THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG
Tyndall's (q.v.) Christianity as Old as the Creation, in which it is taught that natural religion was perfect from the beginning, and was restored by Christ. Radical opposition to rational dogmatism in religion, as well as against deism and natural religion, appears with David Hume (q.v.) in his skeptical theory of knowledge. Religious principles can not be proved by reason, but must be accepted by faith. In his Natural History of Religion (1755) he laid the permanent foundation for a philosophy of religion, the purpose of which is psychological analysis and the investigation of historical development. This method did not present monotheism but polytheism as the primitive form. The roots of religion were passive, fear and hope, not the perception of nature and reflective thought. Pressed by natural necessities, and anxious and restive before the uncertain accidents of life and impending evil, particularly death, men asked what the future would bring, and encountered with surprise traces of deity. To refer all to one being was not possible among the varying circumstances; and the tendency of comparison with self led to the anthropomorphic conception. Monotheism came not by reflection and the perception of a universe conformable to law, but from practical reasons beginning with the idea of God as Creator and Ruler. Oscillations between monotheism and polytheism occur later, even in Christianity. As regards tolerance, monotheism is behind the other, which by nature may admit contemporary forms. The principles of English deism were transferred to French soil by Voltaire (q.v.), whose famous sentence was: " If God did not exist he would have to be invented, but all nature acclaims that he is." He attacked Christianity violently as based on illusion, and spreading fanaticism and superstition. [In justice to Voltaire it should be borne in mind that his antagonism was not to religion itself, but to degenerate religion as exemplified by the extremely corrupt forms and practises current in the France of his day.] Baron d'Holbach (q.v.), on the other hand, in his Systeme de la nature (1770) taught radical atheism, claiming that the divine potencies were products of a deceived imagination, prompted by fear and ignorance, and that the idea of God was unnecessary and injurious, the cause of unrest instead of comfort.
Kant (q.v.) revolutionized the status of religion in shifting the basis to morality, though he belongs to the Enlightenment. In his earlier Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (1755) he postulates a first cause upon the purposive operations of the powers of nature. In his Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes (1763), a skepticism about proofs for the existence already appears. He states that Providence did not leave the views necessary to happiness dependent upon subtle deductions, but to the immediate perceptions of natural common sense. Yet he reasons a priori that it is impossible that nothing exists; for that would mean that all that is requisite for the possible was made void; but that whereby all possibility is removed is itself impossible. In the statement at this place, that it is necessary that one convince himself of the exist-
4. Kant
and
Criticism.
ence of God but not necessary that he demonstrate it, he anticipates the foremost conclusion of his critical work; that, where knowing ends faith begins, which has a sure foundation on the moral. Significant is it that intellectualism for religion was here dethroned. In the " Critique of Pure Reason " the proofs for the existence of God are subjected to severe criticism. The ontological argument is void because existence can not belong to the real predicates of the most perfect being along with the others, but is rather a judgment of the object together with all its predicates. The cosmological and physico-theological arguments require the ontological for their completion, and are therefore not conclusive. Even if the cosmological were conclusive, it would yet fall short of proving the perfectness of the final cause, which the idea of God calls for; and if the teleological argument would show a supermundane being, such would not be an omnipotent Creator but the cosmic architect, in view of universally manifest design. Proceeding to positive theology in the search for the certainty of the existence of God, Kant does not dismiss rational belief from philosophy, as was formerly done in the absolute separation of knowledge and faith, but he does not admit it as knowledge. The existence of God obtains as a practical postulate alongside of freedom and immortality. The combination of virtue and happiness is an a priori-synthetic judgment and thus necessary, but does not become actual on account of the non-agreement of the natural and moral laws. Hence a supernatural being is postulated holy and just, who effects this reconciliation by reason and will. This is known as the moral argument, the central point in the moral theology in the " Critique of the Practical Reason." Again, belief in God's existence is based on the conscience, as the consciousness of the inner court in man, which appears in dual personality of accuser and judge. The accuser must conceive himself under another being, almighty but moral, God. The fact remains undetermined whether this is a real or an ideal person invented by reason. The keyword of Kant's ethics is duty, the categorical imperative in man, whereby he legislates for his own choice and conduct. All duties are divine commands; wherefore God and the legislator in man would coincide. This might point to a form of pantheism, which Kant, however, could never have confessed. The moral ground or moral consciousness of " religion within the limits of reason alone " is emphasized by the omission of other motives of religion; he would mark the limits against whatever of revealed religion is not rationally apprehended. All religious practise or conduct which issues not from ethical law is sham. The moral order is inverted by the ceremonial element in religion, which is fetish worship. Such also is prayer considered as an inner formal act of service, as a means of grace. The spirit of prayer is the consciousness with every act, of doing it in the service of God. In the " Critique of Judgment," with reference to the existence of God, all things are to be explained, of course, by mechanical laws, but this does not exclude the reflection, with reference to forms of nature or even to nature as a whole, upon the fundamental princi-