THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG
24S). The Church of all ages, historically founded on Christ, hides the elect within itself, unlike the lost world (De civilatc Dei, xv. 1; Eng. transl., ii. 2S4). In the empiric admission to " the body of Christ," set forth already in the reception of infant baptism (De natura et gratia, viii. 9; Eng. transl., v. 124), God's free dispensation to his elect discloses itself (De correptionc ct gratia, viii. 42; Eng. transl., v. 489). In his writings on predestination Augustine considers, for the most part, only those whom the grace of God leads to his kingdom of their own free will; and even the Church is the body of the elect only in a general sense, since it contains " vessels to honor " and " vessels to dishonor," the latter not belonging fully to the Church (De baptismo, VII., Ii. 99). The basis of the idea that election is not accomplished merely by external incorporation into the Church, but fulfils itself finally by the personal operation of grace, was afforded by the experience of " grace free but not freed " (De correptione ct gratia, xiii. 41-42; Eng. transl., v. 488—489), and the formally free will must, therefore, be filled with good (De gratia et libero arbitrio, xv. 31; Eng. transl., v. 456-457). By his experience of conversion Augustine found his free will instantly, whereby he submitted absolutely in divine service (Conf., ix. 1; Eng. transl., i. 129). From which the conclusion follows that " the human will does not attain grace by freedom, but rather freedom by grace " (De correptione et gratia, viii. 17; Eng. transl., v. 478). Faith is especially, from first to last, the work of God in man, so that " the elect are not elected because they believe, but they are elected that they may believe " (De prozdestinatione sanctorum, viii. 16, xvii. 34; cf. ii. 3-4, xx. 40; Eng. transl., v. 506, 514-515, 499, 517-518). God chose a "certain number" from the "mass of perdition" (De correptione et gratia, x. 26, xiii. 39; cf. vii. 12; Eng. transl., v. 482, 487-488, 476; De dono perseverantire, xiv. 35; Eng. transl., v. 539; De pr&destinatione sanctorum, xii. 23; Eng. transl., v. 509). For Augustine there is thus a division only on the whole, never with reference to individual persons. The former sense of foreknowledge continues, but now comes to be applied to God's own operations of grace, not to human resolves (xiv. 31, xix. 38), and, so far as the elect are concerned, foreknowledge is thus identical with predestination (De dono perseveration, xix. 47—48; Eng. transl., v. 545). As to the others, emphasis on the elect relieved the necessity of mentioning the non-elect. " Predestination can not exist without foreknowledge, although foreknowledge may exist without predestination " (De pradestinatione sanctorum, x. 19; Eng. transl., v. 507). This distinction steers clear of supralapsarianism even as to the fall; for God foreknew the fall of Adam, but did not compel it (De correptione et gratia, xii. 37; Eng. transl., v. 487). After the fall, the non-elect were simply left in the " mass of perdition," from which no one had any claim to be saved (De gratia ct libero arbitrio, xxi. 42-43, xxiii. 45; cf. De correptione et gratia, xiii. 42; De dono pcr.scverantiae, xiii. 33; Frig, transl., v. 462-463, 489, 538). These variants of emphasis spring from Augustine's fundamental postulate that all good is of God and all evil of free will, a view aided by his Platonic notion
that evil is essentially a defect, the " not-being " (De libero arbitrio, II., xx. 54) . Later in the development of Augustine's thought he was able to postulate predestination to destruction, even if not to sin (Enchiridion, c; Eng. transl., hi. 269; ci.Decivitatr Dei, XXII., xxiv. 5; Eng. transl., ii. 504). I Tim. ii. 4 means that God does not will that every man be saved, but that no man is saved apart from his will and " all men " refers to the whole race in its varieties (Enchiridion, ciii.; Eng. transl., iii. 269). The carrying-out of the counsel of grace to the elect is secured by admonitory preaching (De correptione <\ gratia, vii. 13; Eng. transl., v. 477). This entire treatise aims to prove that the general historical and the individual operations of grace are not mutually exclusive (xiv. 43; Eng. transl., v. 489); hence room is left for free moral activity to such an extent that Augustine repeatedly speaks of " merits " though these rest, in the last analysis, on divine activity (e.g., De gratia et libero arbitrio, vi. 15; Eng. transl., v. 450). The "grace" of Augustine is a divine power to which man owes moral " vivification " or " infusion of love," of which remission of sins appears to be a natural concomitant (cf. De gratia et libero arbitrio, xi. 23-24; Eng. transl., v. 453^54). Behind human preaching God's secret instruction works on the elect (De prozdestinatione sanctorum, viii. 13; Eng. transl., v. 504-505). In view of the guidance in experience of the elect, Augustine distinguishes various degrees of grace (De gratia et libero arbitrio, xvii. 33; Eng. transl., v. 457-458) ; the aid to those in divine communion exceeds the first enabling power as actuality surpasses possibility. Not only can human will resist the divine will (De correptione et gratia, xiv. 45; Eng. transl., v. 489—490), but God alone grants the gift of perseverance to his elect (De dono perseverantios, i. 1; Eng. transl., v. 526), who, without this gift, are not truly elect (De correptione et gratia, vii. 14, ix. 20-21, xii. 36; De prozdestinatione sanctorum, xvi. 32; Eng. transl., v. 477, 479^80, 486, 513).
While the authority of Augustine, combined with the deeper character of the Western doctrine of grace, easily overthrew Pelagianism, so that even the Semipelagians (see Semipelagianism) disowned the anathematized heresies of Pelagius,
Augustine's doctrine of predestina-
4. Post- tion fell far short of acceptance.
Augustinian Jerome, Hilary, and Faustus of Ricz
Views. (qq-v.) adhered to free will, nor did the
Semi-Pelagians make it clear that admission to Christianity through baptism, regarded as necessary to salvation, signified predestination. Later followers of Augustine seem to have reduced the operation of grace as based on divine election to this point, for the Synod of Orange (q.v.) in 529 (Mansi, Concilia, viii. 735 sqq.), in effect, denied a predestined reprobation in connection with its commitment on the grace of baptism, affirming that the divine election had designed no division among the baptized. Although an essential thought of Augustine was thus sacrificed, yet the way was opened to reunite on the middle ground represented by the old theory of foreknowledge which was facilitated for the followers of Augustine in that he had never formally assailed