THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG
SOTO, PETRUS DE: Spanish Dominican; b.
at Cordova about 1500; d. at Trent Apr. 20, 1563. He entered the Dominican order at Salamanca in 151 S and quickly attained a reputation as a rigid and learned Thomist. Charles V. made him his confessor, but his order appointed him vicar for the Netherlands, and later he became professor of theology at the newly founded seminary of Dillingen, where he wrote his catechetical Institution.es Christiana (Augsburg, 1548), Methodus confessionis, sive doctrines pietatisque Christiana epitome (Dillingen, 1553), Compendium doctrinal Catholicm (Antwerp, 1556), and Tractatus de institutione sacerdotum qui sub episcopis animarum curam gerunt, sive manuale clericorum (Dillingen, 1558), the latter his chief work. His Assertio Catholicos fidei circa articulos confessionis (Antwerp, 1552) involved him in a controversy with Johann Brenz (q.v.), thus occasioning his Defensio Catholicce confessionis et scholiorum circa confessionem (1557). De Soto later accompanied Philip II. to England, where Mary appointed him professor of theology at Oxford, but on the queen's death in 1558 he returned to Dillingen. In 1561 Pius IV. summoned him to Trent, where he bravely defended the sacramental nature of the priesthood and episcopal rights, but died before the council adjourned. (O. ZocKLERf.)
Bibliography: J. Quetif and J. Echard, Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum, ii. 183 sqq., Paris, 1721; KL, xi. 531-532.
SOUL AND SPIRIT, BIBLICAL CONCEPTIONS OF.
Biblical Terms (§1).
Distinction Between Soul and Spirit (§ 2).
Pauline Doctrine (§3).
Spirit, Divine and Human (§4).
Origin of Soul and Spirit (§ 5).
Consequences of Sin (§ 6).
Bearing on Personality of Jesus (§ 7).
" Spirit " — in classical Greek, pneuma, like the Hebr. ruah — denotes not merely the breath as symbol of life but also life itself in distinction from soma. The soul (Goth, saiwala, Hebr. nephesh, Gk. psyche, Lat. anima) signifies in general the life as it
animates the individual material or-
i. Biblical ganism which is the medium of its
Terms, action. Both spirit and soul are applied
to man (Job x. 12; Ps. xxxii. 2; Ezek. xxxvii. 8; cf. with Gen. xlvi. 15, Ex. i. 5), and also to animals (Eccl. iii. 19 sqq.; Gen. vi. 17, vii. 15, 22; Ps. civ. 30; Gen. i. 20, 30; Job. xii. 10; Rev. viii. 9). The animal nephesh is identical with the animal body. " Spirit " indicates that the creature originates in and is bound to God (Ps. civ. 29; Job. xxxiv. 14 sqq.; Ezek. xxxvii. 5, 9, 10; Rev. xi. 11). The Old but not the New Testament speaks of the nephesh of God (Lev. xxvi. 11; Judges x. 16; Isa. xlii. 1). Soul and spirit are sometimes used synonymously (cf. Gen. xlv. 27 with Ps. cxix. 175; I Sam. xxx. 12 with I Kings xvii. 21, 22; Ps. cxlvi. 4 with Gen. xxxv. 18). The Septuagint never translates nephesh by pneuma, ruah very rarely by psychs (cf. Gen. xli. 8; Ex. xxxv. 21). Soma and pneuma (cf. I Cor. vii. 34) are opposed to each other as are sarx and pneuma; not sarx but soma is opposed to psyche, hence sarx and pneuma, soma and psyche are the proper opposites; pneuma and psyche are interrelated as are sarx and s6ma. Soul and spirit
are not seldom sharply distinguished — not merely in point of view (Wendt). (1) Dying is a giving up of the pneuma and of the psyche, but it is never said that the spirit, but only that the soul, dies or is killed (Judges xvi. 16; Matt. x. 28; Mark xiv. 34). (2) Pneuma and psyche are often used interchangeably with reference to sensation and impulse, knowledge and self-consciousness (Matt. xi. 29; I Cor. xvi. 18; Luke i. 46, 47), but only the soul is the subject of willing and desire, inclination and aversion (Deut. xii. 20; I Sam. ii. 16; Job xxiii. 13; Prov. xxi. 10; Isa. xxvi. 8; Micah vii. 1), and of redemption (Isa. xxxviii. 17; Matt. xvi. 26; cf., however, I Cor. v. 5; I Pet. iv. 6). Consciousness, perception, and willing are indeed ordinarily referred to the heart, but when the emphasis is to be laid on the hidden state to which these feelings belong, soul and spirit are used (see Heart, Biblical Usage). (3) The dead are designated as spirits -(Luke xxiv. 37, 39; Acts xxiii. 8-9; Heb. xii. 23; I Pet. iii. 19; cfv however, Rev. vi. 9). (4) Most important of all, nephesh and psyche refer to the individual, the subject of life, while ruah and pneuma are never used of the subject as individual.
As an independent subject, pneuma is always something other than the human spirit. The distinction depends on the original difference in terms: spirit is the condition, soul the mani- 2. Distinc- festation, of life. Whatever belongs tion Between to the spirit belongs to the soul also,
Soul and but not everything that belongs to the Spirit. soul belongs to the spirit. It does not suffice to speak of the inner being of man, now as spirit, now as soul; one must regard the spirit as the principle of the soul, the divine principle of life, included in but not identical with the individual. Spirit may be distinguished but not separated from the soul. Body and spirit are not two poles between which is the soul. Since the soul includes the spirit as part of itself, it may be called spirit. The soul may sin and die, but the spirit, as a divine principle having its source in God, can neither sin nor die. The human soul is indeed bound to corporeality, yet it survives death because it possesses the Spirit of God as its immanent principle of life. The loss of the body caused by death will in those who share in the consummation give place to a redeemed corporeality (I Cor. xv. 42 sqq.; Rev. vi. 9). The occasion for a distinction between soul and spirit lies in the religious consciousness of the difference between the actual man and his divine destination (cf. Plato's distinction between a rational and an irrational, a mortal and an immortal division (E. Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy, pp. 413 sqq., London, 1888). To understand this one has but to see the meaning of the spirit for man, and the relation of the human spirit to the Spirit of God. The Spirit of God is indeed wherever life is, but man possesses this in a unique degree (Gen. i. 26-27, ii. 19-20; cf. Eccles. iii. 19-21), since he alone is conscious of dependence upon God. And it is the Spirit of God in him — the principle of his true life— which gives him his special relation to other creatures and to God and provides the foundation for his consciousness and will.
Here then arises the question whether the Spirit