There is included in the doctrine of the will, 1st, that in the exercise of the faculty of volition, or self-decision, the soul truly originates action, i. e., acts as an original cause of its own acts, therein differing totally from all material causes, which act only as they are acted upon. This is the transcendental element of the human will, generally marked by the term spontaneity, which has rendered the whole subject so obscure. The truth must be recognized that we have here reached one of the impassable limits of human thought. Our minds are so constituted that we can understand only a chain of operations, each link of which is al- ternately effect and cause. The action of an absolute cause, that is, of one really originating action, is a mystery to our understand- ings, though it be daily part of our personal experience. Any attempt to analyse this ultimate fact only destroys it, and con- fuses the testimony of consciousness. This conclusion, stated in different language, is arrived at by different paths by Sir William Hamilton. — See Discussions, pp. 575-590 ; M'Cosh, see " Divine
THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL. 219
Government," pp. 273-294 ; and Isaac Taylor, see " World of Mind/' pp. 83-93, and others.
2d. That this executive act of volition is always according to the present prevailing desires or affections of the soul, in respect to the object of action, in the view which the understanding takes of the whole case at the time. A man always chooses as, upon the whole, he desires to choose. The soul often decides in oppo- sition to many of its most intense desires. Yet it always decides in conformity with that desire which is, upon the whole, the strongest. If the question be — Whence orginates the soul's ac- tion ? the answer must refer to the soul's inherent power of act- ing as an original cause. If the question be — Why does the soul act thus rather than otherwise ? the answer must refer to the in- herent state of the soul itself in relation to the object of choice.
3d. That these prevalent dispositions and desires, although they are temporarily excited to action by the view which the understanding transmits of external objects, nevertheless have their only efficient cause and reason in the principles, or perma- nent nature of the will itself. These affections and desires are spontaneous, and are determined in their character by the will which exercises them. The understanding can give no further account of them.
4. What is the distinction between a temporaeilt preva- lent AFFECTION OT DESIRE, and a PERMANENT PRINCIPLE of the
Will ?
The " affection" or " desire" is a temporary spontaneous state of the will with respect to a certain choice or volition, for the time being, and in the view which the mind takes of all the cir- cumstances and reasons of the case. The " principle" or the a disposition," on the other hand, is a permanent habit, inherent in the will, of exercising " affections" or " desires" of some par- ticular kind.
A man chooses or refuses in every particular case, according to his prevalent desire in that case. But a man prevailingly desires, and so chooses and refuses im all similar cases, according to his permanent habitual principles and disposition. These permanent habitual principles or dispositions constitute the man's permanent character ; as a moral agent, he is always as they are : by know-
220 THE OKIGINAL STATE OF MAN.
ing them we know him, and can to a good degree predict his free action under given circumstances. These permanent principles are of two classes with respect to origin : 1st, innate ; 2d, ac- quired by repeated actions of the same kind. This distinction, however, makes no difference with respect to character or moral responsibility. A man whose spontaneous dispositions are malig- nant, is a bad man, whether those dispositions be innate or ac- quired, and in either case he is equally responsible.
5. What is the conscience ?
Conscience, as a faculty, includes a moral sense, or the power of discerning the distinction between right and wrong, which, combining with the understanding, or faculty of comparing and judging, judges of the right or wrong of our own moral disposi- tions and voluntary actions, and of the dispositions and volun- tary actions of other free agents. This faculty judges according to a divine law of right and wrong, included within itself (it is a law to itself, the original law written upon the heart, Kom. ii., 14), and it is accompanied with vivid emotions, pleasurable in view of that which is right, and painful in view of that which is wrong, especially when our conscience is engaged in reviewing the states, or the actions of our own wills. This faculty in its own province is sovereign, and can have no other superior than the revealed word of G-od. — See M'Cosh, "Divine Government," Book III., chap, i., sec. 4.
6. What do ive mean ivhen we say that man is a free agent ?