§ 110. DUNS SCOTUS. 687
presuppose their reality.1 The universal is gotten by abstrac tion and by noting points of agreement in individuals, and in a certain sense it is a creation of the mind. The individual has its individuality, or hcecceitas, not by reason of its differ entiation from something else but by its own real essence, or quidditas. A stone is an individual by reason of something positive, intrinsic within itself. The individual is the final form of being, ultima realitas entis.
Theology is a practical science and its chief value is in furnishing to the will the materials of faith to lighten it on the path of virtuous action.
The Scriptures contain what is to be believed, but the authority of the Church establishes what these truths are. Articles of faith are to be accepted, not because they are demonstrable by reason. Reason is unreliable or, at best, obscure and many truths it cannot prove, such as the soul's immortality, the unity of God, and transubstantiation. A doctrine such as the descent into hell, which is not found in the Scriptures is, nevertheless, to be accepted because it is found in the Apostles' Creed. Other truths the Church possesses which are not found in the Scriptures. Our belief in the Scriptures rests ultimately on the authority of the Church.2
The doctrines in which Duns differed most from his prede cessors were the doctrines of God and transubstantiation. In his treatment of God, Duns shows himself to be the most positive of determinists. The controlling element in the divine nature is the will of God, and to submit to the will of God is the highest goal the human will can reach. Here he differs widely from Thomas Aquinas, who places God's intel ligence above His will. The sufficient explanation of God's action is His absolute will.3 God is good because God wills to be so. The will of God might have made what is now bad
1 Universali aliquid extra correspondet a quo movetur intellectus ad causandum talem intentionem. Seeberg, p. 69.
2 Libris canonici sacri non est credendum nisi quia primo credendum est ecclesice approbanti et autorizanti libros istos et contenta in eis. Seeberg, p. 120.
3 Quart? voluntas voluit hoc, nulla est causa, nisi quia voluntas voluntasest, Seeberg, pp. 162 sqq., 660 sqq.
688 THE MIDDLE AGES. A.D. 1049-1294.
good, had God so chosen. He can do all things except what is logically absurd.1 He could have saved Judas after he was condemned, but He cannot make a stone holy or change an event which has already happened.
The will of God determines the salvation of men. The predestination of the elect is an act purely of God's determi nation. The non-elect are reprobated in view of their foreseen demerit. On the other hand, Duns seems to hold fast to the doctrine that the elect merit the eternal reward by good works. Without attempting to exhaust the apparent contra diction between divine foreordination and human responsi bility, he confesses the mystery attaching to the subject.2
Sin is not infinite, for it is connected with finite beings. Original righteousness was a superadded gift, forfeited through the first sin. Eve's sin was greater than Adam's, for Adam shrank from offending Eve — Eve sought to be equal with God. Man's freedom consists in his ability to choose the contrary. Original sin consists in the loss of original righteousness which Adam owed to God.3 Sin does not pass down to Adam's descendants by way of infection. Duns separated from Augustine in denying the doctrine of moral inability, the servum arbitrium. It belongs to the very nature of the will to be free. This freedom, however, the will can lose by repeated volitions. Sin is inherent in the will alone, and concupiscence is only an inclination of the will to desire objects of pleasure immoderately.4
1 Harnack, Dogmengesch., III. 446, has chosen strong words to show the unwillingness of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus to pursue the narrow way to the knowledge of God, that is, through the person of the historical Christ. And Seeberg, p. 671, lays stress upon the failure of Duns to bring God near to the soul. God remained a God afar off. According to both these modern dogmaticians, it remained for the Reformation through the principles of a living faith and God's love to bring God into nearness to the soul.
2 Seeberg, Dogmengesch., II. 135, Theologie, etc., 227 sq., 293 sqq., 666 sq. ; Schwane, p. 4(53.
8 Carentia justitice originalis. Seeberg, 218 sq. ; Loofs, Dogmengesch., p. 305. Harnack, III. 551, and Seeberg, p. 220, emphatically assert that Duns abandoned the Augustinian conception of sin and moral corruption.
* Pronitas in appetitu rationale, i.e. in voluntate ad concupiscendum delectabilia immoderate. Quoted by Stockl, II. 362.