604 THE MIDDLE AGES. A.D. 1049-1294.
being was, and that it was to it alone Iris argument applied.
Untenable as Anselm's argument is logically, it possesses a strong fascination, and contains a great truth. The being of God is an intuition of the mind, which can only be ex plained by God's objective existence. The modern theory of correlation lends its aid to corroborate what was, after all, fundamental in the Anselmic presentation, namely, that the idea of God in the mind must have corresponding to it a God who really exists. Otherwise, we are left to the mystery which is perhaps still greater, how such an idea could ever have taken firm and general hold of the human mind.1
The doctrine of the atonement. — With the Cur Deus homo, " Why God became Man," a new chapter opens in the de velopment of the doctrine of the atonement. The treatise, which is in the form of a dialogue, is the author's most elabo rate work, and he thought the argument sufficient to break down the objections of Jew and Pagan to the Christian system.
Anselm was the first to attempt to prove the necessity of the incarnation and death of the Son of God by the processes of pure reason. He argued that the world cannot be re deemed by an arbitrary decree of God, nor through man or angel. Man is under the domination of the devil, deserves punishment, and is justly punished; but the devil torments him without right,2 for he does not do it by the authority of God, but from malice. The handwriting of ordinances against the sinner (Col. 2 : 14) is not a note due the devil, but the sen tence of God that he who sinned should be the servant of sin.
1A careful statement of the history of the ontological argument was given by Kostlin, D. Beweisefurs Dasein Gottes, in Studien u. Kriliken, 1875, 1876. Also Ruze, D. ontol Gottesbeioeis seit Anselm, Halle, 1882.
2 Quamvis homo juste a diabolo torqueretitr, ipse tamen ilium injuste torquebat, etc., I. 7 ; Migne, 158. 367 sq. Again Anselm takes up this point, II. 20; p. 427 sq., and says it was not necessary for God to descend to conquer the devil or to proceed judicially against him in order to liberate man. Nothing else did God owe the devil but punishment, and nothing else did man owe the devil but to treat him as he had been treated, that is, to conquer him as man himself had been conquered. All that was demanded by the devil, man owed to God and not to the devil.
§ 98. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY. 605
God cannot allow his original purpose to be thwarted. Sin must be forgiven, but how ? Man owes subjection to God's will. Sin is denying to God the honor due him.1 Satisfaction must be rendered to justice before there can be forgiveness. Bare restitution, however, is not a sufficient satisfaction. For his "contumely," man must give back more than he has taken. He must compensate God's honor.2 Just as he who has inflicted a wound must not only heal the wound, but pay damages to satisfy the demands of violated honor.
All sin, then, must either receive punishment or be covered by satisfaction. Can man make this satisfaction ? No. Were it possible for him to lead a perfectly holy life, from the moment he became conscious of his debt, he would be simply doing his duty for that period. The debt of the past would remain unsettled. But sin, having struck at the roots of man's being, he is not able to lead a perfect life.
God's justice, then, man is not able to satisfy. Man ought, but cannot. God need not, but does. For, most foreign to God would it be to allow man, the most precious of his creatures, to perish. But as God himself must make the satisfaction, and man ought to make it, the satisfaction must be made by one who is both God and man, that is, the Godman.3
To make satisfaction, the God-man must give back to God something he is not under obligation to render. A life of perfect obedience he owes. Death he does not owe, for death is the wages of sin, and he had no sin. By submitting to death, he acquired merit. Because this merit is infinite in value, being connected with the person of the infinite Son of God, it covers the infinite guilt of the sinner and consti tutes the satisfaction required.
1 Non aliud est peccare quam Deo non reddere debitum I. 11; Migne, p. 376.
2 pro contumelia illata plus reddere quam abstulit. . . . Debet omnis qui peccat, honorem quern rapuit, Deo solvere et hcec est satisfactio quam omnis peccator Deo debetfacere.
8 Satisfactio quam nee potest facere nisi Deus nee debet nisi homo, necesse est ut earn faciat Drus-homo, II. 0; Migne, p. 404,