§ 120. SIN AND GRACE. 753
of righteousness — that is, the doing of what we owe — to be called a meritorious act. Without the grace of the Holy Spirit it is not possible to merit eternal life. Man is not even able to make the preparation necessary to receive the light of grace. Prevenient grace is essential to beget in him the disposition to holiness, — interior voluntas. The number of the elect is fixed even to the persons of the saved, and perse vering grace is given to those who remain steadfast to the end. Man cannot even know the truth without help from above.1
Thomas distinguished two kinds of merit or meritorious works : the merit which comes by the proper use of our natu ral gifts, — meritum de congruo, — and the merit which comes from the proper use of the gifts of grace, — meritum de condigno. In his original state, man was enabled by the superadded gift of grace to love God above all things. In the fallen state, grace is required to restore this ability, and no works of this second sort can be done without the assistance of the Holy Spirit. Such statements as these could be multiplied almost indefinitely. There is, however, notwithstanding these clear statements, a tone in Thomas' treatment which makes the impression that he modified strict Augustinianism and made a place for the real merit of works, and in this the Catholic Church follows him.
As for the satisfaction of Christ, Thomas Aquinas fol lowed Anaelm in holding that Christ's death was not a price paid to the devil.2 He did not lay down a very exact definition of the mode in which the atonement was made effi cacious ; but he laid stress upon the merit which Christ won by the assent of his own will to the will of God. He does not speak of the propitiation of Christ in the way Abrelard and Peter the Lombard 3 did as an exercise of love draw-
1 Verum non potest cognoscere sine auxilio divino. Summa, II. 109, 2, 6, 7, Migne, II. 907 sqq.
2 Sanguis qui estpretium nostrce redemptionis non dicitur obtulisse diabolo sed deo. Summa, III. 48, 4, Migne, III. 44.
3 Mors Christi nos justificat, dum per earn charitas excitatur in cordibus nostris. Sent., III. 19, 1.
3c
754 THE MIDDLE AGES. A.D. 1049-1294.
ing man to God. The love and obedience of Christ are efficient, through the sufferings he endured on the cross, in reconciling man to God and redeeming man from the power of the devil.
Thomas very clearly states the consequences of Christ's atonement. The first is that thereby man comes to know how great the love of God is, and is provoked to love God in return.1 By the cross Christ set an example of humility, righteousness, and other virtues. He also taught men the necessity of keeping free from sin, overcoming the devil, and conquering death by dying to sin and the world. God might have pardoned man without the satisfaction of the cross, for all things are possible with Him. This was in opposition to Anselm's position that God could have re deemed man in no other way than by the cross.
Bonaventura went further in opposition to Anselm and distinctly asserted that God could have liberated and saved the race otherwise than He did. He might have saved it by the way of pity — per mam misericordice — in distinction from the way of justice. And in choosing this way he would have done no injury to the claims of justice.2 His chapter on this subject he closes with the words, " It would be dangerous for me to put a limit on God's power to redeem, for He is able to do above what we are able to think."
No distinction was made by the mediaeval theologians between the doctrine of justification and the doctrine of sanctificatioU) such as is made by Protestant theologians. Justification was treated as a part of the process of making the sinner righteous, and not as a judicial sentence by which he was declared to be righteous. Sanctificatioii was so thoroughly involved in the sacramental system that we must look for its treatment in the chapters on the seven sacraments, the instrumentalities of sarictification; or under
1 Per passionem Christi homo cognoscit quantum dens hominem diligat et per hoc provocatur ad eum diligendum. Summa, III. 46, 3, Migne, III. 417.
2 In Sent., III. 20, Peltier's ed., IV. 439. He attempts to show that he is not out of accord with Anselm, but he makes poor work of it. Anselm's statement is absolute. Cur deus homo, II. 10.