Chapter VIII--Instincts.
When the old man had said this, I Clement said to him: "Hear, my father: if my brother Niceta bring you to acknowledge that the world is not governed without the providence of God, I shall be able to answer you in that part which remains concerning the genesis; for I am well acquainted with this doctrine." And when I had thus spoken, my brother Aquila said: "What is the use of our calling him father, when we are commanded to call no man father upon earth?" [812] Then, looking to the old man, he said, "Do not take it amiss, my father, that I have found fault with my brother for calling you father, for we have a precept not to call any one by that name." When Aquila said that, all the assembly of the bystanders, as well as the old man and Peter, laughed. And when Aquila asked the reason of their all laughing, I said to him: "Because you yourself do the very thing which you find fault with in another; for you called the old man father." But he denied it, saying: "I am not aware that I called him father." Meantime Peter was moved with certain suspicions, [813] as he told us afterwards; and looking to Niceta, he said, "Go on with what you have proposed."
[812] Matt. xxiii. 9.
[813] [Another foreshadowing of the approaching recognition; peculiar to this narrative.--R.]
Chapter IX.--Simple and Compound.
Then Niceta began as follows: [814] "Everything that is, is either simple or compound. That which is simple is without number, division, colour, difference, roughness, smoothness, weight, lightness, quality, quantity, and therefore without end. But that which is compound is either compounded of two, or of three, or even of four elements, or at all events of several; and things which are compounded can also of necessity be divided." The old man, hearing this, said: "You speak most excellently and learnedly, my son." Then Niceta went on: "Therefore that which is simple, and which is without any of those things by which that which subsists can be dissolved, is without doubt incomprehensible and infinite, knowing neither beginning nor end, and therefore is one and alone, and subsisting without an author. But that which is compound is subject to number, and diversity, and division,--is necessarily compounded by some author, and is a diversity collected into one species. That which is infinite is therefore, in respect of goodness, a Father; in respect of power, a Creator. Nor can the power of creating cease in the Infinite, nor the goodness be quiescent; but He is impelled by goodness to change existing things, and by power to arrange and strengthen them. Therefore some things, as we have said, are changed, and composed of two or three, some of four, others of more elements. But since our inquiry at present is concerning the method of the world and its substance, which, it is agreed, is compounded of four elements, to which all those ten differences belong which we have mentioned above, let us begin at these lower steps, and come to the higher. For a way is afforded us to intellectual and invisible things from those which we see and handle; as is contained in arithmetical instructions, where, when inquiry is made concerning divine things, we rise from the lower to the higher numbers; but when the method respecting present and visible things is expounded, the order is directed from the higher to the lower numbers. Is it not so?"
[814] [The argument of Niceta (chaps. 9-34), while it necessarily includes statements occurring elsewhere in this literature, is, as a whole, peculiar to the Recognitions. In order of arrangement and logical force it is much superior to most of the discourses.--R.]
Chapter X.--Creation Implies Providence.
Then the old man said: "You are following it out exceedingly well." Then Niceta: "Now, then, we must inquire concerning the method of the world; of which the first inquiry is divided into two parts. For it is asked whether it has been made or not? And if it has not been made, itself must be that Unbegotten from which all things are. But if it has been made, concerning this again the question is divided into two parts, whether it was made by itself, or by another. And if indeed it was made by itself, then without doubt providence is excluded. If providence is not admitted, in vain is the mind incited to virtue, in vain justice is maintained, if there be no one to render to the just man according to his merits. But even the soul itself will not appear to be immortal, if there be no dispensation of providence to receive it after its escape from the body.