But now the conclusion, with which Tully finished the sentiment, is much more absurd. [228] "But if matter," he says, "was not made by God, the earth indeed, and water, and air, and fire, were not made by God." How skilfully he avoided the danger! For he stated the former point as though it required no proof, whereas it was much more uncertain than that on account of which the statement was made. If matter, he says, was not made by God, the world was not made by God. He preferred to draw a false inference from that which is false, than a true one from that which is true. And though uncertain things ought to be proved from those which are certain, he drew a proof from an uncertainty, to overthrow that which was certain. For, that the world was made by divine providence (not to mention Trismegistus, who proclaims this; not to mention the verses of the Sibyls, who make the same announcement; not to mention the prophets, [229] who with one impulse and with harmonious [230] voice bear witness that the world was made, [231] and that it was the workmanship of God), even the philosophers almost universally agree; for this is the opinion of the Pythagoreans, the Stoics, and the Peripatetics, who are the chief of every sect. [232] In short, from those first seven wise men, [233] even to Socrates and Plato, it was held as an acknowledged and undoubted fact; until many ages afterwards [234] the crazy Epicurus lived, who alone ventured to deny that which is most evident, doubtless through the desire of discovering novelties, that he might found a sect in his own name. And because he could find out nothing new, that he might still appear to disagree with the others, he wished to overthrow old opinions. But in this all the philosophers who snarled [235] around him, refuted him. It is more certain, therefore, that the world was arranged by providence, than that matter was collected [236] by providence. Wherefore he ought not to have supposed that the world was not made by divine providence, because its matter was not made by divine providence; but because the world was made by divine providence, he ought to have concluded that matter also was made by the Deity. For it is more credible that matter was made by God, because He is all-powerful, than that the world was not made by God, because nothing can be made without mind, intelligence, and design. But this is not the fault of Cicero, but of the sect. For when he had undertaken a disputation, by which he might take away the nature of the gods, respecting which philosophers prated, in his ignorance of the truth he imagined that the Deity must altogether be taken away. He was able therefore to take away the gods, for they had no existence. But when he attempted to overthrow the divine providence, which is in the one God, because he had begun to strive against the truth, his arguments failed, and he necessarily fell into this pitfall, from which he was unable to withdraw himself. Here, then, I hold him firmly fixed; I hold him fastened to the spot, since Lucilius, who disputed on the other side, was silent. Here, then, is the turning-point; [237] on this everything depends. Let Cotta disentangle himself, if he can, from this difficulty; [238] let him bring forward arguments by which he may prove that matter has always existed, which no providence made. Let him show how anything ponderous and heavy either could exist without an author or could be changed, and how that which always was ceased to be, so that that which never was might begin to be. And if he shall prove these things, then, and not till then, will I admit that the world itself was not established by divine providence, and yet in making this admission I shall hold him fast by another snare. For he will turn round again to the same point, to which he will be unwilling to return, so as to say that both the matter of which the world consists, and the world which consists of matter, existed by nature; though I contend that nature itself is God. For no one can make wonderful things, that is, things existing with the greatest order, except one who has intelligence, foresight, and power. And thus it will come to be seen that God made all things, and that nothing at all can exist which did not derive its origin from God.
But the same, as often as he follows the Epicureans, [239] and does not admit that the world was made by God, is wont to inquire by what hands, by what machines, by what levers, by what contrivance, He made this work of such magnitude. He might see, if he could have lived at that time in which God made it. But, that man might not look into the works of God, He was unwilling to bring him into this world until all things were completed. But he could not be brought in: for how could he exist while the heaven above was being built, and the foundations of the earth beneath were being laid; when humid things, perchance, either benumbed with excessive stiffness were becoming congealed, or seethed with fiery heat and rendered solid were growing hard? Or how could he live when the sun was not yet established, and neither corn nor animals were produced? Therefore it was necessary that man should be last made, when the finishing [240] hand had now been applied to the world and to all other things. Finally, the sacred writings teach that man was the last work of God, and that he was brought into this world as into a house prepared and made ready; for all things were made on his account. The poets also acknowledge the same. Ovid, having described the completion of the world, and the formation of the other animals, added: [241] --
"An animal more sacred than these, and more capacious of a lofty mind, was yet wanting, and which might exercise dominion over the rest. Man was produced."
So impious must we think it to search into those things which God wished to be kept secret! But his inquiries were not made through a desire of hearing or learning, but of refuting; for he was confident that no one could assert that. As though, in truth, it were to be supposed that these things were not made by God, because it cannot be plainly seen in what manner they were created! If you had been brought up in a well-built and ornamented house, and had never seen a workshop, [242] would you have supposed that that house was not built by man, because you did not know how it was built? You would assuredly ask the same question about the house which you now ask about the world--by what hands, with what implements, man had contrived such great works; and especially if you should see large stones, immense blocks, [243] vast columns, the whole work lofty and elevated, would not these things appear to you to exceed the measure of human strength, because you would not know that these things were made not so much by strength as by skill and ingenuity?
But if man, in whom nothing is perfect, nevertheless effects more by skill than his feeble strength would permit, what reason is there why it should appear to you incredible, when it is alleged that the world was made by God, in whom, since He is perfect, wisdom can have no limit, and strength no measure? His works are seen by the eyes; but how He made them is not seen even by the mind, because, as Hermes says, the mortal cannot draw nigh to (that is, approach nearer, and follow up with the understanding) the immortal, the temporal [244] to the eternal, the corruptible to the incorruptible. And on this account the earthly animal is as yet incapable of perceiving [245] heavenly things, because it is shut in and held as it were in custody by the body, so that it cannot discern all things with free and unrestrained perception. Let him know, therefore, how foolishly he acts, who inquires into things which are indescribable. For this is to pass the limits of one's own condition, and not to understand how far it is permitted man to approach. In short, when God revealed the truth to man, He wished us only to know those things which it concerned man to know for the attainment of life; but as to the things which related to a profane and eager curiosity [246] He was silent, that they might be secret. Why, then, do you inquire into things which you cannot know, and if you knew them you would not be happier. It is perfect wisdom in man, if he knows that there is but one God, and that all things were made by Him.
[201] The tricks of a juggler.
[202] Most prudent.
[203] Chap. vi., infra
[204] Free.
[205] The Son of God, afterwards spoken of.
[206] By perseverance. There seems to be a contrast between the Son, who remained stedfast, and the evil spirits who fell.
[207] dia'bolos, "slanderer or accuser." The Greek and Latin words employed by Lactantius have the same meaning.
[208] Providence.
[209] Book iv. ch. vi., etc. [Deus, igitur, machinator constitutorque rerum, etc.]
[210] Lying under; answering to the Greek expression hupokeime'ne hule, subject matter.
[211] Not now found in the treatise which bears this title.
[212] Capable of proof.
[213] Materia; perhaps from "mater," mother stuff--matter out of which anything is composed.
[214] The moulder. The ancients made statues of wax or clay, as well as of wood, ivory, and marble.
[215] Contradict.
[216] Alluding to the well-known practise of the Academics, viz., of arguing on both sides of a question.
[217] The founder or preparer of the material.
[218] [Quam vim potuit habere nullo dante?]
[219] Providentia.
[220] Sibi illam dedit. There is another reading, illa sibi illam dedit, but it does not give so good a sense.
[221] A proverbial expression, signifying "to get out of one difficulty by getting into another." The passage in the text is a quotation from Terence, Phorm , v. 2. 15. [Not in some editions of our author; e.g., Basil, 1521.]
[222] Stand firm and stedfast.
[223] Which does not exist there, from whence it is sought.
[224] Fountain.
[225] Distruitur, "pulled to pieces." The word is thus used by Cicero.
[226] Distruitur, "pulled to pieces." The word is thus used by Cicero.
[227] Ch. 3 and 7. [See pp. [25]11, [26]17, supra.]
[228] [Multo absurdior.]
[229] Lactantius seems to refer not to the true prophets, but to those of other nations, such as Orpheus and Zoroaster, or the magi of the Persians, the gymnosophists of the Indians, or the Druids of the Gauls. St. Augustine often makes mention of these. It would seem inconsistent to mention Moses and the prophets of God with the prophets of the heathens. [Compare, however, "Christian analogies," etc., in Justin. See vol. i. [27]169; also Ibid., pp. [28]182, [29]283-286.]
[230] Pari voce.
[231] The work of the world, and the workmanship of God.
[232] Qui sunt principes omnis disciplinæ. There is another reading: quæ sunt principes omnium disciplinæ, "which are the leading sects of all."
[233] Thales said that the world was the work of God.
[234] This statement is incorrect, as Plato was born b.c. 430, and Epicurus b.c. 337.
[235] There is probably an allusion to the Cynics.
[236] Conglobatam. Another reading is, quàm materiâ providentiam conglobatam.
[237] Hinge.
[238] Abyss.
[239] As often as he is an Epicurean.
[240] The last hand.
[241] Metamorph , book i.
[242] Fabrica. The word is also used to denote the exercise of skill in workmanship.
[243] Cæmenta, rough stones from the quarry.
[244] Pertaining to time, as opposed to eternal.
[245] Looking into.
[246] A curious and profane eagerness.
Chap. X.--Of the World, and Its Parts, the Elements and Seasons.
Now, having refuted those who entertain false sentiments respecting the world and God its Maker, let us return to the divine workmanship of the world, concerning which we are informed in the sacred [247] writings of our holy religion. Therefore, first of all, God made the heaven, and suspended it on high, that it might be the seat of God Himself, the Creator. Then He founded the earth, and placed it under the heaven, as a dwelling-place for man, with the other races of animals. He willed that it should be surrounded and held together by water. But He adorned and filled His own dwelling-place with bright lights; He decked it with the sun, and the shining orb of the moon, and with the glittering signs of the twinkling stars; but He placed on the earth the darkness, which is contrary to these. For of itself the earth contains no light, unless it receives it from the heaven, in which He placed perpetual light, and the gods above, and eternal life; and, on the contrary, He placed on the earth darkness, and the inhabitants of the lower regions, and death. For these things are as far removed from the former ones, as evil things are from good, and vices from virtues. He also established two parts of the earth itself opposite to one another, and of a different character,--namely, the east and the west; and of these the east is assigned to God, because He Himself is the fountain of light, and the enlightener [248] of all things, and because He makes us rise to eternal life. But the west is ascribed to that disturbed and depraved mind, because it conceals the light, because it always brings on darkness, and because it makes men die and perish in their sins. For as light belongs to the east, and the whole course of life depends upon the light, so darkness belongs to the west: but death and destruction are contained in darkness. [249] Then He measured out in the same way the other parts,--namely, the south and the north, which parts are closely united with the two former. For that which is more glowing with the warmth of the sun, is nearest to and closely united with the east; but that which is torpid with colds and perpetual ice belongs to the same division as the extreme west. For as darkness is opposed to light, so is cold to heat. As, therefore, heat is nearest to light, so is the south to the east; and as cold is nearest to darkness, so is the northern region to the west. And He assigned to each of these parts its own time,--namely, the spring to the east, the summer to the southern region, the autumn belongs to the west, and the winter to the north. In these two parts also, the southern and the northern, is contained a figure of life and death, because life consists in heat, death in cold. And as heat arises from fire, so does cold from water. And according to the division of these parts He also made day and night, to complete by alternate succession with each other the courses [250] and perpetual revolutions of time, which we call years. The day, which the first east supplies, must belong to God, as all things do, which are of a better character. But the night, which the extreme west brings on, belongs, indeed, to him whom we have said to be the rival of God.