THE NEW SCHAFF-IIERZOG
work advances a theory of knowledge based upon the recognition of innate universal characteristics on the object perceived, and rigidly opposed to knowledge supernatural in its origin and determinable only by strife and conflict. The second work lays down the common marks by which religious truth is recognized. These are a belief in the existence of the Deity, the obligation to reverence such a power, the identification of worship with practical moralitj', the obligation to repent of sin and to abandon it, and, finally, divine recompense in this world and the next. These five essentials (the so-called " Five Articles " of the English Deists) constitute the nucleus of all religions and of Christianity in its primitive, uncorrupted form. The variations between positive religions are explained as due partly to the allegorization of nature, partly to self-deception, the workings of imagination, and priestly guile.
Herbert's influence disappeared in the storms of the Puritan Revolution, and Deism found the most important impetus supplied to its progress in ecclesiastical circles. The learning of the Renaissance had served to incline the clergy of the Establishment to a moderate rational theology, and in the conflict between Puritans and Anglicans, and between Roman Catholics and Protestants, it became common to invoke Reason as arbiter. Later Deists could appeal to the arguments of leading theologians, as well as to those of the Cambridge Platonists (q.v.), who, in their conflict against the sensualism of Hobbes, exalted the authority of moral intuitions. The Revolution served to intensify the growing feeling against what was arbitrary in religion, and emphasized the demand for subjective independence in the field of reason and the need of unity in the realm of practical morality.
Antagonism to theological supernaturalism stands out as the most conspicuous characteristic in the system of Hobbes (d. 1679; see Hobbes, Thomas), inspired by the teachings of the new mathematical and natural sciences. The different religions are explained as <the product of human fear interr. TT preting natural phenomena in anthro-
pomorphic form, or, in their higher Others, aspects, as the outcome of reflection on causal relation in the universe. Miracles and revelations are in themselves improbable, and may be most easily explained as the imaginings of the ignorant. Positive religion is the creation of the State, and the sovereign justly possesses unconditional power to enforce its pre- ^ scriptions, for only in this way can religious strife be avoided. Between religion thus naturally explained and a prophetic and Christian revelation Hobbes, nevertheless, attempted to mediate; he mentions as the means that might lead to such a reconciliation the rational interpretation of miracles, the differentiation between the inner moral sense of Scripture and more figurative expression, and the historical criticisms of Biblical sources. The entire apparatus of Rationalism is here to be found, limited only in its application. Further, Spinoza's Trartatus theologico-politicus (1670) and Bayle's Diciionnaire (1695-97) were effective in shaping the character of Deism. Of no small im-
portance, also, was the rise of a literature of comparative religion and the publication of ethnographical studies and works of travel. China, Arabia, Egypt, Persia, India, savage nations even, were brought within the horizon of religious investigation. Philosophy, beginning with Locke's theory of knowledge, and natural science, with Newton's theory of gravitation, contributed to the opposition with which dogma was confronted. Yet their attitude was not one of hostility to religion, which they sought rather to utilize for the purpose of establishing the desired universal standard of truth. Newton and Boyle succeeded in reconciling the creed of the Church with their mechanical metaphysics; and this union remained characteristic of England, so that even men like Priestley and Hartley did not shrink from supporting their materialistic theories by theological arguments. We have here the blending of a sensualistic epistemology, a mechanical-teleological metaphysics, a historical criticism, and an aprioristic ethics whose product in the ■ shape of natural religion was destined first to undermine Christianity, then to compete with it, and finally to supplant it.
These various tendencies could not show themselves fully under the ecclesiastical restraint of the Restoration, yet they appear clearly enough in the writings of Charles Blount (d. 1693), usually 3 Charles ^^^^'^ second to Herbert in the lists
Blount °^ Deists. Like his predecessor, Blount dwells on the conflict between rival religions, and finds a standard of adjustment in a fusion of Herbert's theory of universal characteristics with Hobbes's prescription by the State. Like Hobbes and Spinoza, he touches serious problems of Biblical criticism at this early date. Freedom from prejudice is his boast; he asserts the supernatural character of Christianity on the basis of its miracles, after he has already rendered them dubious by parallels with non-Christian miracles. His works were: Anima mundi (London, 1679), Great is Diana of the Ephesians (1680), and The Two First Books of Philostratus concerning the Life of Apollonius Tyaneus, published in English with notes (1680).
The Revolution of 1688, the establishment of the freedom of the press in 1694, the political favor that was bestowed on the new tendencies in theology, in opposition to the stricter Anglican-
4 John which was tainted with Stuart
£ocke partizanship, were conditions favorable to the development of the seed that had already been planted. Parallel with the liberalization of orthodox dogrna, there ran a more radical development aiming at the attainment of a standard for the testing of the contents of revelation. Of surpassing importance in this direction was the influence and work of John Locke (d. 1704), who, in the field of theology, found his startingpoint, like most prominent thinkers of the age, in the conflict of systems, doctrines, and practises. Out of his reflections on the data of experience he developed a mechanical-teleological metaphysics and an empirical-utilitarian ethics, the latter agreeing with the old idea of lex naturcc in that ethical experience merely confirms the connection estab-