[3711] [Routh (also on Pinytus and Soter), R. S., p. 177. This series, vol. vi. p. 102, note 3. Note also Lightfoot, A. F., part ii. vol. ii. p. 192, note 1; and Westcott, Canon, p. 206.]
[3712] [Comp. p. 758, note 8, supra. Also Ignatius, vol. i. p. 63, at note 2, this series.]
[3713] mss. "planted."
[3714] The text is evidently corrupt.
[3715] [For the reply of Pinytus, and what is said by Eusebius of seven other epistles, see Routh, R. S., vol. i. pp. 181-184.]
[3716] i.e., of such importance or of such a character.
Rhodon. [3717]
[a.d. 180.] This Rhodon [3718] was supposed by St. Jerome to have been the author of the work against the Cataphrygians, ascribed to Asterius Urbanus more probably. [3719] Eusebius [3720] gives us the fragment from his work against Marcion, addressed to Callistion, which is here translated. He tells us that he was a pupil of Tatian, and expresses an intention of furnishing original solutions of Scriptural problems stated by Tatian, [3721] and by that author explained in a manner apparently unsatisfactory. He also appears to have written against the blasphemous Apelles, [3722] whose Hexaëmeron was an attempt to refute Moses; but whether he also fulfilled his promise concerning an 'Epilusis of Tatian's Problems (or Questions), seems doubtful. Routh has devoted to the fragment here translated six pages of notes, [3723] which he subjoins to the Greek text (of Eusebius) and a Latin version of the same.
Wherefore also they [3724] disagree among themselves, maintaining as they do an opinion which has no consistency with itself. For one of their herd, Apelles, who prides himself on the strictness of his life, [3725] and on his age, admits that there is only one first principle, [3726] yet says that the prophecies have come from an opposing spirit, in which opinion he is influenced by the responses of a soothsaying [3727] maid named Philumene. But others, among whom are Potitus and Basilicus, like Marcion [3728] himself, introduce two first principles. These men, following the Pontic wolf, and not being able to discover any more than he the division of things, have had to recourse to rash assertion, and declared the existence of two first principles simply and without proof. Others of them, again, drifting from bad to worse, assume not two only, but even three natures. Of these men the leader and champion is Syneros, as those who adopt his teaching say....
For the old man Apelles entered into conversation with us, and was convicted of uttering many false opinions. For example, he asserted that men should on no account examine into their creed, [3729] but that every one ought to continue to the last in the belief he has once adopted. For he declared that those who had rested their hope on the Crucified One would be saved, provided only they were found living in the practice of good works. But the most perplexing of all the doctrines laid down by him was, as we have remarked before, what he said concerning God: for he affirmed that there was only one first principle, precisely as our own faith teaches....
On asking him, "Where do you get proof of this? or how are you able to assert that there is only one first principle? tell us,"--he said that the prophecies refuted themselves, because they had uttered nothing at all that was true: for that they were discordant and false, and self-contradictory. As to the question, "How does it appear that there is only one first principle?" he said he could not tell, only he was impelled to that belief. On my thereupon conjuring him to speak the truth, he solemnly declared that he was expressing his real sentiments; and that he did not know "how" there could be one uncreated God, but that he believed the fact. Here I burst into laughter and rebuked him, because he professed to be a teacher, and yet was unable to confirm by arguments what he taught.
------------------------
[3717] In Eusebius, Hist. Eccl., v. 13.
[3718] Or Rhodo.
[3719] Vol. vii. pp. 333-338, this series, where I neglected to insert a reference to Routh, Rel. Sac., vol. ii. pp. 183-217.
[3720] H. E., book v. cap. 13.
[3721] Vol. ii. p. 62, this series.
[3722] See Origen, vol. iv. p. 567, this series.
[3723] Rel. Sac., vol. i. pp. 437-446.
[3724] The Marcionites.
[3725] Politeia. See Migne's note.
[3726] 'Archen. [See vol. vii. p. 365, this series.]
[3727] Daimonoses.
[3728] Some copies have "Marcion the sailor," and so Tertullian (de Præscriptionibus) speaks of him. [Vol. iii. cap. 30, p. 257, this series.]
[3729] Ton logon.
Maximus, Bishop of Jerusalem.
[a.d. 185-196.] He was a noted character among Christians, according to Eusebius; living, according to Jerome, under Commodus and Severus. He wrote on the inveterate question concerning the Origin of Evil; and the fragment here translated, as given by Eusebius, is also textually cited by Origen against the Marcionites, [3730] if that Dialogue be his. The reader will not fail to recollect that liberal citations out of this work are also to be found in Methodius, On Free-Will. [3731] But all who desire fuller information on the subject will be gratified by the learned prolegomena and notes of Routh, to which I refer them. [3732] Whether Maximus was the bishop of Jerusalem (a.d. 185) mentioned by Eusebius as presiding in that See in the sixth year of Commodus, seems to be uncertain.
From the Book Concerning Matter, or in Defence of the Proposition that Matter is Created, and is Not the Cause of Evil. [3733]
"That there cannot exist two uncreated substances at one and the same time, I presume that you hold equally with myself. You appear, however, very decidedly to have assumed, and to have introduced into the argument, this principle, that we must of unavoidable necessity maintain one of two things: either that God is separate from matter; or else, on the contrary, that He is indissolubly connected with it.
"If, then, any one should choose to assert that He exists in union with matter, that would be saying that there is only one uncreated substance. For either of the two must constitute a part of the other; and, since they form parts of each other, they cannot be two uncreated substances. Just as, in speaking of man, we do not describe him as subdivided into a number of distinct parts, each forming a separate created substance, but, as reason requires us to do, assert that he was made by God a single created substance consisting of many parts,--so, in like manner, if God is not separate from matter, we are driven to the conclusion that there is only one uncreated substance.
"If, on the other hand, it be affirmed that He is separate from matter, it necessarily follows that there is some other substance intermediate between the two, by which their separation is made apparent. For it is impossible that one thing should be shown to be severed by an interval from another, unless there be something else by which the interval between the two is produced. This principle, too, holds good not only with regard to this or any other single case, but in any number of cases you please. For the same argument which we have employed in dealing with the two uncreated substances must in like manner be valid if the substances in question be given as three. For in regard to these also I should have to inquire whether they are separate from one another, or whether, on the contrary, each of them is united to its fellow. For, if you should say that they are united, you would hear from me the same argument as before; but if, on the contrary, you should say that they are separate, you could not escape the unavoidable assumption of a separating medium.
"If, again, perchance any one should think that there is a third view which may be consistently maintained with regard to uncreated substances,--namely, that God is not separate from matter, nor yet, on the other hand, united to it as a part, but that God exists in matter as in a place, or possibly matter exists in God,--let such a person observe the consequence:--
"That, if we make matter God's place, we must of necessity admit that He can be contained, [3734] and that He is circumscribed by matter. Nay, further, he must grant that He is, in the same way as matter, driven about hither and thither, unable to maintain His place and to stay where He is, since that in which He exists is perpetually being driven about in one direction or another. Beside this, he must also admit that God has had His place among the worst kind of elements. For if matter was once in disorder, and if he reduced it to order for the purpose of rendering it better, there was a time when God existed among the disordered elements of matter.
"I might also fairly put this question: whether God filled the whole of matter, or was in some part of it. If any one should choose to say that God was in some part of matter, he would be making Him indefinitely smaller than matter, inasmuch as a part of it contained the whole of Him; [3735] but, if he maintained that He pervaded the whole of matter, I need to be informed how He became the Fashioner of this matter. For we must necessarily assume, either that there was on the part of God a contraction, [3736] so to speak, of Himself, and a withdrawal from matter, whereupon He proceeded to fashion that from which He had retired; or else that He fashioned Himself in conjunction with matter, in consequence of having no place to retire to.
"But suppose it to be maintained, on the other hand, that matter is in God, it will behove us similarly to inquire, whether we are to understand by this that He is sundered from Himself, and that, just like the air, which contains various kinds of animals, so is He sundered and divided into parts for the reception of those creatures which from time to time exist in [3737] Him; or whether matter is in God as in a place,--for instance, as water is contained in earth. For should we say as in air,' we should perforce be speaking of God as divisible into parts; but if as water in earth,' and if matter was, as is admitted, in confusion and disorder, and moreover also contained what was evil, we should have to admit that God is the place of disorder and evil. But this it does not seem to me consistent with reverence to say, but hazardous rather. For you contend that matter is uncreated, [3738] that you may not have to admit that God is the author of evil; and yet, while aiming to escape this difficulty, you make Him the receptacle of evil.
"If you had stated that your suspicion that matter was uncreated arose from the nature of created things as we find them, [3739] I should have employed abundant argument in proof that it cannot be so. But, since you have spoken of the existence of evil as the cause of such suspicion, I am disposed to enter upon a separate examination of this point. For, when once it has been made clear how it is that evil exists, and when it is seen to be impossible to deny that God is the author of evil, in consequence of His having had recourse to matter for His materials, [3740] it seems to me that a suspicion of this kind disappears.
"You assert, then, that matter, destitute of all qualities good or bad, co-existed at the outset with God, and that out of it He fashioned the world as we now find it."
"Such is my opinion."
"Well, then, if matter was without any qualities, and the world has come into existence from God, and if the world possesses qualities, the author of those qualities must be God."
"Exactly so."
"Since, too, I heard you say yourself just now that out of nothing [3741] nothing can possibly come, give me an answer to the question I am about to ask you. You seem to me to think that the qualities of the world have not sprung from pre-existing [3742] qualities, and moreover that they are something different from the substances themselves."
"I do."
"If, therefore, God did not produce the qualities in question from qualities already existing, nor yet from substances, by reason that they are not substances, the conclusion is inevitable, that they were made by God out of nothing. So that you seemed to me to affirm more than you were warranted to do, when you said that it had been proved impossible to hold the opinion [3743] that anything was made by God out of nothing.
"But let us put the matter thus. We see persons among ourselves making certain things out of nothing, however true it may be that they make them by means of something. [3744] Let us take our illustration, say, from builders. These men do not make cities out of cities; nor, similarly, temples out of temples. Nay, if you suppose that, because the substances necessary for these constructions are already provided, therefore they make them out of that which already exists, your reasoning is fallacious. For it is not the substance that makes the city or the temples, but the art which is employed about the substance. Neither, again, does the art proceed from any art inhering in the substances, but it arises independently of any such art in them.