A Brighter Day Begins with His Word.

Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series • VOL 9 • SECTION 197

Chapter XX.--That there are not two Kingdoms.

← Hilary of Poitiers & John of Damascus

Chapter XX.--That there are not two Kingdoms.

That there are not two kingdoms [2620] , one good and one bad, we shall see from this. For good and evil are opposed to one another and mutually destructive, and cannot exist in one another or with one another. Each of them, therefore, in its own division will belong to the whole, and first [2621] they will be circumscribed, not by the whole alone but also each of them by part of the whole.

Next I ask [2622] , who it is that assigns [2623] to each its place. For they will not affirm that they have come to a friendly agreement with, or been reconciled to, one another. For evil is not evil when it is at peace with, and reconciled to, goodness, nor is goodness good when it is on amicable terms with evil. But if He Who has marked off to each of these its own sphere of action is something different from them, He must the rather be God.

One of two things indeed is necessary, either that they come in contact with and destroy one another, or that there exists some intermediate place where neither goodness nor evil exists, separating both from one another, like a partition. And so there will be no longer two but three kingdoms.

Again, one of these alternatives is necessary, either that they are at peace, which is quite incompatible with evil (for that which is at peace is not evil), or they are at strife, which is incompatible with goodness (for that which is at strife is not perfectly good), or the evil is at strife and the good does not retaliate, but is destroyed by the evil, or they are ever in trouble and distress [2624] , which is not a mark of goodness. There is, therefore, but one kingdom, delivered from all evil.

But if this is so, they say, whence comes evil [2625] ? For it is quite impossible that evil should originate from goodness. We answer then, that evil is nothing else than absence of goodness and a lapsing [2626] from what is natural into what is unnatural: for nothing evil is natural. For all things, whatsoever God made, are very good [2627] , so far as they were made: if, therefore, they remain just as they were created, they are very good, but when they voluntarily depart from what is natural and turn to what is unnatural, they slip into evil.

By nature, therefore, all things are servants of the Creator and obey Him. Whenever, then, any of His creatures voluntarily rebels and becomes disobedient to his Maker, he introduces evil into himself. For evil is not any essence nor a property of essence, but an accident, that is, a voluntary deviation from what is natural into what is unnatural, which is sin.

Whence, then, comes sin [2628] ? It is an invention of the free-will of the devil. Is the devil, then, evil? In so far as he was brought into existence he is not evil but good. For he was created by his Maker a bright and very brilliant angel, endowed with free-will as being rational. But he voluntarily departed from the virtue that is natural and came into the darkness of evil, being far removed from God, Who alone is good and can give life and light. For from Him every good thing derives its goodness, and so far as it is separated from Him in will (for it is not in place), it falls into evil.

[2620] Athan., Cont. Gentes.

[2621] Athan., Cont. omnes hæret.

[2622] Damasc., Dial. Cont. Manich.

[2623] Text, apotemnomenos. Variants, apotemomenos and aponemomenos.

[2624] Text, kakousthai. Variant, kakoucheisthai.

[2625] Basil, Hom. Deum non esse caus. mal.

[2626] Text, paradrome. Variant, para. rope, cf. infra.

[2627] Gen. i. 31.

[2628] Basil, Hom. Deum non esse caus. mal.

Chapter XXI.--The purpose [2629] for which God in His foreknowledge created persons who would sin and not repent.

God in His goodness [2630] brought what exists into being out of nothing, and has foreknowledge of what will exist in the future. If, therefore, they were not to exist in the future, they would neither be evil in the future nor would they be foreknown. For knowledge is of what exists and foreknowledge is of what will surely exist in the future. For simple being comes first and then good or evil being. But if the very existence of those, who through the goodness of God are in the future to exist, were to be prevented by the fact that they were to become evil of their own choice, evil would have prevailed over the goodness of God. Wherefore God makes all His works good, but each becomes of its own choice good or evil. Although, then, the Lord said, Good were it for that man that he had never been born [2631] , He said it in condemnation not of His own creation but of the evil which His own creation had acquired by his own choice and through his own heedlessness. For the heedlessness that marks man's judgment made His Creator's beneficence of no profit to him. It is just as if any one, when he had obtained riches and dominion from a king, were to lord it over his benefactor, who, when he has worsted him, will punish him as he deserves, if he should see him keeping hold of the sovereignty to the end.

[2629] Jer., Contr. Pelag., bk. iii.

[2630] Damasc., Dialog contra Manich.

[2631] St. Mark xiv. 21.

Historical source

Public Domain • Christian Classics Ethereal Library source edition.

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