86 THE EEASON OF FAITH. [BOOK VI., PAET I.
and have fortuitous events, or such as, from a concatenation of ante- cedent causes, are fatally necessary, and are not disposed by an in- finitely wise, unerring, holy jDrovidence. And this also is directly contradictory unto the first principles and notions of natural light ; whereby it openly proclaims itself not to be an effect of reason in its clue exercise, but a mere delusion.
So if any pretend unto revelations by faith which are contradic- tory unto the first principles of natural light or reason, in its proper exercise about its proper objects, it is a delusion. On this ground the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation is justly rejected; for it proposeth that as a revelation by faith which is expressly contradic- tory unto our sense and reason, in their proper exercise about their proper objects. And a supposition of the possibility of any such thing would make the ways whereby God reveals and makes known himself to cross and interfere one with another; which would leave us no certainty in any thing, divine or human.
But yet as these means of divine revelation do harmonize and perfectly agree one with the other, sothey are not objectively equal, or equally extensive, nor are they co-ordinate, but subordinate unto one another. Wherefore, there are many things discernible by rea- son in its exercise which do not appear unto the first principles of natural light. So the sober philosophers of old attained unto many true and great conceptions of God and the excellencies of his nature, above what they arrived unto who either did not or could not culti- vate and improve the principles of natural light in the same manner as they did. It is, therefore, folly to pretend that things so made known of God are not infallibly true and certain, because they are not obvious unto the first conceptions of natural light, without the due exercise of reason, provided they are not contradictory thereunto. And there are many things revealed unto faith that are above and beyond the comprehension of reason in the best and utmost of its most proper exercise: such are all the principal mysteries of Chris- tian religion. And it is the height of folly to reject them, as some do, because they are not discernible and comprehensible by reason, seeing they are not contradictory thereunto. Wherefore, these ways of God's revelation of himself are not equally extensive or commen- surate, but are so subordinate one unto another that what is want- ing unto the one is supposed by the other, unto the accomplishment of the whole and entire end of divine revelation; and the truth of God is the same in them all.
(1.) The revelation which God makes of himself in the first way, by the inbred principles of natural light, doth sufficiently and in- fallibly evidence itself to be from him; it doth it in, unto, and by those principles themselves. This revelation of God is infallible, the
CHAP. VI.] THE NATURE OF DIVINE REVELATIONS. 87
assent unto it is infallible, which the infallible evidence it gives of itself makes to be so. We dispute not now what a few atheistical sceptics pretend unto, whose folly hath been sufficiently detected by others. ' All the sobriety that is in the world consents in this, that the light of the knowledge of God, in and by the inbred principles of our minds and consciences, doth sufficiently, uncontrollably, and infallibly manifest itself to be from him; and that the mind neither is nor can be possibly imposed on in its apprehensions of that nature. And if the first dictates of reason concerning God do not evidence themselves to be from God, they are neither of any use nor force; for they are not capable of being confirmed by external arguments, and what is written about them is to show their force and evidence, not to give them any. Wherefore, this first way of God's revelation of himself unto us is infallible, and infallibly evidenceth itself in our minds, according to the capacity of our natures.
(2.) The revelation that God maketh of himself by the ivories of creation and providence unto our reason in exercise, or the facul- ties of our souls as discursive, concluding rationally one thing from another, doth sufficiently, yea, infallibly, evidence and demonstrate itself to be from him, so that it is impossible we should be deceived therein. It doth not do so unto the inbred principles of natural light, unless they are engaged in a rational exercise about the means of the revelation made. That is, we must rationally consider the works of God, both of creation aftd providence, or we cannot learn by them what God intends to reveal of himself. 'And in our doing so we cannot be deceived ; for " the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead," Rom. i. 20. They are clearly seen, and therefore may be perfectly understood as to what they teach of God, without any possibility of mistake. And wherever men do not receive the revelation intended in the way intended, that is, do not certainly conclude that what God teaches by his works of creation and providence, — namely, his eternal power and Godhead, with the essential properties thereof, infinite wisdom, goodness, righteousness, and the like, — is certainly and infallibly so, believing it accordingly, it is not from any defect in the revelation, or its self-evidencing efficacy, but only from the depraved, vicious habits of their minds, their enmity against God, and dislike of him. And so the apostle saith that they who rejected or improved not the revelation of God did it " because they did not like to retain God in their knowledge/' Rom. i. 28 ; for which cause God did so severely revenge their natural unbelief, as is there expressed. See Isa. xlvi. 8, xliv. 19, 20. That which I principally insist on from hence is, that the revelation which God makes of himself, by the works of