1, That God accepteth of the punishment of Christ as a creditor accepteth of his due debt, when he spares not the debtor, but re- quires the uttennost farthing. It is true of puni.shment, as punish- ment, there is no creditor properly; for, " Dclicta puniri publico in- terest." But this punishment being considered also as a price, as it is, 1 Cor. vi. 20, it must be paid to the hands of some creditor, as this was into the hands of God ; whence Christ is said to come to do God's Avill, Heb. X. 9, and to satisfy him, as John vi. 38. Neither, indeed, do the arguments that some have used to prove that God, as a creditor,
ARGUMENTS AGAINST UNIVERSAL REDEMPTION. 271
cannot inflict punishment, nor yet by virtue of supreme dominion, seem to me of any great weight. Divers I find urged by liim whose great skill in the law, and such terms as these, might well give him sanctuary from such weak examiners as myself] but he that hath so foully betrayed the truth of God in other things, and corrupted his word, deserves not our assent in any thing but what by evidence of reason is extorted. Let us, then, see what there is of that in this which we have now in hand : —
First, then, he tells us that " The right of punishing in the rector or lawgiver can neither be a right of absolute dominion nor a right of a creditor; because these things belong to him, and are exercised for his own sake, who hath them, but the right of punishing is for the good of community."
Ans. Refer this reason unto God, which is the aim of it, and it will appear to be of no value; for we deny that there is any thing in him or done by him primarily for the good of any but himself. His aWdp-Aticc, or self-sufficiency, will not allov/ that he should do any thing with an ultimate respect to any thing but himself And whereas he saith that the right of punishing is for the good of com- munity, we answer, that " bonum universi," the good of community, is the glory of God, and that only. So that these things inliim cannot be distinguished.
Secondly, He addeth, " Punishment is not in and for itself desir- able, but only for community's sake. Now, the right of dominion and the right of a creditor are things in themselves expetible and desir- able, without the consideration of any public aim."
Ans. First, That the comparison ought not to be between punish- ment and the right of dominion, but between the right of punish- ment and the right of dominion ; the fact of one is not to be com- pared with the right of the other.
Secondly, God desireth nothing, neither is there any thing desir- able to him, but only for himself To suppose a good desirable to God for its own sake is intolerable
Thirdly, There be some acts of supreme dominion, in themselves and for their own sake, as little desirable as any act of punishment ; as the annihilation of an innocent creature, which Grotius will not deny but that God may do.
Thirdly, He proceedeth, " Any one may, without any wrong, go off from the right of supreme dominion or creditorship ; but the Lord cannot omit the act of pu)-i-''hment to some sins, as of the impeni- tent."
Ans. God may, by virtue ot hi.'^ supreme dominion, omit punisli- raent without any wrong or prejudice to his justice. It is as great a thing to impute sin where it is not, and to inflict punishment upon that imputation, as not to impute sin where it is, and to remove or
272 THE DEATH OF DEATH. [BOOK III.
not to inflict punishment upon that non-imputation. Now, the first of these God did towards Christ; and, therefore, he may do the latter.
Secondly, The wrong or injustice of not punishing any sin or sins doth not arise from any natural ol)ligation, but the consideration of an affirmative positive act of God's will, whereby he hath purposed that he will do it.
Fourthly, He adds, " None can be called just for using his own right or lordship; but God is called just for punishing or not remit- ting sin," Rev. xvi. 5.
Ans. First, However it be in other causes, yet in this God may certainly be said to be just in exacting his debt or using his dominion, because his own will is the only rule of justice.
Secondly, We do not say 23unishing is an act of dominion, but an act of exacting a due debt; the requiring this of Christ in our stead supposing the interveiition of an act of supreme dominion.
Fifthly, His last reason is, " Because that virtue whereby one goeth off from his dominion or remitteth his debt, is liberality ; but that virtue whereby a man abstaineth from punishing is clemenc}': so that pimishment can be no act of exacting a debt or acting a do- minion."
Ans. The virtue whereby a man goeth off from the exacting of that which is due, universally considered, is not always liberality; for, as Grotius himself confesseth, a debt may arise and accrue to any by the injury of his fame, credit, or name, by a lie, slander, or otherwise. Now, that virtue whereby a man is moved not to exact payment by way of reparation, is not in this case liberality, but either clemency, or that grace of the gospel for which moralists have no name; and so it is with every party offended, so often as he hath a right of requiring punishment from his offender, which yet he doth not. So that, notwithstanding these exceptions, this is eminently seen in this business of satisfixction, — that God, as a creditor, doth exactly require the payment of the debt by the way of punishment.