Further note, that will (thelesis) and wish (boulesis) are two different things: also the object of will (to theleton) and the capacity for will (theletikon), and the subject that exercises will (ho thelon), are all different. For will is just the simple faculty of willing, whereas wish is will directed to some definite object. Again, the object of will is the matter underlying the will, that is to say, the thing that we will: for instance, when appetite is roused for food. The appetite pure and simple, however, is a rational will. The capacity for will, moreover, means that which possesses the volitional faculty, for example, man. Further, the subject that exercises will is the actual person who makes use of will.
The word to thelema, it is well to note, sometimes denotes the will, that is, the volitional faculty, and in this sense we speak of natural will: and sometimes it denotes the object of will, and we speak of will (thelema gnomikon) depending on inclination [1860] .
[1846] Cf. 1 Cor. i. 10.
[1847] Max. ad Marin. et ad Incert. p. 98.
[1848] to bouleton.
[1849] Max. Dial. cum Pyrrh. et Epist. 1 ad Marin.
[1850] Thomas Aquinas (1--2, Quæst. 4, a. 1 and 2) lays down the position in accordance with John of Damascus, that there is no "counsel" in God quatenus est appetitus inquisitivus, but that there is quantum ad certitudinem judicii. Basil (Hexaëm. Hom. 1), arguing against the ancient philosophers who taught that the world was made aproairetos, affirms "counsel" in God in the latter sense.
[1851] Max., Epist. 1 ad Marin.
[1852] Text, ho de Theos panta eidos haplos, ou bouleuetai. Various reading is, ho de Theos panta aidos haplos bouletai.
[1853] Max., Dial. cum Pyrrh.
[1854] dio oude gnomikon eiche thelema.
[1855] gnomen.
[1856] v. infr., lib. iii. ch. 14.
[1857] Or, personalities.
[1858] Text, theleton, as given by Faber. Variant, theletikon.
[1859] to gnomikon thelema, the will of individual opinion, or, the dispositional will.
[1860] Or, acting by opinion, or disposition.
Chapter XXIII.--Concerning Energy.
All the faculties [1861] we have already discussed, both those of knowledge and those of life, both the natural and the artificial, are, it is to be noted, called energies. For energy [1862] is the natural force and activity of each essence: or again, natural energy is the activity innate in every essence: and so, clearly, things that have the same essence have also the same energy, and things that have different natures have also different energies. For no essence can be devoid of natural energy.
Natural energy again is the force in each essence by which its nature is made manifest. And again: natural energy is the primal, eternally-moving force of the intelligent soul: that is, the eternally-moving word of the soul, which ever springs naturally from it. And yet again: natural energy [1863] is the force and activity of each essence which only that which is not lacks.
But actions [1864] are also called energies: for instance, speaking, eating, drinking, and such like. The natural affections [1865] also are often called energies, for instance, hunger, thirst, and so forth [1866] . And yet again, the result of the force is also often called energy.
Things are spoken of in a twofold way as being potential and actual. For we say that the child at the breast is a potential scholar, for he is so equipped that, if taught, he will become a scholar. Further, we speak of a potential and an actual scholar, meaning that the latter is versed in letters, while the former has the power of interpreting letters, but does not put it into actual use: again, when we speak of an actual scholar, we mean that he puts his power into actual use, that is to say, that he really interprets writings.
It is, therefore, to be observed that in the second sense potentiality and actuality go together; for the scholar is in the one case potential, and in the other actual.
The primal and only true energy of nature is the voluntary or rational and independent life which constitutes our humanity. I know not how those who rob the Lord of this can say that He became man [1867] .
Energy is drastic activity of nature: and by drastic is meant that which is moved of itself.
[1861] Anast. Sin. in Odeg., from Greg. Nyss., p. 44; Clem. Alex. ap. Max., p. 151.
[1862] The Greek energeia being a term with a large connotation is explained as meaning in different cases operation (operatio), action (actio), and act (actus). Nemesius defines actio as operatio rationalis, actus as perfectio potentiæ
[1863] Cf. Anast. Sin. in Odegos, p. 43; John of Dam., Dialect. c. 30; Greg. Nyss., in Maximus, II., p. 155.
[1864] praxeis. So praxis is defined as energeia logike in the following chapter.
[1865] ta pathe. Cf. Instit. Elem., c. 9; Greg. Nyss., Cont. Eunom., v. p. 170.
[1866] Max., Dial. cum Pyrrh.
[1867] Greg. Nyss. ap. Max., p. 155.