[1570] Or, standard.
[1571] Titulo.
[1572] Ergastula.
[1573] Or, in the wicked one. 1 John v. 19.
[1574] The text gives "extra eum." Routh suggests Deum, outside of God.
[1575] Vas.
[1576] The text gives simply "quod Dei substantia," etc. We may perhaps adopt, with Routh, "quod si Dei," etc.
[1577] Sedes. ["Thrones," as in Milton.] Routh suggests sidera, luminaries.
[1578] Ingenitæ.
[1579] Fructus.
[1580] The reference is to the ancient custom of using wax and certain earths and clays for the purpose of affixing, by means of the ring, a seal with an impression on any object which it was desired to secure. Thus Herodotus, ii. 38, tell us how the Egyptians marked the pure victim by wrapping it round the horns with papyrus, and then smearing some sealing earth (gen semantrida) on it, and stamping it with a ring. See also Cicero, Pro Flacco, where he speaks of the laudatio obsignata cretâ illa Asiatica; and Plautus, Pseudolus, Scene i., where he mentions the expressam in cera ex annulo suam imaginem, etc. [Compare vol. v. p. 466, note 3, this series.]
15. The judges said: We need not inquire as to the manner in which that primitive commerce took place until we have first seen it proved that there are two natural principles. For when once it is made clear that there are two unbegotten natures, then others of your averments may also gain our assent, even although something in them may not seem to fit in very readily with what is credible. For as the power of pronouncing judgment has been committed to us, we shall declare what may make itself clear to our mind. We may, however, also grant to Archelaus the liberty of speaking to these statements of yours, so that, by comparing what is said by each of you, we may be able to give our decision in accordance with the truth. Archelaus said: Notwithstanding, the adversary's intent is replete with gross audacity and blasphemy. Manes said: Hear, O judges, what he has said of the adversary. [1581] He admits, then, that there are two objects. Archelaus said: It seems to me that this man is full of madness rather than of prudence, who would stir up a controversy with me to-day because I chance to speak of the adversary. But this objection of yours may be removed with few words, notwithstanding that you have supposed from this expression of mine that I shall allow that there are these two natures. [1582] You have come forward with a most extravagant [1583] doctrine; for neither of the assertions made by you holds good. For it is quite possible that one who is an adversary, not by nature, but by determination, may be made a friend, and cease to be an adversary; and thus, when the one of us has come to acquiesce with the other, we twain shall appear to be, as it were, one and the same object. This account also indicates that rational creatures have been entrusted with free-will, [1584] in virtue of which they also admit of conversions. And consequently there cannot be two unbegotten natures. [1585] What do you say, then? Are these two natures inconvertible? or are they convertible? or is one of them converted? Manes, however, held back, because he did not find a suitable reply; for he was pondering the conclusion which might be drawn from either of two answers which he might make, turning the matter over thus in his thoughts: If I say that they are converted, he will meet me with that statement which is recorded in the Gospel about the trees; [1586] but if I say that they are not convertible, he will necessarily ask me to explain the condition and cause of their intermingling. In the meantime, after a little delay, Manes replied: They are indeed both inconvertible in so far as contraries are concerned; but they are convertible as far as properties [1587] are concerned. Archelaus then said: You seem to me to be out of your mind, and oblivious of your own propositions; yea, you do not appear even to recognise the powers or qualities of the very words which you have been learning. [1588] For you do not understand either what conversion is, or what is meant by unbegotten, or what duality implies, or what is past, or what is present, or what is future, as I have gathered from the opinions to which you have just now given expression. For you have affirmed, indeed, that each of these two natures is inconvertible so far as regards contraries, but convertible so far as regards properties. But I maintain that one who moves in properties does not pass out of himself, but subsists in these same properties, in which he is ever inconvertible; while in the case of one who is susceptible of conversion, the effect is that he is placed outside the pale of properties, and passes within the sphere of accidents. [1589]
[1581] The text is "quid dixerit adversarii;" some propose "quod" or "quia dixerit," etc.
[1582] The manuscript reading is, "tam si quidem ex hoc arbitratus est se affirmaturum." For this it is proposed to read, as in the translation, "tametsi quidem ex hoc arbitratus es me affirmaturum."
[1583] The text gives ingentem. Routh suggests inscientem, stupid.
[1584] [Vol. iii. 301-302. See Coleridge (on Donne), English Divines, vol. i. p. 87.]
[1585] Adopting the proposed reading, "et ideo duæ, ingenitæ naturæ esse non possunt." The text omits the duæ, however; and in that case the sense would be simply, And consequently there cannot be unbegotten natures; or perhaps, And so they (the creatures) cannot be of an unbegotten nature.
[1586] [Matt. vii. 15-20.]
[1587] Propria.
[1588] Didicisti. But perhaps we ought to read dixisti, which you have been uttering.
[1589] Aliena, of what is alien.
16. The judges said: Convertibility translates the person whom it befalls into another; as, for example, we might say that if a Jew were to make up his mind to become a Christian, or, on the other hand, if a Christian were to decide to be a Gentile, this would be a species of convertibility, and a cause of the same. [1590] But, again, if we suppose a Gentile to keep by all his own heathen properties, and to offer sacrifices to his gods, and to do service to the temples as usual, surely you would not be of opinion that he could be said to be converted, while he yet holds by his properties, and goes on in them? What, then, do you say? Do they sustain convertibility or not? And as Manes hesitated, Archelaus proceeded thus: If, indeed, he says that both natures are convertible, [1591] what is there to prevent our thinking them to be one and the same object? For if they are inconvertible, then surely in natures which are similarly inconvertible and similarly unbegotten there is no distinction, neither can the one of them be recognised as good or as evil. But if they are both convertible, then, forsooth, the possible result may be both that the good is made evil, and that the evil is made good. If, however, this is the possible result, why should we not speak of one only as unbegotten, [1592] which would be a conception in worthier accordance with the reckoning of truth? For we have to consider how that evil one became so at first, or against what objects he exercised his wickedness before the formation of the world. When the heavens had not yet appeared, when the earth did not yet subsist, and when there was neither man nor animal, against whom did he put his wickedness in operation? whom did he oppress unjustly? whom did he rob and kill? But if you say that he first appeared in his evil nature to his own kin, [1593] then without doubt you give the proof that he comes of a good nature. And if, again, all these are also evil, how can Satan then cast out Satan? [1594] But while thus reduced to a dilemma on this point, you may change your position in the discussion, and say that the good suffered violence from the evil. But none the more is it without peril for you to make such a statement, to the effect of affirming the vanquishing of the light; for what is vanquished has destruction near it. [1595] For what says the divine word? "Who can enter into a strong man's house, and spoil his goods, except he be stronger than he?" [1596] But if you allege that he first appeared in his evil nature to men, and only from that time showed openly the marks of his wickedness, then it follows that before this time he was good, and that he took on this quality of conversion because the creation of man [1597] was found to have emerged as the cause of his wickedness. But, in fine, let him tell us what he understands by evil, lest perchance he may be defending or setting up a mere name. And if it is not the name but the substance of evil that he speaks of, then let him set before us the fruits of this wickedness and iniquity, since the nature of a tree can never be known but by its fruit.
[1590] The text runs thus: "ut si dicamus, Judæus, si velit fieri Christianus, aut si Christianus velit esse gentilis, hæc species est convertibilitatis et causa."
[1591] The text gives convertibiles. Routh suggests inconvertibiles, inconvertible.
[1592] The text is unum dicamus ingenitum. Routh suggests unum bonum, etc. = Why should we not speak of only one unbegotten good?
[1593] The text is, "quod si suis eum dicas extitisse malum, sine dubio ergo ostenditur illum bonæ esse naturæ." Routh suggests, "quia istis suis adversatur qui mali sunt," etc. = The fact that he is adverse to those who are of his own kin, and who are evil, would be a proof that he comes of a good nature.
[1594] Mark iii. 23.
[1595] Or, kin to it, vicinum habet interitum.
[1596] Mark iii. 27.
[1597] The text is, "creati hominis causa invenitur exstitisse malitiæ," for which we read "creatio hominis," etc.
17. Manes said: Let it first be allowed on your side that there is an alien root of wickedness, which God has not planted, and then I shall tell you its fruits. Archelaus said: Truth's reckoning does not make any such requirement; and I shall not admit to you that there is a root of any such evil tree, of the fruit whereof no one has ever tasted. But just as, when a man desires to make any purchase, he does not produce the money unless he first ascertains by tasting the object whether it is of a dry or a moist species, so I shall not admit to you that the tree is evil and utterly corrupt, unless the quality of its fruit is first exhibited; for it is written, that "the tree is known by its fruits." [1598] Tell us, therefore, O Manes, what fruit is yielded by that tree which is called evil, or of what nature it is, and what virtue it is, that we may also believe with you that the root of that same tree is of that character which you ascribe to it. Manes said: The root indeed is evil, and the tree is most corrupt, but the increase is not from God. Moreover, fornications, adulteries, murders, avarice, and all evil deeds, are the fruits of that evil root. Archelaus said: That we may credit you when you say that these are the fruits of that evil root, give us a taste of these things; for you have pronounced the substance of this tree to be ungenerate, [1599] the fruits of which are produced after its own likeness. Manes said: The very unrighteousness which subsists in men offers the proof itself, and in avarice too you may taste that evil root. Archelaus said: Well, then, as you have stated the question, those iniquities which prevail among men are fruits of this tree. Manes said: Quite so. Archelaus proceeded: If these, then, are the fruits, that is to say, the wicked deeds of men, it will follow that the men themselves will hold the place of the root and of the tree; for you have declared that they produce fruits of this nature. Manes said: That is my statement. Archelaus answered: Not well say you, That is my statement: for surely that cannot be your statement; otherwise, when men cease from sinning, this tree of wickedness will appear to be unfruitful. Manes said: What you say is an impossibility; for even though one or another, or several, were to cease sinning, there would yet be others doing evil still. Archelaus said: If it is at all possible for one or another, or several, as you admit, not to sin, it is also possible for all to do the same; for they are all of one parent, and are all men of one lump. And, not to follow at my ease those affirmations which you have so confusedly made through all their absurdities, I shall conclude their refutation by certain unmistakeable counter-arguments. Do you allege that the fruits of the evil root and the evil tree are the deeds of men, that is to say, fornications, adulteries, perjuries, murders, and other similar things? Manes said: I do. Archelaus said: Well, then, if it happened that the race of men was to die off the face of the earth, so that they should not be able to sin any more, the substance of that tree would then perish, and it would bear fruit no more. Manes said: And when will that take place of which you speak? Archelaus said: What [1600] is in the future I know not, for I am but a man; nevertheless I shall not leave these words of yours unexamined. What say you of the race of men? Is it unbegotten, or is it a production? Manes said: It is a production. Archelaus said: If man is a production, who is the parent of adultery and fornication, and such other things? Whose fruit is this? Before man was made, who was there to be a fornicator, or an adulterer, or a murderer? Manes said: But if the man is fashioned of the evil nature, it is manifest that he is such a fruit, [1601] albeit he may sin, albeit he may not sin; whence also the name and race of men are once for all and absolutely of this character, whether they may do what is righteous or what is unrighteous. Archelaus said: Well, we may also take notice of that matter. If, as you aver, the wicked one himself made man, why is it that he practises his malignity on him?