It is not reasonable to object that God simply foresaw the event, and so prophesied, promised, or threatened it, because the event is frequently promised or threatened contingently, upon a condition which does not stand in the relation of a cause to that event. God could not foresee one event as contingent upon an- other which sustains no causal relation to it. The truth of the promise or threatening in such a case can not depend upon the natural connection between the two events, but upon God's de- termination to cause one to follow the other.
10. Prove from Scripture that the providence of God extends I over the natural ivorld.
Ps. civ., 14 ; cxxxv., 5-7 ; cxlvii., 8-18 ; cxlviii., 7, 8 ; Job| ix., 5, 6 ; xxi., 9-11 ; xxxvii., 6-13 ; Acts xiv., 17.
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11. Prove from Scripture that it includes the brute creation. Ps. civ., 21-29 ; cxlvii., 9 : Matt. vi.3 26 ; x.? 29.
12. Prove from Scripture that it extends to the general affairs of men.
1 Chron. xvi., 31 ; Ps. xlvii., 7 ; lxvi, 7 ; Prov. xxi., 1 ; Job xii., 23 ; Isa. x., 12-15 ; Dan. ii., 21; iv., 25.
13. Show from Scripture that the circumstances of indi- viduals are controlled by God.
1 Sam. ii., 6 ; Ps. xviii., 30 ; Prov. xvi., 9 ; Isa. xlv., 5; Luke i., 53 ; James iv., 13-15.
14. Prove that events considered by us fortuitous are subject to the control of God.
1st. A fortuitous event is one whose proximate causes, because either of their complexity or their subtlety, escape our observa- tion. Every such event, however, as the falling of a leaf, is linked with the general system of things, both by its antecedents and its consequences.
2d. Scripture affirms the fact. — Ex. xxi., 13 ; Ps. lxxv., 6, 7 ; Job v., 6 ; Prov. xvi., 33.
15. Prove that a general necessarily involves a particular providence.
Every department of existence in the universe is so intimately related to all the rest, that every change taking effect in one necessarily affects the others. All events, moreover, occur in successions of causes and effects, each link in turn being the effect of what preceeds and the cause of what follows. In the present order of things it would be impossible to secure certain general ends, without necessarily determining all those particular events upon which those general ends depend ; and thus, as no event is isolated, since even the least event springs from and contributes to the general system, every event must be presided over to that end. The notion of a general providence, a particular one excluded, is as absurd as that of a chain without links.
16. Prove that the providential government of God extends to the free acts of men
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PROVIDENCE.
1st. The free actions of men are potent causes influencing the general system of things precisely as all other classes of causes in the world, and consequently, on the principle indicated in the answer to the preceding question, they also must be subject to God, or every form of providence whatever would be impossible for him.
2d. It is affirmed in Scripture. — Ex. xii., 36 ; 1 Sam. xxiv., 9-15; Ps. xxxiii., 14, 15 ; Prov. xvi., 1; xix., 21; xx., 24; xxi., 1 ; Jer. x., 23 ; Phil, ii., 13.
17. Show from Scripture that God's providence is exercised over the sinful acts of men.
2 Sam. xvi., 10 ; xxiv. 1 ; Ps. lxxvi, 10 ; Eom. xi.} 32; Acts iv., 27, 28.
18. What general principles, as to the nature of God's provi- dential government, is it important to hear in mind ?
1st. The fact that Clod does control all the actions, internal and external, necessary and free, good and bad, of all his creatures. 2d. That whatever may be the mode in which God exercises this providential control, or the nature of the influence he exerts upon any of his creatures, it can not be inconsistent either (1.) with his own infinite perfections, or (2.) with that constitution and those attributes with which he has himself endowed the crea- ture upon whom he acts. His influence, therefore, must always be worthy of himself, and in each case congruous to the nature of the creature.
3d. It follows from the ascertained limits of human thought that we can never clearly understand the mode in which, in the ultimate act, the infinite spirit of God acts upon the finite spirit of man. The interaction of God's agency in providence and grace with man's dependent agency constitutes that limit of thought which is emerging at every step, which we may define, but neither avoid nor transcend.
19. What is the nature of God's agency in the material world ?
All that we know upon this subject may be defined as follows : 1st. The properties of material elements are inherent in
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their subjects, and consequently they act efficiently as second causes.
2d. God has so adjusted these elements in their proportions and relations that they act and interact according to certain gen- eral laws, which he has established as an order of nature.