[3420] Lit., "most worthy even of weeping and pity."
[3421] Redarguat. This sense is not recognised by Riddle and White, and would therefore seem to be, if not unique, at least extremely rare. The derivative redargutio, however, is in late Latin used for "demonstration," and this is evidently the meaning here.
[3422] Fidem vobis faciunt argumenta credendi. Heraldus, joining the two last words, naturally regards them as a gloss from the margin; but read as above, joining the first and last, there is nothing out of place.
[3423] Lit., "tranquillity being assumed, passed to placid feelings."
[3424] Res, "the thing."
[3425] Lit., "on chance encounters."
[3426] Rationes cognitas. There is some difficulty as to the meaning of these words, but it seems best to refer them to the argumenta credendi (beginning of chapter, "do not even these proofs"), and render as above. Hildebrand, however, reads tortiones, "they accept the tortures which they know will befall them."
[3427] The ms. reads et non omnium, "and by a love not of all the virtues," changed in most edd. as above into atque omnium, while Oehler proposes et novo omnium, "and by fresh love of all," etc. It will be remembered that the transposition of leaves in the ms. (note on ii. 1) occurs here, and this seems to account for the arbitrary reading of Gelenius, which has no ms. authority whatever, but was added by himself when transposing these chapters to the first book (cf. p. 432, n. 14), atque nectare ebrii cuncta contemnant--"As if intoxicated with a certain sweetness and nectar, they despise all things." The same circumstance has made the restoration of the passage by Canterus a connecting of fragments of widely separated sentences and arguments.
[3428] Lit., "all the things of the world." Here the argument breaks off, and passes into a new phase, but Orelli includes the next sentence also in the fifth chapter.
6. But perhaps those seem to you weak-minded and silly, who even now are uniting all over the world, and joining together to assent with that readiness of belief at which you mock. [3429] What then? Do you alone, imbued [3430] with the true power of wisdom and understanding, see something wholly different [3431] and profound? Do you alone perceive that all these things are trifles? you alone, that those things are mere words and childish absurdities which we declare are about to come to us from the supreme Ruler? Whence, pray, has so much wisdom been given to you? whence so much subtlety and wit? Or from what scientific training have you been able to gain so much wisdom, to derive so much foresight? Because you are skilled in declining verbs and nouns by cases and tenses, and [3432] in avoiding barbarous words and expressions; because you have learned either to express yourselves in [3433] harmonious, and orderly, and fitly-disposed language, or to know when it is rude and unpolished; [3434] because you have stamped on your memory the Fornix of Lucilius, [3435] and Marsyas of Pomponius; because you know what the issues to be proposed in lawsuits are, how many kinds of cases there are, how many ways of pleading, what the genus is, what the species, by what methods an opposite is distinguished from a contrary,--do you therefore think that you know what is false, what true, what can or cannot be done, what is the nature of the lowest and highest? Have the well-known words never rung in [3436] your ears, that the wisdom of man is foolishness with God?
[3429] Lit., "to the assent of that credulity."
[3430] So the ms., reading conditi vi mera, for which Orelli would read with Oudendorp, conditæ--"by the pure force of recondite wisdom." The ms., however, is supported by the similar phrase in the beginning of chap. 8, where tincti is used.
[3431] So the ms., reading aliud, for which Stewechius, adopting a suggestion of Canterus, conjectures, altius et profundius--"something deeper and more profound." Others propose readings further removed from the text; while Obbarius, retaining the ms. reading, explains it as "not common."
[3432] Lit., "because you are," etc.
[3433] Lit., "either yourselves to utter," etc.
[3434] Incomptus, for which Heraldus would read inconditus, as in opposition to "harmonious." This is, however, unnecessary, as the clause is evidently opposed to the whole of the preceding one.
[3435] No trace of either of these works has come down to us, and therefore, though there has been abundance of conjecture, we can reach no satisfactory conclusion about them. It seems most natural to suppose the former to be probably part of the lost satires of Lucilius, which had dealt with obscene matters, and the author of the latter to be the Atellane poet of Bononia. As to this there has been some discussion; but, in our utter ignorance of the work itself, it is as well to allow that we must remain ignorant of its author also. The scope of both works is suggested clearly enough by their titles--the statue of Marsyas in the forum overlooking nightly licentious orgies; and their mention seems intended to suggest a covert argument against the heathen, in the implied indecency of the knowledge on which they prided themselves. For Fornicem Lucilianum (ms. Lucialinum) Meursius reads Cæcilianum.
[3436] Lit., "Has that thing published never struck," etc. There is clearly a reference to 1 Cor. iii. 19, "the wisdom of this world." The argument breaks off here, and is taken up from a different point in the next sentence, which is included, however, in this chapter by Orelli.
7. In the first place, you yourselves, too, [3437] see clearly that, if you ever discuss obscure subjects, and seek to lay bare the mysteries of nature, on the one hand you do not know the very things which you speak of, which you affirm, which you uphold very often with especial zeal, and that each one defends with obstinate resistance his own suppositions as though they were proved and ascertained truths. For how can we of ourselves know whether we [3438] perceive the truth, even if all ages be employed in seeking out knowledge--we whom some envious power [3439] brought forth, and formed so ignorant and proud, that, although we know nothing at all, we yet deceive ourselves, and are uplifted by pride and arrogance so as to suppose ourselves possessed of knowledge? For, to pass by divine things, and those plunged in natural obscurity, can any man explain that which in the Phædrus [3440] the well-known Socrates cannot comprehend--what man is, or whence he is, uncertain, changeable, deceitful, manifold, of many kinds? for what purposes he was produced? by whose ingenuity he was devised? what he does in the world? (C) why he undergoes such countless ills? whether the earth gave life to him as to worms and mice, being affected with decay through the action of some moisture; [3441] or whether he received [3442] these outlines of body, and this cast of face, from the hand of some maker and framer? Can he, I say, know these things, which lie open to all, and are recognisable by [3443] the senses common to all,--by what causes we are plunged into sleep, by what we awake? in what ways dreams are produced, in what they are seen? nay rather--as to which Plato in the Theætetus [3444] is in doubt--whether we are ever awake, or whether that very state which is called waking is part of an unbroken slumber? and what we seem to do when we say that we see a dream? whether we see by means of rays of light proceeding towards the object, [3445] or images of the objects fly to and alight on the pupils of our eyes? whether the flavour is in the things tasted, or arises from their touching the palate? from what causes hairs lay aside their natural darkness, and do not become gray all at once, but by adding little by little? why it is that all fluids, on mingling, form one whole; that oil, on the contrary, does not suffer the others to be poured into it, [3446] but is ever brought together clearly into its own impenetrable [3447] substance? finally, why the soul also, which is said by you to be immortal and divine, [3448] is sick in men who are sick, senseless in children, worn out in doting, silly, [3449] and crazy old age? Now the weakness and wretched ignorance of these theories is greater on this account, that while it may happen that we at times say something which is true, [3450] we cannot be sure even of this very thing, whether we have spoken the truth at all.
[3437] So Gelenius, followed by Canterus and Orelli, reading primum et ipsi, by rejecting one word of the ms. (et quæ). Canterus plausibly combines both words into itaque--"therefore." LB. reads ecquid--"do you at all," etc., with which Orelli so far agrees, that he makes the whole sentence interrogative.
[3438] So restored by Stewechius; in the first ed. perspiciam (instead of am-us) "if I perceive the truth," etc.
[3439] So the ms. very intelligibly and forcibly, res...invida, but the common reading is invid-i-a--"whom something...with envy." The train of thought which is merely started here is pursued at some length a little later.
[3440] The ms. gives fedro, but all editions, except the first, Hildebrand, and Oehler, read Phædone, referring, however, to a passage in the first Alcibiades (st. p. 129), which is manifestly absurd, as in it, while Alcibiades "cannot tell what man is," Socrates at once proceeds to lead him to the required knowledge by the usual dialectic. Nourry thinks that there is a general reference to Phædr., st. p. 230,--a passage in which Socrates says that he disregards mythological questions that he may study himself. [P. 447, note 2, infra.]
[3441] Lit., "changed with the rottenness of some moisture." The reference is probably to the statement by Socrates (Phædo, st. p. 96) of the questions with regard to the origin of life, its progress and development, which interested him as a young man.
[3442] So the ms., LB., and Oehler, but the other edd. make the verb plural, and thus break the connection.
[3443] Lit., "established in the common senses."
[3444] Arnobius overstates the fact here. In the passage referred to (Th., st. p. 158), Socrates is represented as developing the Protagorean theory from its author's standpoint, not as stating his own opinions.
[3445] Lit., "by the stretching out of rays and of light." This, the doctrine of the Stoics, is naturally contrasted in the next clause with that of Epicurus.
[3446] Lit., "oil refuses to suffer immersion into itself," i.e., of other fluids.
[3447] So LB., followed by Orelli, reading impenetrabil-em, for the ms. impenetrabil-is, which is corrected in both Roman edd. by Gelenius, Canterus, and Elmenhorst -e, to agree with the subject oleum--"being impenetrable is ever," etc.
[3448] Lit., "a god."
[3449] So the edd., generally reading fatua for the ms. futura, which is clearly corrupt. Hildebrand turns the three adjectives into corresponding verbs, and Heinsius emends deliret (ms. -ra) et fatue et insane--"dotes both sillily and crazily." Arnobius here follows Lucr., iii. 445 sqq.
[3450] Lit., "something of truth."
8. And since you have been wont to laugh at our faith, and with droll jests to pull to pieces our readiness of belief too, say, O wits, soaked and filled with wisdom's pure drought, is there in life any kind of business demanding diligence and activity, which the doers [3451] undertake, engage in, and essay, without believing that it can be done? Do you travel about, do you sail on the sea without believing that you will return home when your business is done? Do you break up the earth with the plough, and fill it with different kinds of seeds without believing that you will gather in the fruit with the changes of the seasons? Do you unite with partners in marriage, [3452] without believing that it will be pure, and a union serviceable to the husband? Do you beget children without believing that they will pass [3453] safely through the different stages of life to the goal of age? Do you commit your sick bodies to the hands of physicians, without believing that diseases can be relieved by their severity being lessened? Do you wage wars with your enemies, without believing that you will carry off the victory by success in battles? [3454] Do you worship and serve the gods without believing that they are, and that they listen graciously to your prayers?
[3451] The ms. has a-t-tor-o-s, corrected by a later writer a-c-tor-e-s, which is received in LB. and by Meursius and Orelli.
[3452] Lit., "unite marriage partnerships."
[3453] Lit., "be safe and come."
[3454] Or, "in successive battles"--præliorum successionibus.
9. What, have you seen with your eyes, and handled [3455] with your hands, those things which you write yourselves, which you read from time to time on subjects placed beyond human knowledge? Does not each one trust this author or that? That which any one has persuaded himself is said with truth by another, does he not defend with a kind of assent, as it were, like that of faith? Does not he who says that fire [3456] or water is the origin of all things, pin his faith to Thales or Heraclitus? he who places the cause of all in numbers, to Pythagoras of Samos, and to Archytas? he who divides the soul, and sets up bodiless forms, to Plato, the disciple of Socrates? he who adds a fifth element [3457] to the primary causes, to Aristotle, the father of the Peripatetics? he who threatens the world with destruction by fire, and says that when the time comes it will be set on fire, to Panætius, Chrysippus, Zeno? he who is always fashioning worlds from atoms, [3458] and destroying them, to Epicurus, Democritus, Metrodorus? he who says that nothing is comprehended by man, and that all things are wrapt in dark obscurity, [3459] to Archesilas, [3460] to Carneades?--to some teacher, in fine, of the old and later Academy?