[3251] hexin. vid. Or. ii. 38, n. 6; iv. 2, n. 7.
[3252] sumbainousan kai aposumbainousan, vid. de Decr. 11, n. 7, and 22, n. 9, sumbama, Euseb. Eccl. Theol. iii. p. 150. in the same, though a technical sense. vid. also Serap. i. 26; Naz. Orat. 31, 15 fin.
[3253] Acts viii. 20.
[3254] Prov. iii. 19; Ps. xxxiii. 6; cxxxv. 6, cxv. 3; 1 Thess. v. 18.
[3255] Read a word,' cf. p. 394, n. 6.
[3256] De Syn. 53, n. 9.
[3257] ousia and hupostasis are in these passages made synonymous; and so infr. Orat. iv. 1, f. And in iv. 33 fin. to the Son is attributed he patrike hupostasis. Vid. also ad Afros. 4. quoted supr. Exc. A, pp. 77, sqq. Up. might have been expected too in the discussion in the beginning of Orat. iii. did Athan. distinguish between them. It is remarkable how seldom it occurs at all in these Orations, except as contained in Heb. i. 3. Vid. also p. 70, note 13. Yet the phrase treis hupostaseis is certainly found in Illud Omn. fin. and in Incarn. c. Arian. 10. (if genuine) and apparently in Expos. Fid. 2. Vid. also Orat. iv. 25 init.
[3258] Heb. i. 3.
[3259] John iii. 35; v. 20.
[3260] 63, n. 3.
[3261] Or. i. 14, n. 4; ii. 2, n. 3.
[3262] Ps. xlv. 1; John xiv. 10.
[3263] §2, n. 6, &c.
[3264] De Decr. i. n. 6.
[3265] Or. i. 26.
[3266] tes ousias homoia, vid. Or. i. 21, n. 8. Also ii. 42, b. iii. 11, 14 sub. fin., 17, n. 5.
[3267] Or. ii. 1, n. 13.
[3268] 65, n. 8.
[3269] De Decr. 3, n. 2; Orat. i. 27, ii. 4; Apol. c. Ar. 36.
[3270] Cf. 63, n. 9.
[3271] John x. 38, 30; xiv. 9; cf. §5, n. 3.
[3272] Ps. cxlvi. 8.
Excursus C.
Introductory [3273] to the Fourth Discourse against the Arians.
------------------------
The fourth Discourse, as has been already observed (p. 304), stands on a footing of its own. To begin with, it is not quoted in antiquity, as the first three are, as part of the work of Ath. against the Arians (details in Newman, p. 499). Again, the fact that not only the Ep. Æg., but even the dubious de Incar. c. Arian., are in some mss. included in the Orationes, while our present oration appears sometimes as the fifth' sometimes as the sixth,' cast a shade of doubt upon its claim to be included in the Pentabiblus against the Arians' referred to by Photius. In addition to these external considerations, Newman lays stress on the apparent want of continuity in its argument; on its non-conformity to the structural plan of Orat. i.-iii., on the use of the term homoousion (§§10, 22, contrast Orat. i. §9, p. 311, note 12); on certain peculiarities of style which seem characteristic of disjointed notes rather than of a systematic treatise; on the reference to Eusebius' (of Cæsarea) as apparently still living (§8); and on the general absence of personal reference to opponents, while yet a definite and extant system seems to be combated.
Now a comparison with the works of Eusebius against Marcellus leaves little doubt that the system combated by Athan. is that of the latter (described briefly Prolegg. ch. ii. §3 (2) c).
After laying down as a thesis (§1) the substantive existence of the divine Word or Wisdom, Athan. proceeds to combat the idea that the Word has no personality distinct from that of the Father. Setting aside the alternative errors of Sabellius (§2) and Arius (§3), he taxes with the consequence of involving two 'Archai a view that the Word had a substantive existence and was then united to the Father (cf. Euseb. c. Marcell. 32 A, 108 A, 106 C, D). This consequence can only be avoided by falling into the Sabellian alternative of a theos diphues (cf. Tertullian's Deum versipellem'), unless the true solution, that of the eternal divine gennesis, be accepted (§3 worked out in 4, 5). The argument, apparently interrupted by an anti-Arian digression §§6, 7, is resumed §8, whence it proceeds without break to §24. Eusebius, insisting against Marcellus on the eternity of Christ's Kingdom, inconsistently defends those who deny the eternity of His Person. But if so, how inconsistent are those who deny the Son any pre-existence, while yet repelling the Arian formulæ with indignation! In §§9-12, taking Joh. x. 30 as his text, Athan. asks his opponents in what sense Christ and the Father are one,' distinguishing from his own answer that of Sabellius (9, 10), and that of Marcellus (11, 12), whom he presses with the paradoxical character of his explanation of the divine gennesis. In §§13, 14, he examines the (Marcellian, not Sabellian) doctrine of platusmos and sustole, charging it with Sabellianism as its consequence. Next (§§15-24) Ath. turns upon the radically weak point of the system of Marcellus (Prolegg. ubi supra), and asks What do his followers mean by the Son?' Do they mean merely (a) the man, Christ (§20, Photinus), or (b) the union of Word and Man, or (c) the Word regarded as Incarnate? The latter was the answer (§22) of Marcellus himself. This last point leads to a discussion (§24) of those O.T. passages on which Marcellus notoriously relied. §25, which Zahn understands as a direct polemic against Sabellius, is far more probably, as Newman maintains in his note, a supplemental argument against Marcellianism, for the view combated is said to lead inevitably to Sabellianism. The concluding portion, §§26-36, turns the argument of §24, that Scripture declares the identity of Son and Word, against those who (adopting alternative (a) supra) drift from Marcellianism toward the Samosatene rather than toward the Sabellian position (on the connection of the two see Prolegg. ch. ii. §3 (2) a and c). Even here, the name of Photinus, to whose position the section specially applies, is significantly withheld.
Such is the course of the argument in the Fourth Oration; and with the exception of §§6, 7, and again possibly §25, it forms a homogeneous, if not a finished and elaborated piece of argument. Its date and composition may be left an open question; but its purpose as an appendix to Orat. i.-iii., is we think open to little doubt (supr. p. 304). Of Sabellius, who left no writings [3274] , the age of Athanasius knew little, except that he identified Father and Son (huiopator), and denied the Trinity of Persons. Most that is told us of Sabellius from the fourth century onwards requires careful sifting, in order to eliminate what really belongs to Marcellus, Photinus, or others who were taxed with Sabellianism, and combated as Sabellians.' But with the simple patri-passianism which is the one undoubted element in the teaching of Sabellius, Marcellus had little or nothing in common. The criticism of Marcellus that Sabellius knew not the Word' reveals the true difference between them. To Sabellius, creation and redemption were the work of the one God under successive changes of manifestation; to Marcellus, they were the realisation of a process eternally latent in God; but both Marcellus and apparently Sabellius referred to the divine Nature what the theology of the Church has consistently referred to the divine Will.
The following table will make the foregoing scheme clear.
§1. Introductory. Thesis: the co-eternal personality of the Son or Word.
§§2-5. Those who, while rejecting Arianism, would avoid Sabellianism, must accept the eternal divine Generation of the Son.
§§6, 7. [Digression: the humiliation of the Word explained against the Arians.]
§8. The eternity of Christ's Kingdom and of His Person implied each in the other.
§§9-12. In what sense Christ and the Father are, and are not, one. The divine gennesis.
§§13, 14. The doctrine of divine dilatation and contraction denies true personal distinctions in the Godhead.
§§15-24. The Son and the Word identical. Refutation of the three alternative suppositions, and of the argument alleged from the O.T. in support of them.
§25. Final refutation of the doctrine of dilatation.
§§26-36. The Scriptural identification of Son and Word refutes the restriction of the former title to the man Jesus.
[3273] The above Excursus is substituted for the longer introduction of Newman (republished in Latin in his Tracts, Theological and Ecclesiastical, 1872), and is in the main a condensation of the more recent and final discussion of Zahn (Marcellus, 1867, pp. 198 seqq.). The result of the latter is to confirm the main contention of Newman, viz. that the system, rather than the person, of Marcellus is throughout in view. Earlier discussions pointing the same way are cited: In Eusebii contra Marcellum libros Observationes, auctore K.S.C.,' Lips. 1787 (cited by Newman); Rettberg, Marcelliana, Præf. p. 7; Kuhn, Kathol. Dogm. ii. p. 344, note 1 (by Zahn).
[3274] The Articles Sabellianism and Sabellius (both sub. fin.) in D.C.B. vol. iv., state the contrary, but the present writer follows the standard discussion of Zahn, of which the learned articles in question do not seem to take account.
Discourse IV.
------------------------
§§1-5. The substantiality of the Word proved from Scripture. If the One Origin be substantial, Its Word is substantial. Unless the Word and Son be a second Origin, or a work, or an attribute (and so God be compounded), or at the same time Father, or involve a second nature in God, He is from the Father's Essence and distinct from Him. Illustration of John x. 30, drawn from Deut. iv. 4.
1. The Word is God from God; for the Word was God [3275] ,' and again, Of whom are the Fathers, and of whom Christ, who is God over all, blessed for ever. Amen [3276] .' And since Christ is God from God, and God's Word, Wisdom, Son, and Power, therefore but One God is declared in the divine Scriptures. For the Word, being Son of the One God, is referred to Him of whom also He is; so that Father and Son are two, yet the Monad of the Godhead is indivisible and inseparable. And thus too we preserve One Beginning of Godhead and not two Beginnings, whence there is strictly a Monarchy. And of this very Beginning the Word is by nature Son, not as if another beginning, subsisting by Himself, nor having come into being externally to that Beginning, lest from that diversity a Dyarchy and Polyarchy should ensue; but of the one Beginning He is own Son, own Wisdom, own Word, existing from It. For, according to John, in' that Beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,' for the Beginning was God; and since He is from It, therefore also the Word was God.' And as there is one Beginning and therefore one God, so one is that Essence and Subsistence which indeed and truly and really is, and which said I am that I am [3277] ,' and not two, that there be not two Beginnings; and from the One, a Son in nature and truth, is Its own Word, Its Wisdom, Its Power, and inseparable from It. And as there is not another essence, lest there be two Beginnings, so the Word which is from that One Essence has no dissolution, nor is a sound significative, but is an essential Word and essential Wisdom, which is the true Son. For were He not essential, God will be speaking into the air [3278] , and having a body, in nothing differently from men; but since He is not man, neither is His Word according to the infirmity of man [3279] . For as the Beginning is one Essence, so Its Word is one, essential, and subsisting, and Its Wisdom. For as He is God from God, and Wisdom from the Wise, and Word from the Rational, and Son from Father, so is He from Subsistence Subsistent, and from Essence Essential and Substantive, and Being from Being.
2. Since were He not essential Wisdom and substantive Word, and Son existing, but simply Wisdom and Word and Son in the Father, then the Father Himself would have a nature compounded of Wisdom and Word. But if so, the forementioned absurdities would follow; and He will be His own Father, and the Son begetting and begotten by Himself; or Word, Wisdom, Son, is a name only, and He does not subsist who owns, or rather who is, these titles. If then He does not subsist, the names are idle and empty, unless we say that God is Very Wisdom [3280] and Very Word. But if so, He is His own Father and Son; Father, when Wise, Son, when Wisdom; but these things are not in God as a certain quality; away with the dishonourable [3281] thought; for it will issue in this, that God is compounded of essence and quality [3282] . For whereas all quality is in essence, it will clearly follow that the Divine Monad, indivisible as it is, must be compound, being severed into essence and accident [3283] . We must ask then these headstrong men; The Son was proclaimed as God's Wisdom and Word; how then is He such? if as a quality, the absurdity has been shewn; but if God is that Very Wisdom, then it is the absurdity of Sabellius; therefore He is so, as an Offspring in a proper sense from the Father Himself, according to the illustration of light. For as there is light from fire, so from God is there a Word, and Wisdom from the Wise, and from the Father a Son. For in this way the Monad remains undivided and entire, and Its Son, Word not unessential, nor not subsisting, but essential truly. For were it not so, all that is said would be said notionally [3284] and verbally [3285] . But if we must avoid that absurdity, then is a true Word essential. For as there is a Father truly, so Wisdom truly. In this respect then they are two; not because, as Sabellius said, Father and Son are the same, but because the Father is Father and the Son Son, and they are one, because He is Son of the Essence of the Father by nature, existing as His own Word. This the Lord said, viz. I and the Father are One [3286] ;' for neither is the Word separated from the Father, nor was or is the Father ever Wordless; on this account He says, I in the Father and the Father in Me [3287] .'