§ 152. THE AUGUSTESTIAN SYSTEM. 811
Yet Augustine admits that tlie original state ol man was only relatively perfect, perfect in its kind ; as a child may be a perfect cliild, while lie is destined to become a ma.Ti ; or as the seed fulfils its idea as seed, tliougli it has yet to become a tree. God alone is immutable and absolutely good ; man is subject to development in time, and therefore to change. The primal gifts were bestowed on man simply as powers, to be developed in either one of two ways. Adam could go straight forward, develop himself harmoniously in untroubled unity with God, and thus gradually attain his final perfection ; or he could fall away, engender evil ex nihilo by abuse of his free will, and develop himself through discords and contradictions. It was graciously made ])ossible that his mind should become incapable of-error, his will, of sin, his body, of death ; and by a normal growth this possibility would have become actual. But this was mere possibility, involving, in the nature of the case, the opposite jijossibility of error, sin, and death.
Augustine makes the important distinction between the ]30ssibility of not sinning' and the impossibility of sinning.' The former is conditional or potential freedom from sin, which may tm-n into its opposite, the bondage of sin. This belonged to man before the fall. The latter is the absolute freedom from sin or the perfected holiness, which belongs to God, to
and delicia; of Eden in poetic colors, and extends the perfection even to the animal and vegetable realms. Yet he is not everywhere consistent. His views became more exaggerated from hie opposition to Pelagianism. In the treatise, De libero arbitrio, iii. c. 24, §§ 71, 72, which he completed a. d. 395, he says, that the first human beings were neither wise nor foolisli, but had at first only the capability to become one or the other. " Infans nee stultus nee sapiens dici potest, quamxis jam homo Bit; ex quo apparet naturam hominis recipere aliquid medium, quod neg'^e stultitiam neque saplentiam recte vocaris," . . . "Ita factus est homo, ut ^uamvia eapiens nondum esset, pneceptum tamen posset accipere." On the other hand, in his much later Opus imperf. c. Julianum, I. v. c. 1 (torn. x. f. 1222) he ascribes to the first man excellentissima sapientia, appealing to Pythagoras, who is said to hare declared him the wisest, who first gave names to things.
' Posse non peccare^ which at the same time Implies tne possibilitas peccandi. Oomp. Opus imperf. v. 60 (fol. 1278): "Prorsus ita factus est, ut peccandi poasibilitatem haberet a necessario, peccatum vero a possibili," i. e., the possibility of sinuing was necessary, but the sinning itself merely possible. The peccare posse, sayi Augustine, in the same connection, is natura, the peccare is culpa.
^ Non posse peccare, or impossibilitas peccandi.
82C THIRD PERIOD. A.D, 311-590.
the holy angels who have acceptably passed their probatioA and to the redeemed saints in heaven.
In like manner he distinguishes between absolute and relative immortality.' The former is the impossibility of dying, founded upon the impossibility of sinning ; an attribute of God and of the saints after the resurrection. The latter is the baro pre-conformation for immortality, and implies tlie opposite possibility of death. This was the immortality of Adam before the full, and if he had persevered, it would have passed into the impossibility of dying; but it was lost by sin.'^
Freedom, also, Augustine holds to be an original endowment of man ; but he distinguishes diflerent kinds of it, and different degrees of its development, which we must observe, or we should charge him with self-contradiction."
By freedom Augustine understands, in the first place, simply spontaneity or self -activity ^ as opposed to action under external constraint or from animal instinct. Both sin and holiness are "Doluntary, that is, acts of the will, not motions of natural necessity.'' This freedom belongs at all times and essentially to the human will, even in the sinful state (in which
' Between the non posse moii aud the posse non mori, or between the immor^ talitas major aud the immortalifas minor.
' Comp. Opus imperf. 1. vi. cap. 30 (torn. x. I'ol. 13G0): "Ilia vero immortalitaa in qua sancti angeli vivunt, et m qua nos quoque victuri sumu3, piocul dubio majoi est. Non enim talis, in qua homo habeat quidem in potestate non mori, sicut non peccare, sed etiam possit et mori, quia potest peccare : sed talis est ilia immortalitas, in qua omnis qui ibi est, vel erit, mori non poterit, quia nee peccare jam poterit." De corrept. et grat. §33 (x. f. TeS): "Prima libertas voluntatis erat, posse non peccare, novissima erit multo major, non posse peccare : prima immortalitas erat, posse non mori, novissima erit multo major, non posse mori : prima erat perseverantiae potestas, bonura posse non deserere ; novissima erit felicitas pcrseverantise, bonum non posse deserere."
• The distinctions in the Augustinian idea of freedom have been overlooked by Wiggers and most of the old historians, but, on the other hand, brought out with more or less clearness by Neander (in the Kirchengcaehichte and in tlie Dogmcngeschichte), by Ritter (G«sch der christl. Philoso[)hio, ii. p. 341 ff.), Jul. Midler (Dia cbristl. Lehre von der Siindte, ii. 45 flf.), Joh. Huber (Philosophie der Kirchenviiter, p. '296 CF.). Baur bases his acute criticism of the Augustinian system in part upon the false assumption that Augustine's view of the liberum arbitrium was preciselj the same as t lat of Pclagius. See below.
* Retract, i. c. 9, § 4 : " Voluntas est qua et pcccatur, et recte vivitur."