[3749] Lit., "a comparison of the worst may effect that we," etc.
[3750] So all edd. except Hildebrand, who gives as the reading of the ms., qui-d--"what! do they assert."
[3751] Lit., "by the force of," vi,--an emendation of Heraldus for the ms. in.
[3752] So most edd., reading pertinacifor the ms. -ium--"by the opposition of persistent virtues," which is retained in both Roman edd., Gelenius, Canterus, Hildebrand, and Oehler.
[3753] So Stewechius and later edd., reading ut...auferant, except Hildebrand, who gives as the ms. reading, et...-unt--"shun...and remove," etc. The first four edd. read ne...afferant--"that they may not bring upon themselves," etc.
[3754] So the ms. and first four edd., Orelli (who, however, seems to have meant to give the other reading), and Oehler, reading corri-p-i, for which the others read -igi--"corrected," except Hildebrand, who without due reason gives -rumpi--"corrupted."
[3755] In the ms. imperfectum is marked as a gloss, but is retained in all edd., while improbabilem is omitted, except in LB., when im is omitted, and probabilem joined to the next clause--"however he may strive to be acceptable," in order to provide an object for "strive;" and with a similar purpose Orelli thrusts in contrarium, although it is quite clear that the verb refers to the preceding clause, "struggles to amend."
51. But you laugh at our reply, because, while we deny that souls are of royal descent, we do not, on the other hand, say in turn from what causes and beginnings they have sprung. But what kind of crime is it either to be ignorant of anything, or to confess quite openly that you do not know that of which you are ignorant? or whether does he rather seem to you most deserving of ridicule who assumes to himself no knowledge of some dark subject; or he who thinks that he [3756] knows most clearly that which transcends human knowledge, and which has been involved in dark obscurity? If the nature of everything were thoroughly considered, you too are in a position like that which you censure in our case. For you do not say anything which has been ascertained and set most clearly in the light of truth, because you say that souls descend from the Supreme Ruler Himself, and enter into the forms of men. For you conjecture, do not perceive [3757] this; surmise, do not actually know it; for if to know is to retain in the mind that which you have yourself seen or known, not one of those things which you affirm can you say that you have ever seen--that is, that souls descend from the abodes and regions above. You are therefore making use of conjecture, not trusting clear information. But what is conjecture, except a doubtful imagining of things, and directing of the mind upon nothing accessible? He, then, who conjectures, does not comprehend, [3758] nor does he walk in the [3759] light of knowledge. But if this is true and certain in the opinion of proper and very wise judges, your conjectures, too, in which you trust, must be regarded as showing your ignorance.
[3756] The ms. reads se esse, without meaning, from which LB., followed by Hildebrand, and Oehler derived se ex se--"himself of himself." The rest simply omit esse as above.
[3757] Lit., "hold."
[3758] Lit., "hold."
[3759] Lit., "set in the."
52. And yet, lest you should suppose that none but yourselves can make use of conjectures and surmises, we too are able to bring them forward as well, [3760] as your question is appropriate to either side. [3761] Whence, you say, are men; and what or whence are the souls of these men? Whence, we will ask, are elephants, bulls, stags, mules, [3762] asses? Whence lions, horses, dogs, wolves, panthers; and what or whence are the souls of these creatures? For it is not credible that from that Platonic cup, [3763] which Timæus prepares and mixes, either their souls came, or that the locust, [3764] mouse, shrew, cockroach, frog, centipede, should be believed to have been quickened and to live, because [3765] they have a cause and origin of birth in [3766] the elements themselves, if there are in these secret and very little known means [3767] for producing the creatures which live in each of them. For we see that some of the wise say that the earth is mother of men, that others join with it water, [3768] that others add to these breath of air, but that some say that the sun is their framer, and that, having been quickened by his rays, they are filled with the stir of life. [3769] What if it is not these, and is something else, another cause, another method, another power, in fine, unheard of and unknown to us by name, which may have fashioned the human race, and connected it with things as established; [3770] may it not be that men sprang up in this way, and that the cause of their birth does not go back to the Supreme God? For what reason do we suppose that the great Plato had--a man reverent and scrupulous in his wisdom--when he withdrew the fashioning of man from the highest God, and transferred it to some lesser deities, and when he would not have the souls of men formed [3771] of that pure mixture of which he had made the soul of the universe, except that he thought the forming of man unworthy of God, and the fashioning of a feeble being not beseeming His greatness and excellence?
[3760] Lit., "utter the same (conjectures)," easdem, the reading of LB. and Hildebrand, who says that it is so in the ms.; while Crusius asserts that the ms. has idem, which, with Orelli's punctuation, gives--"we have the same power; since it is common (i.e., a general right) to bring forth what you ask," i.e., to put similar questions.
[3761] i.e., may be retorted upon you.
[3762] Here, as elsewhere, instead of muli, the ms. reads milvi--"kites."
[3763] Cf. Plato, Timæus, st. p. 41, already referred to.
[3764] Or, perhaps, "cray-fish," locusta.
[3765] The ms. reads quidem--"indeed," retained by the first four edd., but changed into quia--"because," by Elmenhorst, LB., and Orelli, while Oehler suggests very happily si quidem--"if indeed," i.e., because.
[3766] Lit., "from."
[3767] Rationes.
[3768] Cf. chs. 9 and 10 [p. 416, supra.].
[3769] Orelli, retaining this as a distinct sentence, would yet enclose it in brackets, for what purpose does not appear; more especially as the next sentence follows directly from this in logical sequence.
[3770] Lit., "the constitutions of things."
[3771] Lit., "did not choose the souls of the human race to be mixtures of the same purity," noluit, received from the margin of Ursinus by all except the first four edd., which retain the ms. voluit--"did choose," which is absurd. Arnobius here refers again to the passage in the Timæus, p. 41 sq., but to a different part, with a different purpose. He now refers to the conclusion of the speech of the Supreme God, the first part of which is noticed in ch. 36 (cf. p. 447, n. 20). There the Creator assures the gods He has made of immortality through His grace; now His further invitation that they in turn should form men is alluded to. That they might accomplish this task, the dregs still left in the cup, in which had been mixed the elements of the world's soul, are diluted and given to form the souls of men, to which they attach mortal bodies.
53. Since this, then, is the case, we do nothing out of place or foolish in believing that the souls of men are of a neutral character, inasmuch as they have been produced by secondary beings, [3772] made subject to the law of death, and are of little strength, and that perishable; and that they are gifted with immortality, if [3773] they rest their hope of so great a gift on God Supreme, who alone has power to grant such blessings, by putting away corruption. But this, you say, we are stupid in believing. What is that to you? In so believing, we act most absurdly, sillily. In what do we injure you, or what wrong do we do or inflict upon you, if we trust that Almighty God will take care of us when we leave [3774] our bodies, and from the jaws of hell, as is said, deliver us?
[3772] Lit., "things not principal." Orelli here quotes from Tertullian, de Anim., xxiii., a brief summary of Gnostic doctrines on these points, which he considers Arnobius to have followed throughout this discussion.
[3773] Siwas first inserted in LB., not being found in the ms., though demanded by the context.
[3774] Lit., "have begun to leave."
54. Can, then, anything be made, some one will say, without God's will? We [3775] must consider carefully, and examine with no little pains, lest, while we think that we are honouring God [3776] by such a question, we fall into the opposite sin, doing despite to His supreme majesty. In what way, you ask, on what ground? Because, if all things are brought about by His will, and nothing in the world can either succeed or fail contrary to His pleasure, it follows of necessity that it should be understood that [3777] all evils, too, arise by His will. But if, on the contrary, we chose to say that He is privy to and produces no evil, not referring to Him the causes of very wicked deeds, the worst things will begin to seem to be done either against His will, or, a monstrous thing to say, while He knows it not, but is ignorant and unaware of them. But, again, if we choose to say that there are no evils, as we find some have believed and held, all races will cry out against us and all nations together, showing us their sufferings, and the various kinds of dangers with which the human race is every moment [3778] distressed and afflicted. Then they will ask of us, Why, if there are no evils, do you refrain from certain deeds and actions? Why do you not do all that eager lust has required or demanded? Why, finally, do you establish punishments by terrible laws for the guilty? For what more monstrous [3779] act of folly can be found than to assert that there are no evils, and at the same time to kill and condemn the erring as though they were evil? [3780]
[3775] The ms. and first three edd., read vobis--"you," corrected nobis, as above, by Ursinus.
[3776] So the ms.; but most edd., following the Brussels transcript, read dominum--"Lord."
[3777] Utis omitted in the ms., first four edd., and Hild.
[3778] So LB., reading p-uncta for the ms. c-uncta.
[3779] So the ms., Hild., and Oehler, reading imman-ior; LB., from the margin of Ursinus, major--"greater;" the rest, inanior--"more foolish."
[3780] The difficulty felt by Arnobius as to the origin of evil perplexed others also; and, as Elmenhorst has observed, some of the Fathers attempted to get rid of it by a distinction between the evil of guilt and of punishment,--God being author of the latter, the devil of the former (Tertullian, adv. Marcionem, ii. 14). It would have been simpler and truer to have distinguished deeds, which can be done only if God will, from wickedness, which is in the sinful purpose of man's heart.
55. But when, overcome, we agree that there are these things, [3781] and expressly allow that all human affairs are full of them, they will next ask, Why, then, the Almighty God does not take away these evils, but suffers them to exist and to go on without ceasing through all the ages? [3782] If we have learned of God the Supreme Ruler, and have resolved not to wander in a maze of impious and mad conjectures, we must answer that we do not know these things, and have never sought and striven to know things which could be grasped by no powers which we have, and that we, even thinking it [3783] preferable, rather remain in ignorance and want of knowledge than say that without God nothing is made, so that it should be understood that by His will [3784] He is at once both the source of evil [3785] and the occasion of countless miseries. Whence then, you will say, are all these evils? From the elements, say the wise, and from their dissimilarity; but how it is possible that things which have not feeling and judgment should be held to be wicked or criminal; or that he should not rather be wicked and criminal, who, to bring about some result, took what was afterwards to become very bad and hurtful, [3786] --is for them to consider, who make the assertion. What, then, do we say? whence? There is no necessity that we should answer, for whether we are able to say whence evil springs, or our power fails us, and we are unable, in either case it is a small matter in our opinion; nor do we hold it of much importance either to know or to be ignorant of it, being content to have laid down but one thing,--that nothing proceeds from God Supreme which is hurtful and pernicious. This we are assured of, this we know, on this one truth of knowledge and science we take our stand,--that nothing is made by Him except that which is for the well-being of all, which is agreeable, which is very full of love and joy and gladness, which has unbounded and imperishable pleasures, which every one may ask in all his prayers to befall him, and think that otherwise [3787] life is pernicious and fatal.