88 THE REASON OF FAITH. [BOOK VI., PART I.
creation and providence, doth not evince itself unto the first prin- ciples of natural light, so as that an assent should be given thereunto, without the actual exercise of reason, or the discursive faculty of our minds about them, but thereunto it doth infallibly evidence it- self. So may the Scripture have, and hath, a self-evidencing efficacy, though this appear not unto the light of first natural principles, no, nor to bare reason in its exercise ; for, —
(3.) Unto our faith God reveals himself by the Scripture, or his word, which he hath magnified above all his name, Ps. cxxxviii. 2 ; that is, implanted in it more characters of himself and his properties than in any other way whereby he revealeth or maketh himself known unto us. And this revelation of God by his word, we con- fess, is not sufficient nor suited to evidence itself unto the light of nature, or the first principles of our understanding, so that, by bare proposal of it to be from God, we should by virtue of them imme- diately assent unto it, as men assent unto self-evident natural prin- ciples, as that the part is less than the whole, or the like. Nor doth it evidence itself unto our reason, in its mere natural exercise, as that by virtue thereof we can demonstratively conclude that it is from God, and that what is declared therein is certainly and infallibly true. It hath, indeed, such external evidences accompanying it as make a great impression on reason itself; but the power of our, souls whereunto it is proposed is that whereby we can give an assent unto the truth upon the testimony of the proposer, whereof we have no other evidence. And this is the principal and most noble faculty and power of our nature. There is an instinct in brute creatures that hath some resemblance unto our inbred natural principles, and they will act that instinct, improved by experience, into a great like- ness of reason in its exercise, although it be not so; but as unto the power or facidty of giving an assent unto things on witness or testimony, there is nothing in the nature of irrational creatures that hath the least shadow of it or likeness unto it. And if our souls did want but this one faculty of assenting unto truth upon testimony, all that remains would not be sufficient to conduct us through the affairs of this natural life. This, therefore, being the most noble faculty of our minds is that whereunto the highest way of divine revelation is proposed.
That our minds, in this especial case, to make our assent to be according unto the mind of God, and such as is required of us in a way of duty, are to be prepared and assisted by the Holy Ghost, we have declared and proved before. On this supposition, the reve- lation which God makes of himself by his word doth no less evidence itself unto our minds, in the exercise of faith, to be from him, or gives no less infallible evidence as a ground and reason why we
CHAP. VI.J THE NATURE OF DIVINE REVELATIONS. 89
should believe it to be from him, than his revelation of himself by the works of creation and providence doth manifest itself unto our minds in the exercise of reason to be from him, nor with less assur- ance than what we assent unto in and by the dictates of natural light. And when God revealeth himself, — that is, his "eternal power and Godhead," — by " the things that are made," the works of crea- tion, "the heavens declaring his glory, and the firmament showing his handywork," the reason of men, stirred up and brought into exercise thereby, doth infallibly conclude, upon the evidence that is in that revelation, that there is a God, and he eternally powerful and wise, without any farther arguments to prove the revelation to be true. So when God by his word reveals himself unto the minds of men, there- by exciting and bringing forth faith into exercise, or the power of the soul to assent unto truth upon testimony, that revelation doth no less infallibly evidence itself to be divine or from God, without any ex- ternal arguments to prove it so to be. If I shall say unto a man that the sun is risen and shineth on the earth, if he question or deny it, and ask how I shall prove it, it is a sufficient answer to say that it manifesteth itself 'in and by its own light. And if he add that this is no proof to him, for he doth not discern it ; suppose that to be so, it is a satisfactory answer to tell him that he is blind ; and if he be not so, that it is to no purpose to argue with him who contradicts his own sense, for he leaves no ride whereby what is spoken may be tried or judged on. And if I tell a man that the "heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handywork," or that the " invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made/' and he shall demand how I prove it, it is a sufficient answer to say that these things, in and by themselves, do manifest unto the reason of every man, in its due and proper exercise, that there is an eternal, in- finitely wise and powerful Being, by whom they were caused, pro- duced, and made; so as that whosoever knoweth how to use and exercise his reasonable faculty in the consideration of them, their original, order, nature, and use, must necessarily conclude that so it is. If he shall say that it doth not so appear unto him that the being of God is so revealed by them, it is a sufficient reply, in case he be so indeed, to say he is phrenetic, and hath not the use of his reason; and if he be not so, that he argues in express contradiction unto his own reason, as may be demonstrated. This the heathen philo- sophers granted. " Quid enim potest," saith Cicero, " esse tarn aper- tum, tamque perspicuum, cum ccelum suspeximus, ccelestiaque con- templati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimse mentis, quo haec regantur? .... Quod qui dubitet, haud sane intelligo cur non idem, sol sit, an nullus sit, dubitare possit," De Natura Deor. lib. ii. 2.