Chapter IV.--Defence of the Divine Unity Against Objection. No Analogy Between Human Powers and God's Sovereignty. The Objection Otherwise Untenable, for Why Stop at Two Gods?
But some one may contend that two great Supremes may exist, distinct and separate in their own departments; and may even adduce, as an example, the kingdoms of the world, which, though they are so many in number, are yet supreme in their several regions. Such a man will suppose that human circumstances are always comparable with divine ones. Now, if this mode of reasoning be at all tolerable, what is to prevent our introducing, I will not say a third god or a fourth, but as many as there are kings of the earth? Now it is God that is in question, whose main property it is to admit of no comparison with Himself. Nature itself, therefore, if not an Isaiah, or rather God speaking by Isaiah, will deprecatingly ask, "To whom will ye liken me?" [2370] Human circumstances may perhaps be compared with divine ones, but they may not be with God. God is one thing, and what belongs to God is another thing. Once more: [2371] you who apply the example of a king, as a great supreme, take care that you can use it properly. For although a king is supreme on his throne next to God, he is still inferior to God; and when he is compared with God, he will be dislodged [2372] from that great supremacy which is transferred to God. Now, this being the case, how will you employ in a comparison with God an object as your example, which fails [2373] in all the purposes which belong to a comparison? Why, when supreme power among kings cannot evidently be multifarious, but only unique and singular, is an exception made in the case of Him (of all others) [2374] who is King of kings, and (from the exceeding greatness of His power, and the subjection of all other ranks [2375] to Him) the very summit, [2376] as it were, of dominion? But even in the case of rulers of that other form of government, where they one by one preside in a union of authority, if with their petty [2377] prerogatives of royalty, so to say, they be brought on all points [2378] into such a comparison with one another as shall make it clear which of them is superior in the essential features [2379] and powers of royalty, it must needs follow that the supreme majesty will redound [2380] to one alone,--all the others being gradually, by the issue of the comparison, removed and excluded from the supreme authority. Thus, although, when spread out in several hands, supreme authority seems to be multifarious, yet in its own powers, nature, and condition, it is unique. It follows, then, that if two gods are compared, as two kings and two supreme authorities, the concentration of authority must necessarily, according to the meaning of the comparison, be conceded to one of the two; because it is clear from his own superiority that he is the supreme, his rival being now vanquished, and proved to be not the greater, however great. Now, from this failure of his rival, the other is unique in power, possessing a certain solitude, as it were, in his singular pre-eminence. The inevitable conclusion at which we arrive, then, on this point is this: either we must deny that God is the great Supreme, which no wise man will allow himself to do; or say that God has no one else with whom to share His power.
[2370] Isa. xl. 18, 25.
[2371] Denique.
[2372] Excidet.
[2373] Amittitur. "Tertullian" (who thinks lightly of the analogy of earthly monarchs) "ought rather to have contended that the illustration strengthened his argument. In each kingdom there is only one supreme power; but the universe is God's kingdom: there is therefore only one supreme power in the universe."-- Bp. Kaye, On the Writings of Tertullian, Third edition, p. 453, note 2.
[2374] Scilicet.
[2375] Graduum.
[2376] Culmen.
[2377] Minutalibus regnis.
[2378] Undique.
[2379] Substantiis.
[2380] Eliquetur.
Chapter V.--The Dual Principle Falls to the Ground; Plurality of Gods, of Whatever Number, More Consistent. Absurdity and Injury to Piety Resulting from Marcion's Duality.
But on what principle did Marcion confine his supreme powers to two? I would first ask, If there be two, why not more? Because if number be compatible with the substance of Deity, the richer you make it in number the better. Valentinus was more consistent and more liberal; for he, having once imagined two deities, Bythos and Sige, [2381] poured forth a swarm of divine essences, a brood of no less than thirty Æons, like the sow of Æneas. [2382] Now, whatever principle refuses to admit several supreme beings, the same must reject even two, for there is plurality in the very lowest number after one. After unity, number commences. So, again, the same principle which could admit two could admit more. After two, multitude begins, now that one is exceeded. In short, we feel that reason herself expressly [2383] forbids the belief in more gods than one, because the self-same rule lays down one God and not two, which declares that God must be a Being to which, as the great Supreme, nothing is equal; and that Being to which nothing is equal must, moreover, be unique. But further, what can be the use or advantage in supposing two supreme beings, two co-ordinate [2384] powers? What numerical difference could there be when two equals differ not from one? For that thing which is the same in two is one. Even if there were several equals, all would be just as much one, because, as equals, they would not differ one from another. So, if of two beings neither differs from the other, since both of them are on the supposition [2385] supreme, both being gods, neither of them is more excellent than the other; and so, having no pre-eminence, their numerical distinction [2386] has no reason in it. Number, moreover, in the Deity ought to be consistent with the highest reason, or else His worship would be brought into doubt. For consider [2387] now, if, when I saw two Gods before me (who, being both Supreme Beings, were equal to each other), I were to worship them both, what should I be doing? I should be much afraid that the abundance of my homage would be deemed superstition rather than piety. Because, as both of them are so equal and are both included in either of the two, I might serve them both acceptably in only one; and by this very means I should attest their equality and unity, provided that I worshipped them mutually the one in the other, because in the one both are present to me. If I were to worship one of the two, I should be equally conscious of seeming to pour contempt on the uselessness of a numerical distinction, which was superfluous, because it indicated no difference; in other words, I should think it the safer course to worship neither of these two Gods than one of them with some scruple of conscience, or both of them to none effect.
[2381] Depth and silence.
[2382] See Virgil, Æneid, viii. 43, etc.
[2383] Ipso termino.
[2384] Paria.
[2385] Jam.
[2386] Numeri sui.
[2387] Ecce.