of the Stoic doctrine, "that the soul abides after death, but that it is perishable."
[128] Or, "through what is incorporeal;" that is, through what is void or empty space.
[129] Or, "resurrection;" or, "resistance;" that is, a resisting medium.