THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG
types for the dogmatics of the Middle Ages. Such are the justitia originalis and donum superadditum (original righteousness and superadded 1. Alex- grace). si>:deresis (rudiment of conbales'5 science) ; the sharp distinction of gratia gratis data (preparatory grace freely given in particular effects) anil gratia gratum facicns (grace as an abiding principle of character); of meritum de congruo (merit from the proper use of nature), and meritum de condigno (merit on the basis of supernatural grace); of carentia justitim originalis as cidpa (guilt) and concupiscentia as poena (punishment), in the doctrine of original sin. Also, the distinction of attritio and contritio; as repentance from servile fear and moral penitence. Alexander knew how to seize upon the inmost springs of the religious life of his day, to set them forth in clear apt statement, and with a sure skill to make the new philosophical knowledge and dialectic method subservient to dogma. Although much indebted to Aristotle and citing him continuously, he did not belong to the Aristotelians, but remained an Augustinian Platonist. He held fast to the realism of ideas and for him knowing maintained the religious character of illumination by means of " eternal ideas." Combination with the forms of Aristotelian metaphysics and psychology did not always redound to clearness and consistency. The work received highest recognition when Pope Alexander IV., in 1256, ordered it to be completed (the conclusion consisting of the last three sacraments and eschatology, and, in the third part, the doctrine on ethics were wanting). According to Roger Bacon (q.v.), as a result of Alexander's influence, academic study was reversed in placing the sentences first and Biblical interpretation second. Alexander gave the Church a thorough orthodox system with which to meet the intellectual movement of the time; in it Christianity was digested in thought and presented by means of all the newly acquired philosophical materials and motives.
In the Oxford school of theology, Robert Grosseteste (q.v.) gave impulses to theology decisive for _ _,, the English Franciscans. He was a Oxford thoroughgoing realist; but, as in the School. view of Anselm, the knowledge of the universal realities must be appropriated in experience, which accounts also for his stress otherwise on scientific empiricism. Knowledge of nature he promoted together with mathematics, grammar, and practical philology. At one with this may have been his emphasis on the authority of the Bible for theology. Faith is essentially the " faith of those things which are believed by the authority of sacred Scripture." Faith in the truths of the Bible is redemptive. God is the will that works salvation, but good is realized only as it is done by human free will. The historical significance of this remarkable personage is in the noteworthy combination of empiricism with speculation— of interest in connection with the traditional authoritative conception and the religious consciousness. The influence of this combination which he inspired was the main reason for the tenacity with which the Franciscans held to the
thought and method of the old Augustinian Anselmic theology.
2. The Dominican Advance: The theological movement of the thirteenth century, however, was brought to its eminence by a deeper conception and a stronger infusion of the system of Aristotle into theological discussion. This took place, in the first instance, through the Dominicans, Albert the Great (see Albertus Magnus) and Thomas Aquinas (q.v.), his foremost pupil. Albert, in- ' _, er* spired with a consummate passion for Thomas ' knowledge, collected all that was pos- Aquinas. sible to human understanding, but did not advance beyond reproduction. Aristotle formed his framework, and the packing in of much Augustinian-Platonistic material naturally resulted in serious contradictions. To his world-philosophy were added the church dogmas which remained essentially unchanged, no matter how much Aristotelian material was introduced. Thomas, on the contrary, penetrating and clear in conception, equipped with a fresh insight into fundamentals, a great systematic talent, and a remarkable gift of presentation, was uniquely qualified to take in the Aristotelian philosophy as a whole, and, with a sure and skilful art, of incorporating all except the absolutely contradictory. Without relinquishing dogma at any point, he reestablished the same on the new philosophy like superstructure on foundation. The entire Greek position with regard to the soul is accepted. Th^-SLUDreme object of man is to know. Theology is a speculative science that fe5eTs"to human blessedness, which is the perfect knowledge of God. Accordingly, the nature of man does not center in will but in cognition. The intellect impresses upon volition its spiritual character. In reason as the spiritual power of choice is the seat of " free will." Here the Augustinian point of view gives way to the Greek. Human reason, or philosophy, may of itself conceive only a few religious truths and these only imperfectly and slowly; revealed knowledge must amplify, confirm, and complete. Revelation is at hand in the inspired Scriptures. By them man becomes absolutely certain of the truth because God is their author. Therefore, the Bible is the only certain and absolutely binding authority. But revelation is doctrine, preeminently the doctrine of the " first truth," God. Doctrine is summed up in the Apostle's Creed, and guarded against heretical misinterpretation by the Nicene Creed, the conciliar decisions, and the Fathers. A nova eiitio symboli is in the power of the pope, who calls the council and confirms its sentence. Faith takes hold of the revealed truth. As the " reward of life eternal " is promised to faith, the will finds that which is believed agreeable. The effect of faith upon intellect for the acceptance of what is presented for belief can take place only by the infusion of a " divinely inspired disposition," inasmuch as the truths involved are supernatural. Through this "divinely inspired disposition " the intellect is adapted to believe; " an act of faith consists principally in cognition and therein is its perfection." The fides informis becomes fides formata by the addition of love. This is self-evident; faith in itself remains