Eran.--If the proper qualities of the natures remain distinct, how does the soul together with the body crave for food?
Orth.--The soul does not crave for food. How could it when it is immortal? But the body, which derives its vital force from the soul, feels its need, and desires to receive what is lacking. So after toil it longs for rest, after waking for sleep, and so with the rest of its desires. So forthwith after its dissolution, since it has no longer its vital energy, it does not even crave for what is lacking, and, ceasing to receive it, it undergoes corruption.
Eran.--You see that to thirst and to hunger and similar appetites belong to the soul.
Orth.--Did these belong to the soul it would suffer hunger and thirst, and the similar wants, even after its release from the body.
Eran.--What then do you say to be proper to the soul? [1255]
Orth.--The reasonable, the absolute, the immortal, the invisible.
Eran.--And what of the body?
Orth.--The complex, the visible, the mortal.
Eran.--And we say that man is composed of these?
Orth.--Yes.
Eran.--Then we define [1256] man as a mortal reasonable being.
Orth.--Agreed.
Eran.--And we give names to him from both these attributes.
Orth.--Yes.
Eran.--As then in this case we make no distinction, but call the same man both reasonable and mortal, so also should we do in the case of the Christ, and apply to Him both the divine and the human.
Orth.--This is our argument, although you do not accurately express it. For look you. When we are pursuing the argument about the human soul, do we only mention what is appropriate to its energy and nature?
Eran.--This only.
Orth.--And when our discussion is about the body, do we not only recall what is appropriate to it?
Eran.--Quite so.
Orth.--But, when our discourse touches the whole being, then we have no difficulty in adducing both sets of qualities, for the properties both of the body and of the soul are applicable to man.
Eran.--Unquestionably.
Orth.--Well; just in this way should we speak of the Christ, and, when arguing about His natures, give to each its own, and recognise some as belonging to the Godhead, and some as to the manhood. But when we are discussing the Person we must then make what is proper to the natures common, and apply both sets of qualities to the Saviour, and call the same Being both God and Man, both Son of God and Son of Man--both David's Son and David's Lord, both Seed of Abraham and Creator of Abraham, and so on.
Eran.--That the person of the Christ is one, and that both the divine and the human are attributable to Him, you have quite rightly said, and I accept this definition of the Faith; but your real position, that in discussing the natures we must give to each its own properties, seems to me to dissolve the union. It is for this reason that I object to accept these and similar arguments.
Orth.--Yet when we were enquiring about soul and body you thought the distinction of these terms admirable, and forthwith gave it your approbation. Why then do you refuse to receive the same rule in the case of the Godhead and manhood of the Lord Christ? Do you go so far as to object to comparing the Godhead and the manhood of the Christ to soul and body? So, while you grant an unconfounded union to soul and body, do you venture to say that the Godhead and manhood of the Christ have undergone commixture and confusion?
Eran.--I hold the Godhead of the Christ aye, and His flesh too, to be infinitely higher in honour than soul and body; but after the union I do assert one nature.
Orth.--But now is it not impious and shocking, while maintaining that a soul united to a body is in no way subject to confusion, to deny to the Godhead of the Lord of the universe the power to maintain its own nature unconfounded or to keep within its proper bounds the humanity which He assumed? Is it not, I say, impious to mix the distinct, and to commingle the separate? The idea of one nature gives ground for suspicion of this confusion.
Eran.--I am equally anxious to avoid the term confusion, but I shrink from asserting two natures lest I fall into a dualism of sons.
Orth.--I am equally anxious to escape either horn of the dilemma, both the impious confusion and the impious distinction; for to me it is alike an unhallowed thought to split the one Son in two and to gainsay the duality of the natures. But now in truth's name tell me. Were one of the faction of Arius or Eunomius to endeavour, while disputing with you, to belittle the Son, and to describe Him as less than and inferior to the Father, by the help of all their familiar arguments and citations from the divine Scripture of the text "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me" [1257] and that other, "Now is my soul troubled" [1258] and other like passages, how would you dispose of his objections? How could you show that the Son is in no way diminished in dignity by these expressions and is not of another substance, but begotten of the substance of the Father?
Eran.--I should say that the divine Scripture uses some terms according to the theology and some according to the oeconomy, and that it is wrong to apply what belongs to the oeconomy to what belongs to the theology. [1259]
Orth.--But your opponent would retort that even in the Old Testament the divine Scripture says many things oeconomically, as for instance, "Adam heard the voice of the Lord God walking," [1260] and "I will go down now and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it which has come to me; and if not I will know," [1261] and again, "Now I know that thou fearest God" [1262] and the like.
Eran.--I might answer to this that there is a great distinction between the oeconomies. In the Old Testament there is an oeconomy of words; in the New Testament of deeds.
Orth.--Then your opponent would ask of what deeds?
Eran.--He shall straightway hear of the deeds of the making flesh. For the Son of God on being made man both in word and deed at one time exhibits the flesh, at another the Godhead: as of course, in the passage quoted, He shews the weakness of the flesh and of the soul, the sense namely of fear.
Orth.--But if he were to go on to say, "But he did not take a soul but only a body; for the Godhead instead of a soul being united to the body performed all the functions of the soul," with what arguments could you meet his objections?
Eran.--I could bring proofs from the divine Scripture shewing how God the Word took not only flesh but also soul.
Orth.--And what proofs of this shall we find in Scripture?
Eran.--Have you not heard the Lord saying "I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again....I lay it down of myself that I might take it again." [1263] And again, "Now is my soul troubled." [1264] And again, "My soul is exceeding sorrowful even unto death," [1265] and again David's words as interpreted by Peter "His soul was not left in hell neither did His flesh see corruption." [1266] These and similar passages clearly point out that God the Word assumed not only a body but also a soul.
Orth.--You have quoted this testimony most appositely and properly, but your opponent might reply that even before the incarnation God said to the Jews, "Fasting and holy day and feasts my soul hateth." [1267] Then he might go on to argue that as in the Old Testament He mentioned a soul, though He had not a soul, so He does in the New.
Eran.--But he shall be told again how the divine Scripture, when speaking of God, mentions even parts of the body as "Incline thine ear and hear" [1268] and "Open thine eyes and see" [1269] and "The mouth of the Lord hath spoken it" [1270] and "Thy hands have made me and fashioned me" [1271] and countless other passages.
If then after the incarnation we are forbidden to understand soul to mean soul, it is equally forbidden to hold body to mean body. Thus the great mystery of the oeconomy will be found to be mere imagination; and we shall in no way differ from Marcion, Valentinus and Manes, the inventors of all these figments.
Orth.--But if a follower of Apollinarius were suddenly to intervene in our discussion and were to ask "Most excellent Sir; what kind of soul do you say that Christ assumed?" what would you answer?
Eran.--I should first of all say that I know only one soul of man; then I should answer, "But if you reckon two souls, the one reasonable and the other without reason, I say that the soul assumed was the reasonable. Yours it seems is the unreasonable, inasmuch as you think that our salvation was incomplete."
Orth.--But suppose he were to ask for proof of what you say?
Eran.--I could very easily give it. I shall quote the oracles of the Evangelists "The Child Jesus grew and waxed strong in spirit and the grace of God was upon him" [1272] and again "Jesus increased in wisdom and in stature and in favour with God and men." [1273] I should say that these have nothing to do with Godhead for the body increased in stature, and in wisdom the soul--not that which is without reason, but the reasonable. God the Word then took on Him a reasonable soul.
Orth.--Good Sir, you have bravely broken through the three fold phalanx of your foes; but that union, and the famous commixture and confusion, not in two ways only but in three, you have scattered and undone; and not only have you pointed out the distinction between Godhead and manhood, but you have in two ways distinguished the manhood by pointing out that the soul is one thing and the body another, so that no longer two, according to our argument, but three natures of our Saviour Jesus Christ may be understood.
Eran.--Yes; for did not you say that there is another substance of the soul besides the nature of the body?
Orth.--Yes.
Eran.--How then does the argument seem absurd to you?
Orth.--Because while you object to two, you have admitted three natures.
Eran.--The contest with our antagonists compels us to this, for how could any one in any other way argue against those who deny the assumption of the flesh, or of the soul, or of the mind, but by adducing proofs on these points from the divine Scripture? And how could any one confute them who in their readiness strive to belittle the Godhead of the only Begotten but by pointing out that the divine Scripture speaks sometimes theologically and sometimes oeconomically.
Orth.--What you now say is true. It is what I, nay what all say, who keep whole the apostolic rule. You yourself have become a supporter of our doctrines.
Eran.--How do I support yours, while I refuse to acknowledge two sons?
Orth.--When did you ever hear of our affirming two sons?
Eran.--He who asserts two natures asserts two sons.
Orth.--Then you assert three sons, for you have spoken of three natures.
Eran.--In no other way was it possible to meet the argument of my opponents.
Orth.--Hear this same thing from us too; for both you and I confront the same antagonists.
Eran.--But I do not assert two natures after the union.
Orth.--And yet after many generations of the union a moment ago you used the same words. Explain to us however in what sense you assert one nature after the union. Do you mean one nature derived from both or that one nature remains after the destruction of the other?
Eran.--I maintain that the Godhead remains and that the manhood was swallowed up by it. [1274]
Orth.--Fables of the Gentiles, all this, and follies of the Manichees. I am ashamed so much as to mention such things. The Greeks had their gods' swallowings [1275] and the Manichees wrote of the daughter of light. But we reject such teaching as being as absurd as it is impious, for how could a nature absolute and uncompounded, comprehending the universe, unapproachable and infinite, have absorbed the nature which it assumed?
Eran.--Like the sea receiving a drop of honey, for straightway the drop, as it mingles with the ocean's water, disappears.
Orth.--The sea and the drop are different in quantity, though alike in quality; the one is greatest, the other is least; the one is sweet and the other is bitter; but in all other respects you will find a very close relationship. The nature of both is moist, liquid, and fluid. Both are created. Both are lifeless yet each alike is called a body. There is nothing then absurd in these cognate natures undergoing commixture, and in the one being made to disappear by the other. In the case before us on the contrary the difference is infinite, and so great that no figure of the reality can be found. I will however endeavour to point out to you several instances of substances which are mixed without being confounded, and remain unimpaired.