SUPERSTITION.
Definition (§1).
Etymology; Biblical and Other Usages (§ 2).
Historical Usage in Religion (§ 3).
Bases: Ignorance, Credulity (§4).
Conservatism and Fear as Factors (§ 5).
Historical Effects (§6).
Present Superstitions (§ 7).
Present Consequences (§8).
Contributions to Development (§ 9).
Superstition may be defined objectively as either the aggregate of erroneous beliefs and practises current which may be traced to a combination of errant reason with feeble will, ill-controlled emotions, and ignorance more or less complete;
i. Defini- or, any single act or belief which bears tion. these marks. Subjectively, it is a mental attitude, " a phyletic instinctive desire to believe in certain causal relations which have not been and can not be proved, either experientially or logically, to exist " (F. B. Dresslar, Superstition and Education in University of California Publications, V., i., p. 141, n.p., 1907). The essential error of superstition is therefore in part the misplacing of the source of causation. Psychologically, a superstition is often the result of inability or unwillingness to carry on sustained thinking, involving a consequent readiness to accept as correct certain conclusions which have been handed down without being tested as to their cogency. From this same psychological standpoint, according to scientific investigation, subjective superstition, or the tendency to accept quasi-reasoning as effective, is in part an emotional credulity inherited from earlier periods; it is a species of atavism. Inasmuch as inherited mental reactions are not easily changed, not only is there in this fact a partial explanation of the persistence of superstition even where education has in other respects produced its effects, but also a partial palliation of the individual moral culpability of those who, though educated, still entertain beliefs of this character. More specifically, and from the standpoint of religion, superstition is a belief that is erroneous in that it asserts a causal connection between supernatural powers and events, real or conceived, in the'world of sense. It thus not only involves ignorance of the laws of nature, but offends the enlightened reason in that it opposes those dicta of revelation which have found the securest sanction in human experience and consciousness.
Superstition
THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG
Slight advance is made toward a comprehension of the subject by a study of the etymology and equivalents of the word, though a development in meaning is traceable. The Latin superstitio (super and store, " to stand still over or by a thing "; cf. the Gk. deisidaimonia, " fear of the 2. Etymol- gods, religious feeling"; Germ. Aberogy; Biblical glaube, for Oberglaube, "belief to exand Other cess," Dutch, Biglove) expressed " ex- Usages, cessive fear of the gods, unreasonable religious belief," and was opposed to religio, " a proper, reasonable awe of the gods " (Cicero, De natura deorum, i. 42, 117, ii. 2S, 72). It developed so as to mean a (religious) performance over and above what custom and the nature of the case required, or one which was not recognized by proper authority. In the authorized version of the New Testament the word and its derivative " superstitious " both occur. In Acts xvii. 22, in the celebrated address of Paul on Mar's Hill at Athens, " superstitious " translates wrongly the Greek deisidaimonesterous (R. V., margin, " religous "). It is to be noted that an unfavorable meaning is not to be accepted here, since it is not likely that Paul would have prejudiced his case by charging his hearers, whom he wished to conciliate, with " superstition." In Acts xxv. 19, " superstition " translates the Greek original deisidaimonia, though exactly what term Festus employed (as he probably spoke Latin) is of course not known. But, as in the former case, Festus would hardly have gratuitously offered offense to Agrippa and the Jews by calling the religion of the latter " superstition," the word employed must have had a good sense (cf. R. V., text, " religion "). Outside these passages, the word does not occur in the English Bible. The meaning the word has taken in modern times follow s a different construction of its etymological elements, and embodies the idea of " something surviving " or " something left over (from an earlier and less advanced stage of culture)." This meaning is in itself an explanation of many of the concrete facts of superstition — they are survivals from earlier usage or belief which persist against the pronouncements of an enlightened reason. At the same time it is not precluded either in fact or theory that new " superstitions " arise from time to time.
In close connection with the usage just noted is
that according to which the word is employed by
adherents of one faith to characterize the religious
beliefs and practises of adherents of another faith,
particularly those of a dead religion.
3. Historical Tacitus (" Annals," xv. 44) speaks of
Usage in the religion which had sprung from
Religion. " Christus, who had been put to de:«.th
by Pontius Pilate " as exitiabilis
superstitio, " pernicious superstition." On the other
hand the compliment was returned when, under
Christian influence a couple of centuries later, pagan
rites and worship were so denominated. Thus
Constantine in a law of 319, speaking of the pagan
religion of Rome, says: " They who are desirous of
being slaves to their superstition, have liberty for
the public exercise of their worship " (Codex Theo-
dosianus, IX., xvi. 1-2), only a little afterward
practically defining superstition as proeterita usurpatio, " antiquated usage." Even within the bounds of the same religion great, indeed, irreconcilable, difference exists as to what constitutes superstition. Thus to Protestants very many Roman Catholic beliefs and observances are nothing less than superstition. Among these may be named the veneration of the Host, the adoration of images, the entire cult centering about the Virgin Mary and the saints, particularly the belief in such phenomena as many alleged to have taken place at Lourdes and Loreto (qq.v.), together with the strongly entrenched regard for relics, such as the Holy Coat (q.v.). Yet to the devout Roman Catholic some of these things belong to the very arcana of the religion, and doubt of them seems little if at all short of blasphemy. Another illustration which comes from the same region is the Roman Catholic belief concerning the liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius (q.v.), regarded by those of that faith as a recurrent miracle, while scientists scoff at the explanation of the alleged miracle, and point to the fact that analysis of the contents of the vial is refused. Of course the guardians decline to allow decisive tests on the ground of the sanctity of the relic. Agreement upon what constitutes a superstition in many cases of this sort is unattainable. The difficulty is not relieved if one considers that Roman Catholic authorities would almost certainly denounce as superstition the belief that incubation as practised in the cult of Asklepios (cf. Mary Hamilton, Incubation, or the Cure of Diseases in Pagan Temples and Christian Churches, London, 1906) resulted in cures, though it is claimed that cures result from the practise as maintained in connection with certain saints in Roman Catholic churches in and near Naples, at Amalfi, and elsewhere, as well as under the Greek Church (cf. Mary Hamilton, ut sup., pp. 109 sqq.). And the case is still more complicated by the fact that psychologists maintain the entire probability of many cases of cures under both pagan and Christian auspices, and offer what they deem scientific explanation of the alleged cures.
On its subjective side or as a mental attitude superstition seems to spring from four roots: (1) Ignorance, combined with the exceedingly prevalent and characteristically primitive fallacy of post hoc propter hoc, is a fundamental cause. Man has, so far as indications show, always sought 4. Bases: for the reasons of events, but in his Ignorance; lack of knowledge of real causes has Credulity, often linked things causally which are not so connected. Thus, to give an example of savage logic, the breaking of the fluke of an anchor cast ashore from a wreck on the western coast of Africa having been followed by the death of the man who committed the act, his associates regarded the anchor as a divinity which had been offended by the mutilation and had punished the evil-doer, and they thereafter did reverence to the anchor as to a god (cf. E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, ii. 143 sqq., London, 1877). Similarly. bathing in a pool being followed by a scrofulous affection, the natives of the region regarded the pool as the haunt of a deity which was offended by the invasion and looked upon the disease as the