If not of the essence of God, the Son could not be held to be eternal. "How utterly absurd," exclaims Basil, "to deny the glory of God to have had brightness; [351] to deny the wisdom of God to have been ever with God!...The Father is of eternity. So also is the Son of eternity, united by generation to the unbegotten nature of the Father. This is not my own statement. I shall prove it by quoting the words of Scripture. Let me cite from the Gospel In the beginning was the Word,' [352] and from the Psalm, other words spoken as in the person of the Father, From the womb before the morning I have begotten them.' [353] Let us put both together, and say, He was, and He was begotten....How absurd to seek for something higher in the case of the unoriginate and the unbegotten! Just as absurd is it to start questions as to time, about priority in the case of Him Who was with the Father from eternity, and between Whom and Him that begat Him there is no interval." [354]
A dilemma put by Eunomius was the following: When God begat the Son, the Son either was or was not. [355] If He was not, no argument could lie against Eunomius and the Arians. If He was, the position is blasphemous and absurd, for that which is needs no begetting. [356]
To meet this dilemma, Basil drew a distinction between eternity and the being unoriginate. [357] The Eunomians, from the fact of the unoriginateness of the Father being called eternity, maintained that unoriginateness and eternity are identical. [358] Because the Son is not unbegotten they do not even allow Him to be eternal. But there is a wide distinction to be observed in the meaning of the terms. The word unbegotten is predicated of that which has origin of itself, and no cause of its being: the word eternal is predicated of that which is in being beyond all time and age. [359] Wherefore the Son is both not unbegotten and eternal. [360] Eunomius was ready to give great dignity to the Son as a supreme creature. He did not hold the essence of the Son to be common to that of the things created out of nothing. [361] He would give Him as great a preëminence as the Creator has over His own created works. [362] Basil attributes little importance to this concession, and thinks it only leads to confusion and contradiction. If the God of the universe, being unbegotten, necessarily differs from things begotten, and all things begotten have their common hypostasis of the non-existent, what alternative is there to a natural conjunction of all such things? Just as in the one case the unapproachable effects a distinction between the natures, so in the other equality of condition brings them into mutual contact. They say that the Son and all things that came into being under Him are of the non-existent, and so far they make those natures common, and yet they deny that they give Him a nature of the non-existent. For again, as though Eunomius were Lord himself, and able to give to the Only Begotten what rank and dignity he chooses, he goes on to argue,--We attribute to Him so much supereminence as the Creator must of necessity have over His own creature. He does not say, "We conceive," or "We are of opinion," as would be befitting when treating of God, but he says "We attribute," as though he himself could control the measure of the attribution. And how much supereminence does he give? As much as the Creator must necessarily have over His own creatures. This has not yet reached a statement of difference of substance. Human beings in art surpass their own works, and yet are consubstantial with them, as the potter with his clay, and the shipwright with his timber. For both are alike bodies, subject to sense, and earthy. [363] Eunomius explained the title "Only Begotten" to mean that the Son alone was begotten and created by the Father alone, and therefore was made the most perfect minister. "If," rejoins Basil, "He does not possess His glory in being perfect God, if it lies only in His being an exact and obedient subordinate, in what does He differ from the ministering spirits who perform the work of their service without blame? [364] Indeed Eunomius joins created' to begotten' with the express object of shewing that there is no distinction between the Son and a creature! [365] And how unworthy a conception of the Father that He should need a servant to do His work! He commanded and they were created.' [366] What service was needed by Him Who creates by His will alone? But in what sense are all things said by us to be through the Son'? In that the divine will, starting from the prime cause, as it were from a source, proceeds to operation through its own image, God the Word." [367] Basil sees that if the Son is a creature mankind is still without a revelation of the Divine. He sees that Eunomius, "by alienating the Only Begotten from the Father, and altogether cutting Him off from communion with Him, as far as he can, deprives us of the ascent of knowledge which is made through the Son. Our Lord says that all that is the Father's is His. [368] Eunomius states that there is no fellowship between the Father and Him Who is of Him." [369] If so there is no "brightness" of glory; no "express image of hypostasis." [370] So Dorner, [371] who freely uses the latter portion of the treatise, "The main point of Basil's opposition to Eunomius is that the word unbegotten is not a name indicative of the essence of God, but only of a condition of existence. [372] The divine essence has other predicates. If every peculiar mode of existence causes a distinction in essence also, then the Son cannot be of the same essence with the Father, because He has a peculiar mode of existence, and the Father another; and men cannot be of the same essence, because each of them represents a different mode of existence. By the names of Father, Son, and Spirit, we do not understand different essences, (ousias), but they are names which distinguish the huparxis of each. All are God, and the Father is no more God than the Son, as one man is no more man than another. Quantitative differences are not reckoned in respect of essence; the question is only of being or non-being. But this does not exclude the idea of a variety in condition in the Father and the Son (heteros hechein),--the generation of the Latter. The dignity of both is equal. The essence of Begetter and Begotten is identical. [373]
The Fourth Book contains notes on the chief passages of Scripture which were relied on by Arian disputants. Among these are
I Cor. xv. 28. On the Subjection of the Son.
"If the Son is subjected to the Father in the Godhead, then He must have been subjected from the beginning, from whence He was God. But if He was not subjected, but shall be subjected, it is in the manhood, as for us, not in the Godhead, as for Himself."
Philipp. ii. 9. On the Name above every Name.
"If the name above every name was given by the Father to the Son, Who was God, and every tongue owned Him Lord, after the incarnation, because of His obedience, then before the incarnation He neither had the name above every name nor was owned by all to be Lord. It follows then that after the incarnation He was greater than before the incarnation, which is absurd." So of Matt. xxviii. 18. "We must understand this of the incarnation, and not of the Godhead."
John xiv. 28. "My Father is Greater than I."
"Greater' is predicated in bulk, in time, in dignity, in power, or as cause. The Father cannot be called greater than the Son in bulk, for He is incorporeal: nor yet in time, for the Son is Creator of times: nor yet in dignity, for He was not made what He had once not been: nor yet in power, for what things the Father doeth, these also doeth the son likewise': [374] nor as cause, since (the Father) would be similarly greater than He and than we, if He is cause of Him and of us. The words express rather the honour given by the Son to the Father than any depreciation by the speaker; moreover what is greater is not necessarily of a different essence. Man is called greater than man, and horse than horse. If the Father is called greater, it does not immediately follow that He is of another substance. In a word, the comparison lies between beings of one substance, not between those of different substances. [375]
"A man is not properly said to be greater than a brute, than an inanimate thing, but man than man and brute than brute. The Father is therefore of one substance with the Son, even though He be called greater." [376]
On Matt. xxiv. 36. Of Knowledge of that Day and of that Hour. [377]
"If the Son is the Creator of the world, and does not know the time of the judgment, then He does not know what He created. For He said that He was ignorant not of the judgment, but of the time. How can this be otherwise than absurd?
"If the Son has not knowledge of all things whereof the Father has knowledge, then He spake untruly when He said All things that the Father hath are mine' [378] and As the Father knoweth me so know I the Father.' [379] If there is a distinction between knowing the Father and knowing the things that the Father hath, and if, in proportion as every one is greater than what is his, it is greater to know the Father than to know what is His, then the Son, though He knew the greater (for no man knoweth the Father save the Son), [380] did not know the less.
"This is impossible. He was silent concerning the season of the judgment, because it was not expedient for men to hear. Constant expectation kindles a warmer zeal for true religion. The knowledge that a long interval of time was to elapse would have made men more careless about true religion, from the hope of being saved by a subsequent change of life. How could He who had known everything up to this time (for so He said) not know that hour also? If so, the Apostle vainly said In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.'
"If the Holy Spirit, who searcheth the deep things of God,' [382] cannot be ignorant of anything that is God's, then, as they who will not even allow Him to be equal must contend, the Holy Ghost is greater than the Son." [383]
On Matt. xxvi. 39. Father, if it be Possible, let this Cup pass from Me.
"If the Son really said, Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me,' He not only shewed His own cowardice and weakness, but implied that there might be something impossible to the Father. The words if it be possible' are those of one in doubt, and not thoroughly assured that the Father could save Him. How could not He who gave the boon of life to corpses much rather be able to preserve life in the living? Wherefore then did not He Who had raised Lazarus and many of the dead supply life to Himself? Why did He ask life from the Father, saying, in His fear, Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass away from me'? If He was dying unwillingly, He had not yet humbled Himself; He had not yet been made obedient to the Father unto death; [384] He had not given Himself, as the Apostle says, who gave Himself for our sins, [385] a ransom.' [386] If He was dying willingly, what need of the words Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass away'? No: this must not be understood of Himself; it must be understood of those who were on the point of sinning against Him, to prevent them from sinning; when crucified in their behalf He said, Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.' [387] We must not understand words spoken in accordance with the oeconomy [388] to be spoken simply."
On John vi. 57. I live by the Father. [389]
"If the Son lives on account of [390] the Father, He lives on account of another, and not of Himself. But He who lives on account of another cannot be Self-life. [391] So He who is holy of grace is not holy of himself. [392] Then the Son did not speak truly when He said, I am the life,' [393] and again the Son quickeneth whom He will.' [394] We must therefore understand the words to be spoken in reference to the incarnation, and not to the Godhead."