In behalf of this grace let us glorify the Father, who has given His only begotten Son for the life of the world. Let us glorify the Holy Spirit that worketh in us, and quickeneth us, and furnisheth the gifts meet for the fellowship of God; and let us not intermeddle with the word of the Gospel by lifeless disputations, scattering about endless questionings and logomachies, and making a hard thing of the gentle and simple word of faith; but rather let us work the work of faith, let us love peace, let us exhibit concord, let us preserve unity, let us cultivate love, with which God is well pleased.
As it is not for us to know the times or the seasons which the Father hath put in His own power, [428] but only to believe that there will come an end to time, and that there will be a manifestation of a future world, and a revelation of judgment, and an advent of the Son of God, and a recompense of works, and an inheritance in the kingdom of heaven, so it is not for us to know how the Son of God became man; for this is a great mystery, as it is written, "Who shall declare His generation? for His life is taken from the earth." [429] But it is for us to believe that the Son of God became man, according to the Scriptures; and that He was seen on the earth, and had His conversation with men, according to the Scriptures, in their likeness, yet without sin; and that He died for us, and rose again from the dead, as it is written; and that He was taken up to heaven, and sat down at the right hand of the Father, whence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead, as it is written; lest, while we war against each other with words, any should be led to blaspheme the word of faith, and that should come to pass which is written, "By reason of you is my name [430] continually blasphemed among the nations." [431]
[421] John xi. 33; xii. 27; xiii. 21.
[422] Matt. xxvi. 38.
[423] Isa. liii. 5.
[424] Baruch iii. 38.
[425] Luke ii. 14.
[426] John xvi. 33.
[427] Rom. v. 12; viii. 3.
[428] Acts i. 7.
[429] Isa. liii. 8.
[430] Or, the name of God.
[431] Isa. lii. 5.
Elucidations.
------------------------
These "twelve anathemas," as they are called, do evidently refute the Nestorians and later heretics. Evidently, therefore, we must assign this document to another author. And, as frequent references are made to such tests, I subjoin a list of OEcumenical or Catholic Councils, properly so called, as follows:--
1. Jerusalem, against Judaism, [432] a.d. 50.
2. Nicæa, against Arianism (1), [433] a.d. 325.
3. Constantinople (I.), against Semi-Arianism (2), a.d. 381.
4. Ephesus, against Nestorianism (3), a.d. 431.
5. Chalcedon, against Eutychianism (4), a.d. 451.
6. Constantinople (II.), against Monophysitism (5), a.d. 553.
7. Constantinople (III.), against Monothelitism (6), [434] a.d. 680.
These are all the undisputed councils. The Seventh Council, so called (a.d. 537), was not a free council, and was rejected by a free council of the West, convened at Frankfort a.d. 794. Its acceptance by the Roman pontiffs, subsequently, should have no logical force with the Easterns, who do not recognise their supremacy even over the councils of the West; and no free council has ever been held under pontifical authority. The above list, therefore, is a complete list of all the councils of the undivided Church as defined by Catholic canons. There has been no possibility of a Catholic council since the division of East and West. The Council of Frankfort is the pivot of subsequent history, and its fundamental importance has not been sufficiently insisted upon.
[432] As widely different from the other councils as the Apostles from their successors, and part of its decisions were local and temporary. For all that, it was the greatest of councils, and truly General.
[433] These numbers indicate the ordinary reckoning of writers, and is correct ecclesiastically. The Council of Jerusalem, however, is the base of Christian orthodoxy, and decided the great principles by which the "General Councils" were professedly ruled.
[434] Theological students are often puzzled to recall the councils in order, and not less to recall the rejected heresies. I have found two mnemonics useful, thus: (1) INCE and (CCC) three hundred; (2) JAS. NEMM. Dulce est desipere, etc.
[435] a.d. 325 to 680 is the Synodical Period. Gregory I. (Rome) placed the first four councils next to the four Gospels.
On the Subject of the Soul. [436]
------------------------
You have instructed us, most excellent Tatian, [437] to forward for your use a discourse upon the soul, laying it out in effective demonstrations. And this you have asked us to do without making use of the testimonies of Scripture,--a method which is opened to us, and which, to those who seek the pious mind, proves a manner of setting forth doctrine more convincing than any reasoning of man. [438] You have said, however, that you desire this, not with a view to your own full assurance, taught as you already have been to hold by the Holy Scriptures and traditions, and to avoid being shaken in your convictions by any subtleties of man's disputations, but with a view to the confuting of men who have different sentiments, and who do not admit that such credit is to be given to the Scriptures, and who endeavour, by a kind of cleverness of speech, to gain over those who are unversed in such discussions. Wherefore we were led to comply readily with this commission of yours, not shrinking from the task on account of inexperience in this method of disputation, but taking encouragement from the knowledge of your good-will toward us. For your kind and friendly disposition towards us will make you understand how to put forward publicly whatever you may approve of as rightly expressed by us, and to pass by and conceal whatever statement of ours you may judge to come short of what is proper. Knowing this, therefore, I have betaken myself with all confidence to the exposition. And in my discourse I shall use a certain order and consecution, such as those who are very expert in these matters employ towards those who desire to investigate any subject intelligently.
First of all, then, I shall propose to inquire by what criterion the soul can, according to its nature, be apprehended; then by what means it can be proved to exist; thereafter, whether it is a substance or an accident; [439] then consequently on these points, whether it is a body or is incorporeal; then, whether it is simple or compound; next, whether it is mortal or immortal; and finally, whether it is rational or irrational.
For these are the questions which are wont, above all, to be discussed, in any inquiry about the soul, as most important, and as best calculated to mark out its distinctive nature. And as demonstrations for the establishing of these matters of investigation, we shall employ those common modes of consideration [440] by which the credibility of matters under hand is naturally attested. But for the purpose of brevity and utility, we shall at present make use only of those modes of argumentation which are most cogently demonstrative on the subject of our inquiry, in order that clear and intelligible [441] notions may impart to us some readiness for meeting the gainsayers. With this, therefore, we shall commence our discussion.
[436] A Topical Discourse by our holy father Gregory, surnamed Thaumaturgus, bishop of Neo-Cæsareia in Pontus, addressed to Tatian.
[437] [A person not known.]
[438] [True to the universal testimony of the primitive Fathers as to Holy Scripture.]
[439] [Aristotle, Physica. Elucidation I.]
[440] ennoiais.
[441] euparadekta.
I. Wherein is the Criterion for the Apprehension of the Soul.
All things that exist are either known by sense [442] or apprehended by thought. [443] And what falls under sense has its adequate demonstration in sense itself; for at once, with the application, it creates in us the impression [444] of what underlies it. But what is apprehended by thought is known not by itself, but by its operations. [445] The soul, consequently, being unknown by itself, shall be known property by its effects.
[442] aisthesei.
[443] noesei.
[444] phantasian.
[445] energeion.
II. Whether the Soul Exists.
Our body, when it is put in action, is put in action either from without or from within. And that it is not put in action from without, is manifest from the circumstance that it is put in action neither by impulsion [446] nor by traction, [447] like soulless things. And again, if it is put in action from within, it is not put in action according to nature, like fire. For fire never loses its action as long as there is fire; whereas the body, when it has become dead, is a body void of action. Hence, if it is put in action neither from without, like soulless things, nor according to nature, after the fashion of fire, it is evident that it is put in action by the soul, which also furnishes life to it. If, then, the soul is shown to furnish the life to our body, the soul will also be known for itself by its operations.
[446] othoumenon.
[447] helkomenon.
III. Whether the Soul is a Substance.
That the soul is a substance, [448] is proved in the following manner. In the first place, because the definition given to the term substance suits it very well. And that definition is to the effect, that substance is that which, being ever identical, and ever one in point of numeration with itself, is yet capable of taking on contraries in succession. [449] And that this soul, without passing the limit of its own proper nature, takes on contraries in succession, is, I fancy, clear to everybody. For righteousness and unrighteousness, courage and cowardice, temperance and intemperance, are seen in it successively; and these are contraries. If, then, it is the property of a substance to be capable of taking on contraries in succession, and if the soul is shown to sustain the definition in these terms, it follows that the soul is a substance. And in the second place, because if the body is a substance, the soul must also be a substance. For it cannot be, that what only has life imparted should be a substance, and that what imparts the life should be no substance: unless one should assert that the non-existent is the cause of the existent; or unless, again, one were insane enough to allege that the dependent object is itself the cause of that very thing in which it has its being, and without which it could not subsist. [450]
[448] ousia.
[449] ton enantion parameros einai dektikon, parameros, here apparently = in turn, though usually = out of turn.
[450] The text has an apparent inversion: to en ho ten huparxin echon kai hou aneu einai me dunamenon, aition ekeinou einai tou en ho esti. There is also a variety of reading: kai ho aneu tou einai me dunamenon.
IV. Whether the Soul is Incorporeal.
That the soul is in our body, has been shown above. We ought now, therefore, to ascertain in what manner it is in the body. Now, if it is in juxtaposition with it, as one pebble with another, it follows that the soul will be a body, and also that the whole body will not be animated with soul, [451] inasmuch as with a certain part it will only be in juxtaposition. But if again, it is mingled or fused with the body, the soul will become multiplex, [452] and not simple, and will thus be despoiled of the rationale proper to a soul. For what is multiplex is also divisible and dissoluble; and what is dissoluble, on the other hand, is compound; [453] and what is compound is separable in a threefold manner. Moreover, body attached to body makes weight; [454] but the soul, subsisting in the body, does not make weight, but rather imparts life. The soul, therefore, cannot be a body, but is incorporeal.
Again, if the soul is a body, it is put in action either from without or from within. But it is not put in action from without; for it is moved neither by impulsion nor by traction, like soulless things. Nor is it put in action from within, like objects animated with soul; for it is absurd to talk of a soul of the soul: it cannot, therefore, be a body, but it is incorporeal.
And besides, if the soul is a body, it has sensible qualities, and is maintained by nurture. But it is not thus nurtured. For if it is nurtured, it is not nurtured corporeally, like the body, but incorporeally; for it is nurtured by reason. It has not, therefore, sensible qualities: for neither is righteousness, nor courage, nor any one of these things, something that is seen; yet these are the qualities of the soul. It cannot, therefore, be a body, but is incorporeal.