4th. It is also set forth by the same great writer as the "uni- versal judgment of men, that the goodness or badness of an act depends upon the goodness or badness of the disposition or affec- tion which prompted it. It is the moral state of the will (or heart, see Matt, vii., 17-20 and xh\, 33,) which makes the act of the will right or wrong, and not the act which makes the state wrong. A man's motives may be right, and yet his choice may be wrong through his mistake of its nature, because of ignorance or in- sanity ; yet if all the prevalent dispositions and desires of the heart in any given case be right, the volition must be morally right, if wrong, the volition must be morally wrong ; if indiffer- ent, or neither right or wrong, the volition must be morally in- different also. Hence appears the absurdity of their position. If Adam had been created, as they feign, with a will equally dis- posed either to good or evil, his first act could have had no moral character whatever. And yet Pelagians assume that Adam's first act, which had no moral character itself, determined the moral character of the man himself, and of all his acts and des- tinies for all future time. This, if true, would have been unjust on God's part, since it involves the infliction of the most awful punishment upon an act in itself neither good nor bad. As a theory it is absurd, since it evolves all morality out of that which is morally indifferent.
5th. This whole theory is built upon certain a priori notions, and is contrary to universal experience. If Adam was created with- out positive moral character, and if infants are so born, then the conditions of free agency in these supposed cases must be different from the conditions of free agency in the case of every adult man or woman, from whose consciousness alone we can gather the facts from which to deduce any certain knowledge on the subject. Every man who ever thought or wrote upon this subject, was conscious of freedom only under the conditions of an already formed moral character. Even if the Pelagian view were true, we never could be assured of it, since we never have consciously experienced such a condition of indifferency. It is nothing more than an hypothe- sis, contrived to solve a difficulty ; a difficulty resulting from the limits of our finite powers of thought. — See Sir William Hamil- ton's " Discussions," p. 587, etc.
CHAPTER XV.
COVENANT OF WORKS,
1. In what different senses is the term covenant used in Scripture ?
1st. For a natural ordinance, Jer. xxxiii., 20.
2d. For an unconditional promise. Gen. ix., 11, 12.
3d. For a conditional promise, Is. i., 19, 20.
4th. A dispensation or mode of administration, Heb. viii., 6-9.
For the usage with respect to the Greek term dcaOrjur], usually translated in our version testament and covenant. — See Chapter XIX., on " Covenant of Grace/' question 1.
In the theological phrases " covenant of works," and " cove- nant of grace/' this term is used in the third sense of a promise suspended on conditions.
2. What are the several elements essential to a covenant ?
1st. Contracting parties. 2d. Conditions. These conditions in a covenant between equals are mutually imposed and mutu- ally binding, but in a sovereign constitution, imposed by the Creator upon the creature, these " conditions" are better expressed as (1.) promises on the part of the Creator suspended upon (2.) conditions to be fulfilled by the creature. And (3.) an alterna- tive penalty to be inflicted in case the condition fails.
3. Show that the constitution under which Adam tuas placed by God at his creation may be rightly called a covenant.
The inspired record of God's transactions with Adam presents definitely all the essential elements of a covenant as coexisting in that constitution.
1st. The " contracting parties/' (1.) God, the moral Governor,
ITS PAKTIES. 229
by necessity of nature and relation demanding perfect conformity to moral law. (2.) Adam, the free moral agent, by necessity of nature and relation under the inalienable obligation of moral law.
2d. The " promises," life and favor, Matt, xix., 16, 17 ; Gal. iii., 12.
3d. The "conditions" upon which the promises were sus- pended, perfect obedience, in this instance subjected to a special test, that of abstaining from the fruit of the " tree of knowledge."
4th. The " alternative penalty." " In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," Gen. ii., 16, 17.
This constitution is called a covenant, Hosea, vi., 7.
4. How is it defined in our standards ?
Con. Faith, Chap. IV., Sec. 2 ; Chap. VII., Sec. 1 and 2 ; Chap. XIX., Sec. 1 ; L. Cat., Q. 20 ; S. Cat., Q. 12.
5. Why is it called the Covenant of Works ?