RELIGIOUS ENCYCLOPEDIA
Religion, Philosophy of
psychology, and, possibly, after ethics and esthetics. If it forms the conclusion of the philosophic series, then it is also the climax, since it pertains to the most momentous transactions of the soul-life. As to the division, the first step is an investigation of what is essential in all religions, upon a historical and psychological basis. This is to include not only what appeals to the susceptibility of a refined religious consciousness, but everything to which a possible standard of value may be applied to what constitutes the essence of religion from the lowest stages of development to the highest. As there is no common definition of religion, it depends upon every individual investigator how far he will extend the inclusive limits of religious phenomena, hoping that he may not be too much at variance with universal opinion. If the nature of religion in its essence is presumably found, the next step is to estimate the truth- value of religion and the representations formulated by religious persons. Should this vanish wholly and only an estimate of feeling remain, such representations could not maintain even this, for the intellect might possibly present them as nugatory. Here is the point of contact with metaphysics.
The activities and processes in the human soul are to be viewed in the threefold distinction of representation (cognition), feeling, and will; though it is understood that these are operated by the soul in complex combinations. This
2. Repre- division is of advantage, since the three
sentation. leading modern contributors to the problem distinguish themselves accordingly: Kant representing the religion of ethics or will; Schleiermacher, of feeling; and Hegel, of the intellect. That religion was a matter of representation, thought, knowledge, was always held, and intellectualism prevailed from the age of Socrates. Wherever religion has been recognized representations play their part, and generally of a superhuman being; in the highly developed forms, of the transcendent spiritual being, God, the One. However, does the possession of truth, even the highest, constitute religion? Aristotle claimed knowledge of the prime Mover of things, but was not therefore religious. If any one knew God and divine things from the innermost unity of nature, if he even possessed absolute certainty of the beyond, and yet did not realize a relation with this supramundane or universal, or had not reconciled the variance between the infinite and himself the finite, or did not at least make the attempt, he would not possess what is called religion. Not even if for knowledge were substituted faith in the usual sense; that is not submission to the superhuman, but the lower step, as in the Alexandrine sense of " faith " in comparison with " knowledge." He could not be called pious, because the attitude toward the higher or highest is not yet present. Every religion develops representations, which supplant metaphysics. The mystic sets the highest before his mind, before he sinks into it; the Buddhist must have representation of Nirvana; yet either is concerned about something wholly different.
Feeling, on the other hand, plays a part, without
which a religion is unthinkable. This occurs first in a sense of dependence, which may be upon any incidental object to which power is ascribed (fetish) ; or a useful or harmful part of nature 3. Feeling, (animal worship, star-cult, Sabaism, and perhaps animism) ; or nature with its inflexible laws as a whole, regarded either as animate or as pure mechanism (naturalism, Stoicism, Spinoza); or upon spirits, particularly of the deceased (ancestor- worship, and with it totemism). See Comparative Religion. Many like Herbert Spencer would derive all religion from the revering of the departed or ancestors. The mythological gods probably originated from the personification of the powers of nature, as at a later stage the gods of the myths were allegorically reversed to powers of nature. By knowledge of his dualistic nature, man could conceive of the powers as persons and as spiritual, not without some degree of material form. The final view was that the infinite greatness and power over all was a spirit upon whom man was in all things dependent, yet possessing a certain self-existence and freedom. With these representations of the powers or of dependence upon them, feelings are bound up, either of like or dislike. The latter may accompany a representation of the contraction of human power and the diminution of the sense of self, and become strong aversion, such as fear of impending natural calamity. This feeling is still more intensified, if the sense of guilt be added. If feeling of dependence involves no more than fear, it is not religion. In the religious fear of God the element is much reduced, and the sense passes over into obedience and reverence. Neither can it be said that fear created the gods, because it must have been preceded by the representation of superhuman powers. The sense of fear or the resultant pain, physical or spiritual, leads to liberation from necessity, or salvation, which is hoped for or petitioned from the deities. This hope of salvation, which may pass over into certainty, is bound up with great joy over the sense that a beneficent power watches over man, so that no harm can befall him. A mode of fellowship or union with God develops, though not necessarily mystical; a vanishing of consciousness, though not a theosis; but a complete rest in God, the state of being hid in him, which constitutes blessedness. This is the climax of religion; it is joy without end. The feeling of dependence which starts with the utmost displeasure culminates with the highest bliss of submission to God, of the dissolution of personality, as in Buddhism; in Christianity the union with God in the celestial. The ultimate aim of religion is thus a feeling of good fortune, to use the expression; and as a practical concern of human spirit, religion thus corresponds to ethics.
If this be the case, desire next claims consideration with reference to the nature of religion. It must be admitted that religious phenomena in their evolution can not be understood without the activity of the will. Necessity, or the
4. Will, desire to escape it, impels to a relation
with the highest principle, by which
liberation, salvation from evil, or even the escape
from individual isolation from God are sought-
Religion, Philosophy of Religious Corporations