A Brighter Day Begins with His Word.

New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge • VOLUME 8

SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION

['Herzog, J. J. (Johann Jakob), 1805-1882', 'Schaff, Philip, 1819-1893', 'Hauck, Albert, 1845-1918', 'Jackson, Samuel Macauley, 1851-1912', 'Sherman, Charles Colebrook, 1860-1927', 'Gilmore, George W. (George William), 1858-1933'] • Public-domain historical edition in the United States (published 1908); OCR from Internet Archive scan

SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION

The following system of transliteration has been used for Hebrew :

N = ' or omitted at the

beginning of a word. 3 = b

3 = bh or b

a = g

i = gh or g

<l = d

*1 = dh or d

n = h

1 = w

T = z

n = h

, = y

3 = k

3 = kh or k

* = 1 0 = m J = n

D = s

y = *

B = p

a = ph or p

p = k 1 = r fe>=s E> = sh

n = t

n = th or t

The vowels are transcribed by a, e, i, o, u, without attempt to indicate quantity or quality. Arabic and other Semitic languages are transliterated according to the same system as Hebrew. Greek is written with Roman characters, the common equivalents being used.

KEY TO PRONUNCIATION

When the pronunciation is self-evident the titles are not respelled ; when by mere division and accentuation it can be shown sufficiently clearly the titles have been divided into syllables, and the accented syllables indicated.

6 as in not

8 " " nor

u " " full'

Q " " rule

v " " but

O " " burn

oi " " pine

au " " out

ei " " oil

" " few

a

as in

sofa

a

i<

tt

arm

a

tt

tt

at

a

a

it

fare

e

it

tt

pen1

ti

tt

fate

i

«

tt

tin

i

«

tt

machine

<<

tt

obey

o

<<

it

no

m

iu as in duration

c = k " " cat

ch " " c/iurch

cw = qu as in gueen

dh (ft) " " fte

f " " /ancy

g (hard) " " go

h " " loch (Scotch)

hw (wh) " " why

j " " /aw

1 In accented syllables only ; In unaccented syllables It approximates the sound of e in over. The letter n, with a dot beneath it, indicates the sound of n as in ink. Nasal n (as in French words) is rendered n. a In German and French names u approximates the sound of u in dune.

THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

MORALITY, MORAL LAW.

The Kantian Basis (§ 1).

His Results (§ 2).

Schleiermacher's Basis (§ 3).

Relation of Morality to Moral Law (§ 4).

Conclusion (§ 5).

To establish a clear distinction between these

terms and their relation to one another, it is best to

start with the treatment of the subject by Kant

and Schleiermacher. According to

i. The Kant's system of critical rationalism,

Kantian to found morals on true principles Basis. morality must be derived from the general conception of a reasonable being. It must then be developed as a pure philosophy or metaphysics to be applied to man. Previous attempts to establish the principles of morality failed either because they were purely empirical or, when rational, lacked the critical element. Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Riga, 1785) and Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788) contain his contribution to the subject. Naturally there were systems of moral law before Kant's time and moral legislators of all kinds, but the content of moral prescriptions had been derived from nature, custom, or arbitrary will. Man had indeed established himself as deciding moral questions on the basis of the individual conscience, but Kant in his critical analysis of the power of reason first recognized the secret of morality. The essence of moral legislation which he discovered was legislation by self. An act is moral which the will imposes upon itself in the consciousness that the maxim which it is following in any particular case can be erected into a universal law. Such acts are recognized as duty and done as duty. Man in giving moral commands to himself plays the role of both ruler and subject. The law once accepted must be followed e-ven against man's will, neither threats nor flattery can be brought into relation with it. That will is good which fulfils duty on account of duty's sake, recognizing it as a principle of application. Universal and necessary elements condition morality, so the moral law is like the law of nature, but it expresses a necessity without force. It is an imperative act of will, not hypothetical but categorical, valid under all conditions. But, applicable only to a reasonable being, it is not possible without freedom. This character of freedom established a place for morality in a world dif- VIII.— 1

ferent from that occupied by the phenomenal world with its subjection of things to causal relations. As autonomous morality is a fact, so freedom is a fact. Man has an empirical character as a natural being subject to the causal system of nature, but he is also an intelligent being belonging to a moral supersensible world that proves its existence in no way more clearly than by the fact of man's freedom. But this reality can not be established by psychological analysis or historical investigation. The moral law and all that it involves must be determined by the method of transcen- 2. His dental criticism. The world of phe- Results. nomena must be critically penetrated until the a priori element of reason is sought and found; this is the element that makes the objects of the phenomenal world moral. But the principle of morality is a formal one as it appears in the categorical imperative. It must be applied to persons, wills, and aims, and takes the practical form of acts done in such a way that the individual uses humanity in his own person, as in the person of every other individual, always as an end, never simply as a means. As to the relation established by Kant between morality and religion, he rejects all eudemonistic elements, such as those which regard happiness as a motive for action. But a moral final end must be accepted, so the postulates of the practical reason for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are introduced. By immortality and God, he establishes an effect adequate to the general exercise of the moral law. It becomes a necessity of reason to assume a power, the supreme cause of nature and the moral creator of the world. In this way man's duties are recognized as divine commands. Without God as the moral creator and law-giver, knowledge and action, even that willed freely by man, remains aimless and incomplete. This was Kant's reply to the riddle — man autonomous in the midst of the world with the duty of making out of it his moral world. The recognition of the categorical imperative, or moral law, makes man a moral being. The accommodation of his character to the law is virtue. Evil is the constant tendency to transgress the law, but there is hope for an unending progress. Kant considered that his system was essentially Christian, since the precepts of the Gospel recognize a perfection not to be reached by any creature, yet offering a model to which man

Morality Morau

Historical source record →