Chapter XL.--Genesis.
"If, therefore, it can be shown that mind and reason created all things, it follows that those things which come after are also managed by reason and providence. But if unintelligent and blind nature produces all things, the reason of judgment is undoubtedly overthrown; and there is no ground to expect either punishment of sin or reward of well-doing where there is no judge. Since, then, the whole matter depends upon this, and hangs by this head, do not take it amiss, if I wish this to be discussed and handled somewhat more fully. For in this the first gate, as it were, is shut towards all things which are propounded, and therefore I wish first of all to have it opened to me. Now therefore hear what my doctrine is; and if any one of you pleases, let him reply to me: for I shall not be ashamed to learn, if I hear that which is true, and to assent to him who speaks rightly. The discourse, then, which you delivered yesterday, which asserted that all things consist by art, and measure, and reason, does not fully persuade me that it is mind and reason that has made the world; for I have many things which I can show to consist by competent measure, and form, and species, and which yet were not made by mind and reason. Then, besides, I see that many things are done in the world without arrangement, consequence, or justice, and that nothing can be done without the course of Genesis. This I shall in the sequel prove most clearly from my own case."
Chapter XLI.--The Rainbow.
When the old man had thus spoken, Aquila answered: "As you yourself proposed that any one who pleased should have an opportunity of answering to what you might say, my brother Niceta permits me to conduct the argument today." Then the old man: "Go on, my son, as you please." And Aquila answered: "You promised that you would show that there are many things in the world which have a form and species arranged by equal reason, which yet it is evident were not effected by God as their Creator. Now, then, as you have promised, point out these things." Then said the old man: "Behold, we see the bow in the heaven assume a circular shape, completed in all proportion, and have an appearance of reality, which perhaps neither mind could have constructed nor reason described; and yet it is not made by any mind. Behold, I have set forth the whole in a word: now answer me."
Chapter XLII.--Types and Forms.
Then said Aquila: "If anything is expressed from a type and form, it is at once understood that it is from reason, and that it could not be made without mind; since the type itself, which expresses figures and forms, was not made without mind. For example, if wax be applied to an engraved ring, it takes the stamp and figure from the ring, which undoubtedly is without sense; but then the ring, which expresses the figure, was engraven by the hand of a workman, and it was mind and reason that gave the type to the ring. So then the bow also is expressed in the air; for the sun, impressing its rays on the clouds in the process of rarefaction, and affixing the type of its circularity to the cloudy moisture, as it were to soft wax, produces the appearance of a bow; and this, as I have said, is effected by the reflection of the sun's brightness upon the clouds, and reproducing the brightness of its circle from them. Now this does not always take place, but only when the opportunity is presented by the rarefaction of moistened clouds. And consequently, when the clouds again are condensed and unite, the form of the bow is dissolved and vanishes. Finally, the bow never is seen without sun and clouds, just as the image is not produced, unless there be the type, and wax, or some other material. Nor is it wonderful if God the Creator in the beginning made types, from which forms and species may now be expressed. But this is similar to that, that in the beginning God created insensible elements, which He might use for forming and developing all other things. But even those who form statues, first make a mould of clay or wax, and from it the figure of the statue is produced. And then afterwards a shadow is also produced from the statue, which shadow always bears the form and likeness of the statue. What shall we say then? That the insensible statue forms a shadow finished with as diligent care as the statue itself? Or shall the finishing of the shadow be unhesitatingly ascribed to him who has also fashioned the statue?