It is not virtue, therefore, either to be the enemy of the bad or the defender of the good, because virtue cannot be subject to uncertain chances.
"Moreover, to reckon the interests of our country as in the first place."
When the agreement of men is taken away, virtue has no existence at all; for what are the interests of our country, but the inconveniences of another state or nation?--that is, to extend the boundaries which are violently taken from others, to increase the power of the state, to improve the revenues,--all which things are not virtues, but the overthrowing of virtues: for, in the first place, the union of human society is taken away, innocence is taken away, the abstaining from the property of another is taken away; lastly, justice itself is taken away, which is unable to bear the tearing asunder of the human race, and wherever arms have glittered, must be banished and exterminated from thence. This saying of Cicero [1121] is true: "But they who say that regard is to be had to citizens, but that it is not to be had to foreigners, these destroy the common society of the human race; and when this is removed, beneficence, liberality, kindness, and justice are entirely [1122] taken away." For how can a man be just who injures, who hates, who despoils, who puts to death? And they who strive to be serviceable to their country do all these things: for they are ignorant of what this being serviceable is, who think nothing useful, nothing advantageous, but that which can be held by the hand; and this alone cannot be held, because it may be snatched away.
Whoever, then, has gained for his country these goods--as they themselves call them--that is, who by the overthrow of cities and the destruction of nations has filled the treasury with money, has taken lands and enriched his country-men--he is extolled with praises to the heaven: in him there is said to be the greatest and perfect virtue. And this is the error not only of the people and the ignorant, but also of philosophers, who even give precepts for injustice, lest folly and wickedness should be wanting in discipline and authority. Therefore, when they are speaking of the duties relating to warfare, all that discourse is accommodated neither to justice nor to true virtue, but to this life and to civil institutions; [1123] and that this is not justice the matter itself declares, and Cicero has testified. [1124] "But we," he says, "are not in possession of the real and life-like figure of true law and genuine justice, we have nothing but delineations and sketches; [1125] and I wish that we followed even these, for they are taken from the excellent copies made by nature and truth." It is then a delineation and a sketch which they thought to be justice. But what of wisdom? does not the same man confess that it has no existence in philosophers? "Nor," he says, [1126] "when Fabricius or Aristides is called just, is an example of justice sought from these as from a wise man; for none of these is wise in the sense in which we wish the truly wise to be understood. Nor were they who are esteemed and called wise, Marcus Cato and Caius Lælius, actually wise, nor those well-known seven; [1127] but from their constant practice of the middle duties,' [1128] they bore a certain likeness and appearance [1129] of wise men." If therefore wisdom is taken away from the philosophers by their own confession, and justice is taken away from those who are regarded as just, it follows that all those descriptions of virtue must be false, because no one can know what true virtue is but he who is just and wise. But no one is just and wise but he whom God has instructed with heavenly precepts.
[1113] Poene: others read "plenè," and "planè." [c. 30, p. 100, supra.]
[1114] [The first of the three inutilia of Lucilius, ut supra, thus: (1) "Virtus quærendæ rei finem scire, modumque;" (2) "Virtus divitiis pretium persolvere posse;" (3) "Virtus id dare quod re ipsa debetur honori." See [103]p. 167, supra.]
[1115] See chap. v. [[104]p. 167, supra.]
[1116] Ratio virtutis.
[1117] [How I love our author for his winning reproof of mere philosophical virtue in contrast with evangelical righteousness!]
[1118] [See the Quis Dives Salvetur of Clement, vol. ii. [105]p. 591, this series.]
[1119] [Haggai. ii. 7. "La journée de Pharsale fut la dernière heure de la liberté. Le sénat, les lois, le peuple, les moeurs, le mond romain étaient anéantis avec Pompée."--Lamartine.]
[1120] [See, on Pharsalia, etc., Lamartine's eloquent remarks, Vie des Grands Hommes (César), vol. v. pp. 276-277, ed. Paris, 1856.]
[1121] De Offic., iii. 6.
[1122] Funditus, "from the very foundation."
[1123] Moremque civilem.
[1124] De Offic., iii. 17.
[1125] Umbrâ et imaginibus. The figure is borrowed partly from sculpture and partly from painting. "Effigies" is the moulded form, as opposed to the mere outline, "umbra" and "imago."
[1126] De Offic., iii. 4. The words, "aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut," have not been translated, because they refer to the "Decii" and the "Scipiones," who are mentioned by Cicero as examples of bravery, but are omitted by Lactantius.
[1127] [See [106]p. 101, supra]
[1128] [Ex mediorum officiorum frequentia, etc.]
[1129] [Rom. i. 22.]
Chap. VII.--Of the Way of Error and of Truth: that It is Single, Narrow, and Steep, and Has God for Its Guide.
For all those who, by the confessed folly of others, are thought wise, being clothed with the appearance of virtue, grasp at shadows and outlines, but at nothing true. Which happens on this account, because that deceitful road which inclines to the west has many paths, on account of the variety of pursuits and systems which are dissimilar and varied in the life of men. For as that way of wisdom contains something which resembles folly, as we showed in the preceding book, so this way, which belongs altogether to folly, contains something which resembles wisdom, and they who perceive the folly of men in general seize upon this; and as it has its vices manifest, so it has something which appears to resemble virtue: as it has its wickedness open, so it has a likeness and appearance of justice. For how could the forerunner [1130] of that way, whose strength and power are altogether in deceit, lead men altogether into fraud, unless he showed them some things which resembled the truth? [1131] For, that His immortal secret might be hidden, God placed in his way things which men might despise as evil and disgraceful, that, turning away from wisdom and truth, which they were searching for without any guide, they might fall upon that very thing which they desired to avoid and flee from. Therefore he points out that way of destruction and death which has many windings, either because there are many kinds of life, or because there are many gods who are worshipped.
The deceitful [1132] and treacherous guide of this way, that there may appear to be some distinction between truth and falsehood, good and evil, leads the luxurious in one direction, and those who are called temperate [1133] in another; the ignorant in one direction, the learned in another; the sluggish in one direction, the active in another; the foolish in one direction, the philosophers in another, and even these not in one path. For those who do not shun pleasures or riches, he withdraws a little from this public and frequented road; but those who either wish to follow virtue, or profess a contempt for things, he drags over certain rugged precipices. But nevertheless all those paths which display an appearance of honours are not different roads, but turnings off [1134] and bypaths, which appear indeed to be separated from that common one, and to branch off to the right, but yet return to the same, and all lead at the very end to one issue. For that guide unites them all, where it was necessary that the good should be separated from the bad, the strong from the inactive, the wise from the foolish; namely, in the worship of the gods, in which he slays them all with one sword, because they were all foolish without any distinction, and plunges them into death. But this way--which is that of truth, and wisdom, and virtue, and justice, of all which there is but one fountain, one source of strength, one abode--is both simple, [1135] because with like minds, and with the utmost agreement, we follow and worship one God; and it is narrow, because virtue is given to the smaller number; and steep, because goodness, which is very high and lofty, cannot be attained to without the greatest difficulty and labour.
[1130] Præcursor: the exact meaning of the word is a "scout."
[1131] Verisimilia: the word generally means "probabilities."
[1132] Prævaricator; properly an advocate who, by collusion, favours the cause of his opponent.
[1133] Frugi.
[1134] Diverticula.
[1135] Simplex, as opposed to the various paths of the other.
Chap. VIII.--Of the Errors of Philosophers, and the Variableness of Law.
This is the way which philosophers seek, but do not find on this account, because they prefer to seek it on the earth, where it cannot appear. Therefore they wander, as it were, on the great sea, and do not understand whither they are borne, because they neither discern the way nor follow any guide. For this way of life ought to be sought in the same manner in which their course is sought by ships over the deep: for unless they observe some light of heaven, they wander with uncertain courses. But whoever strives to hold the right course of life ought not to look to the earth, but to the heaven: and, to speak more plainly, he ought not to follow man, but God; not to serve these earthly images, but the heavenly God; not to measure all things by their reference to the body, but by their reference to the soul; not to attend to this life, but the eternal life. Therefore, if you always direct your eyes towards heaven, and observe the sun, where it rises, and take this as the guide of your life, as in the case of a voyage, your feet will spontaneously be directed into the way; and that heavenly light, which is a much brighter sun [1136] to sound minds than this which we behold in mortal flesh, will so rule and govern you as to lead you without any error to the most excellent harbour of wisdom and virtue.
Therefore the law of God must be undertaken, which may direct us to this path; that sacred, that heavenly law, which Marcus Tullius, in his third book respecting the Republic, [1137] has described almost with a divine voice; whose words have subjoined, that I might not speak at greater length: "There is indeed a true law, right reason, agreeing with nature, diffused among all, unchanging, everlasting, which calls to duty by commanding, deters from wrong by forbidding; which, however, neither commands nor forbids the good in vain, nor affects the wicked by commanding or forbidding. It is not allowable to alter [1138] the provisions of this law, nor is it permitted us to modify it, nor can it be entirely abrogated. [1139] Nor, truly, can we be released from this law, either by the senate or by the people; nor is another person to be sought to explain or interpret it. Nor will there be one law at Rome and another at Athens; one law at the present time, and another hereafter: but the same law, everlasting and unchangeable, will bind all nations at all times; and there will be one common Master and Ruler of all, even God, the framer, arbitrator, and proposer of this law; and he who shall not obey this will flee from himself, and, despising the nature of man, will suffer the greatest punishments through this very thing, even though he shall have escaped the other punishments which are supposed to exist." Who that is acquainted with the mystery of God could so significantly relate the law of God, as a man far removed from the knowledge of the truth has set forth that law? But I consider that they who speak true things unconsciously are to be so regarded as though they prophesied [1140] under the influence of some spirit. But if he had known or explained this also, in what precepts the law itself consisted, as he clearly saw the force and purport of the divine law, he would not have discharged the office of a philosopher, but of a prophet. And because he was unable to do this, it must be done by us, to whom the law itself has been delivered by the one great Master and Ruler of all, God.
[1136] Multo clarior sol est, quàm hic. Others read, "Multo clarius sole est, quàm hic," etc.
[1137] [Repub., iii. cap. 22, 16.]
[1138] Abrogo is to repeal or abrogate wholly; "derogo," to abrogate in part, or modify; "obrogo," to supersede by another law.